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Prologue
On June 28,1914, in the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo, an assassin's bullet
precipitated a chain of events with unforeseen and dramatic results for
the destinies of the United States and Great Britain. The great war
unleashed by this event accelerated an important trend in international
affairs: the replacement of Great Britain by the United States as the
world's greatest power.
Britain declared war on Germany on August 4. No British soldiers
had fought in Western Europe since Waterloo, but Britain committed
its small, elite fighting force to the Continental war. At the center of
this decision was the fear of what German domination of Europe
would mean, not only for the British Isles but for the British Empire as
well. A fundamental issue was whether Britain would survive as a
great imperial power.
The British Continental commitment was made easier by the
widely held belief that the war would be short. Whatever the duration
of the conflict, however, Britain's leaders anticipated with few excep-
tions that their country's primary role would be in finance, as an
arsenal for the Allies, and as the world's premier naval power. It
seemed unimaginable that direct involvement in the land war would
eventually lead to the deployment of the greatest armed force in one
theater in the country's history. Nevertheless, by the summer and fall
of 1917, British and Dominion forces constituted the mainstay of the
land war against the Imperial Germany Army.
America's part in the war was even more surprising. Forced to
abandon its neutrality and its tradition of noninvolvement in Euro-
pean affairs, the United States was drawn into a collective military
effort against Berlin. When the war ended, General John J. Pershing
commanded the largest force in American history. The two English-
speaking democracies, fighting on foreign soil, possessed the two best
armies and fleets on the globe. At a frightful cost to their economy and
manpower, the British had kept the western front intact in 1917,
absorbed the initial blows of the 1918 Germany offensives, and played
the leading role in the Allied counterattacks that began in August. For
its part, the United States, having achieved global economic ascen-
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dancy during the war, was on the verge of dominating the battlefields
of Western Europe. The battle-initiated yet still fresh American Expe-
ditionary Force in November was destined to become the army of the
future if the war continued into 1919.
The Armistice represented a great triumph for democracy and lib-
eral values in international affairs. The United States and Great Britain
appeared to have the opportunity to make and enforce a peace based
on their shared liberalism and faith in parliamentary government. Yet
though they were joined by their common sacrifices and their essential
agreement on many war objectives, the tension between the American
and British political and military leadership over the development and
manner of employment of an American expeditionary force in Western
Europe boded ill for any Anglo-American world order.
The impact of America's military role on British war policy and
imperial defense strategy has been largely ignored by British histo-
rians. As for U.S. employment of armed force in Western Europe, most
American historians have followed the lead of Foster Rhea Dulles, who
moves immediately from the end of American neutrality to peace-
making in his volume in the New American Nation Series, America's
Rise to World Power, 1898-1954.1 Scholars who have written on Anglo-
American relations during the period of cobelligerency have examined
subjects secondary to the war against the Imperial Germany Army.
Anglo-American war aims, Britain's growing financial dependency
upon the United States, commercial and maritime rivalry, and the
Anglo-American reaction to the emergence of Communism in Russia
have been thoroughly scrutinized.2 Anglo-American relations in the
context of military operations, however, have not received the atten-
tion they deserve. Only David F. Trask, who has examined President
Woodrow Wilson's efforts to harmonize political and military objec-
tives in the European war, as well as Anglo-American naval relations,
1917-18, has analyzed the power and political aspects of America's
extra-Continental activity.3
It is not my intention to duplicate Trask's account of the maritime
front or to parallel his pioneer examination of the American role in the
Supreme War Council. Nor is this binational study written from either
a British or an American point of view. Rather, it attempts to address
Anglo-American relations in the collective military effort without em-
bracing the perspective of either side. Based on extensive research in
the recent literature and in American and British archives, this volume
investigates the political and military aspects of the origins, nature,
and course of Anglo-American cobelligerency. Unpublished sources
provide a fresh perspective for the continuing idealist-realist debate in
international affairs. Emphasis is given to the war leadership of David
Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson, the two most powerful political
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figures in the world during the last phase of the war. In broad terms,
this book also serves as a historical case study of the inevitable tension
between national self-interest and efforts at collective security, even
among powers who share so many common cultural and political
values.
1
From Rapprochement to the
House-Grey Memorandum
The roots of cobelligerency with its underlying tension can be traced to
the Anglo-American rapprochement that developed from 1898 to 1914
as America entered the world stage. Throughout much of the nine-
teenth century, international trends had favored both Britain and the
United States over all other powers. The defeat of Napoleon and the
1814-15 peace settlement created a rare equilibrium in Europe, and
Britain's supremacy on the high seas served to shelter both countries
from any realistic threat of invasion. Both consequently enjoyed the
luxury of maintaining limited peacetime land forces. Britain refused to
embrace the mass conscript army that all great European powers
possessed, relying instead on a small professional force. The United
States, which had momentarily been the world's greatest land power
at the end of its Civil War in 1865, maintained at the turn of the century
an army more suitable to a Portugal or a Norway than to a great world
power.
Without a serious rival on the world scene for most of the nine-
teenth century, Britain continued to add to its vast empire. On the eve
of World War I, Britain had an empire 140 times its own size, con-
stituting almost a quarter of the earth's land surface; some 400,000,000
people at home and abroad were the subjects of George V.
The world map with portions of every continent colored in British
red, however, belied Britain's real position at the beginning of the new
century. It is true that Britain in absolute terms was the world's
premier power if measured by its fleet, financial resources, industrial
capacity, trade, and colonies.1 But fundamental trends in the interna-
tional situation no longer favored Britain. Industrialization in countries
such as Germany, the United States, and Japan created powerful
commercial competitors. Japan built a world-class navy and embarked
on an expansionist policy in Asia; French overseas expansion, es-
pecially in Africa, at times threatened British holdings; Russian impe-
rial designs often collided with British interests in such areas as Persia,
India, and the Far East. Germany, with its determination to build a
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battle fleet that would challenge Britain's and its aggressive policies in
Europe and abroad, came to represent the greatest threat after 1905.
Consequently, Britain was forced to shift its attention increasingly to
European affairs, forming the Triple Entente with France and Russia.
The nation's naval strength was concentrated in home waters, and a
rapid deployment force—the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), capa-
ble of a limited role in any European war—was created.
As British policy became increasingly "defensive" in nature,
Washington and London drew closer. Of all the emerging powers the
United States seemed most benign to British vital interests. Through-
out much of the nineteenth century, Washington had divorced mili-
tary policy from its foreign policies. Safe from any real foreign threat,
the United States was able to make a virtue out of military weakness
both before and after the costly Civil War. Even after it extended its
influence overseas around the turn of the century—acquiring territo-
ries and protectorates in the Caribbean; expanding across the Pacific
with the acquisition of Hawaii, Wake, Guam, Samoa, and the Philip-
pine Islands; and taking an activist role in China—American pol-
icymakers established no real connection between these new foreign
commitments and their country's ability to uphold them. Nor did
American leaders believe that the nature of their expansionism, de-
spite its paternalistic disregard for the national sentiment of the colo-
nial peoples, could be compared to British or European imperialism.
In one sense American expansion was different: America was a
satisfied nation with no emotional or strategical need for additional
territory. Its colonies were not considered permanent; rather, they
were thought of as temporary dependencies to be "civilized" before
being given their independence. It is significant that the United States
was the one major power that began and finished World War I without
any intention of annexing territory.2
America's construction of a modern fleet even seemed to work to
Britain's advantage. Unable to disperse its own fleet to every latitude
of the globe, London began to turn over to the United States the
responsibility of protecting the Western Hemisphere. Another advan-
tage of this informal entente was that the United States, with the
notable exception of its difficulties with Japan, pursued policies in the
decade before the war that did not threaten to entangle Britain in a
dispute with another great power. Equally, from the American point of
view, the growing friendship between the Atlantic powers appeared to
involve no potential military obligations for the United States beyond
the Western Hemisphere.
An extremely important factor in the Anglo-American rapproche-
ment was the prevailing British perspective that the United States was
an Anglo-Saxon cousin—a cousin, incidentally, who had grown from
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an infant with a population of three million at independence to a giant
of almost a hundred million by 1914. Never mind the legacy of Amer-
ican distrust of Britain and the ethnic diversity of the American popula-
tion. The United States, A.E. Campbell has written, "was treated as a
branch of the British Empire which, owing to a regrettable misunder-
standing, had broken away and achieved political independence in the
past."3
The British frequently assumed too much in their relationship with
the United States because of language, economic ties, and a common
culture and history. Modest American expansionist tendencies, writes
P.A.R. Calvert, were considered "with a certain sense of paternal
pride" as "a predictable stage of development of a power stemming
from British origins."4 American innovation and technical success,
though feared for their threat to British economic well-being, were
similarly accepted as manifestations of the Anglo-Saxon race's ge-
nius.5 Joseph Chamberlain, the pro-American colonial secretary at the
turn of the century, included his American "cousins" when he as-
serted: "I believe in this race, the greatest governing race the world
has ever seen; in this Anglo-Saxon race, so proud, tenacious, self-
confident and determined, this race which neither climate nor change
can degenerate, which will infallibly be the predominant force of
future history and universal civilisation."6
Avner Offer's thought-provoking study has shown that the
United States was a decisive dimension in London's prewar strategic
thinking about the rising German threat. "The real assets of British
security," he argues, "were the bonds and resources of the English-
speaking world overseas: economic, social, political, sentimental,
forming a complex but effective system of practical kinship."7 This
emphasis on the superiority and brotherhood of the Anglo-Saxon
race, which was echoed by Theodore Roosevelt and many other
Americans, especially in urban areas on the east coast, contributed to
British misconceptions about the part that the United States was
prepared to play in a war with Germany. The historical and cultural
bond between the two countries was to a large degree responsible
for the generally pro-British tilt of the American public while their
country remained officially neutral. But a wide chasm often existed
between the military and civilian leaders of both countries; conflict-
ing national goals and perceptions were differences that could not
be bridged by considerations of racial kinship. In reality, the im-
proved political relationship between London and Washington prior
to 1914 had been largely one-sided: the British granted concessions
without receiving anything in return. "In hard diplomatic coin,"
Bradford Perkins has observed, "the Americans took but they did
not give."8
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On the eve of World War I, British and American world views on
the employment of force and the balance-of-power politics in defense
of national interests were in sharp contrast.9 The experiences of the
nineteenth century had ill prepared American statesmen to confront
the turbulent new century that ended British domination of the seas
and destroyed the balance of power in Europe, the two conditions—
other than geography—that had most protected American borders
from foreign threat in the nineteenth century. The political struggles of
Europe were seen as alien to American interests. For Americans,
"isolationism had come to reflect not a favorable geographic position
and a satisfactory international equilibrium," Norman Graebner has
astutely observed, "but a superior morality."10 As the "world's major
satisfied nation," the United States was the leading proponent of
peaceful means such as arbitration to resolve conflicts between na-
tions. If the American position were to be accepted, it "would guaran-
tee the country its international advantages without the necessity of
war or extensive military preparations."11 In sum, America on the eve
of World War I aspired to have its world influence match its unques-
tioned economic power without assuming the inevitable international
responsibilities that would ensue and without developing the military
means necessary to support a global policy. That the success of Amer-
ican foreign objectives in the twentieth century would depend in large
part on its willingness and ability to use force may appear obvious to
many students of American diplomacy since 1914. But such a view was
clearly at odds with the prewar thinking of America's foreign policy
elite, which rejected power politics. And why not? Virtual disarma-
ment and isolation from European conflicts had served both the na-
tion's interests and its ideals in the past and apparently would do so in
the future.
It was President Woodrow Wilson's fate to confront a world pic-
ture very different from that viewed by his predecessors. Not since
1812 had the international situation been so threatening to the United
States. Shortly before he took the oath of office on March 3, 1913, he
made a much-quoted remark to a friend: "It would be the irony of fate if
my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs."12 Wilson
certainly expressed a legitmate concern, his previous scholarly inquiry
had given almost no attention to foreign affairs. As the war clouds
grew over Europe, Wilson paid them little or no heed. Before the war,
as Arthur Link, his most authoritative biographer, has noted, Wilson
"spoke and acted as if foreign problems did not exist."13 Because
Wilson paid fleeting attention to the Spanish-American war, even for a
time enthusiastically advocating American overseas expansion, this
view has been challenged, but it remains correct in its essentials. The
voluminous Wilson papers demonstrate that the new president, dur-
Trial by Friendship
Woodrow Wilson and French president Raymond Poincare in December
1918. Courtesy of Special Collections, U.S. Army Military History Institute.
ing the decade before he entered the White House, had had almost
nothing to say or write about foreign affairs.
Wilson's reaction to the outbreak of war mirrored those of his
countrymen: this European civil war, though it soon spread to other
corners of the world from Mesopotamia to East Africa to the Shantung
province in China, was not the business of Americans. As the local
conflict in the Balkans between Austria-Hungary and Serbia threat-
ened to involve the other great European powers, the president told
reporters on July 27: "The United States has never attempted to inter-
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fere in European affairs."14 Wilson, however, apparently decided not
to define an offer of American mediation of the European conflict as
interference: he made an ineffectual attempt on August 4, after the war
had begun, to employ the good offices of United States as a go-
between for peace.
Britain's decision to deploy the British Expeditionary Force on the
European continent to prevent a Germany victory over France altered
Wilson's views on American neutrality not one iota. He greatly ad-
mired British political institutions and, like many other Americans,
felt most at home abroad when visiting the British Isles. But though
he was privately more sympathetic to the British than to the Ger-
mans, he did not share the British view that Germany was the
aggressor nation and must be soundly defeated to preserve future
peace.15 To Wilson's way of thinking, America's and humanity's
interests would best be served by a draw. He told a journalist in
December 1914 that the best chance of "a just and equitable peace, and
of the only possible peace that will be lasting, will be happiest if no
nation gets the decision by arms; and the danger of an unjust peace,
one that will be sure to invite further calamities, will be if some one
nation or group of nations succeeds in enforcing its will upon the
others."16
To prevent the United States from becoming entangled in the
European conflict, he cautioned his countrymen to be "impartial in
thought as well as in action," to be "a nation that neither sits in
judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and which
keeps herself fit and free to do what is necessary and disinterested and
truly serviceable for the peace of the world."17
Wilson's approach to the global crisis was shaped first and fore-
most by what Link has called his Christian idealism. The son, grand-
son, and nephew of Presbyterian ministers, Wilson was a devout
Christian. When in residence at the White House, he never missed a
Sunday service at the Central Presbyterian Church. His Christian
ethics provided his sense of right and wrong in foreign relations; he
believed that nations no less than individuals should be guided by the
moral teachings of Christ.18 Wilson also had a strong faith in de-
mocracy, was optimistic about human nature, and believed with a
crusader's zeal that the United States had a mission to lead the world
away from world empires, armed alliances, and balance-of-power
politics to a new world order based on law and universal values. To the
world's most satisfied power, of course, these objectives promised to
enhance national interests with virtually no sacrifice. In an interna-
tional system of democracies based on the rule of law, the United
States, with its rapidly growing population and an industry that was
on the verge of outproducing all the European states added together,19
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would become the dominant power of the twentieth century without
the implicit dangers of militarism.
His pursuit of American national self-interest while he also cham-
pioned the interests of humanity has led to considerable disagreement
about Wilson's motives, which indeed were often more complex than
they sometimes appeared at the time. Part of the confusion in London
about his policies stemmed from his subtle mind, his aloofness, and
especially the mixed signals emanating from the men who were ex-
pected to inform him on British policy and faithfully represent his
views to the British government. In Anglo-American relations, Wilson
was primarily advised by Robert Lansing, who had become secretary
of state following the resignation of William Jennings Bryan in
mid-1915; Walter Hines Page, the American ambassador in London;
and Colonel Edward M. House, his alter ego and closest adviser.
Unlike the president, these Anglophiles were concerned with the dire
strategic consequences to the United States should Germany triumph
over Britain. In contrast to most of their countrymen, they recognized
that America's security in large part rested on retaining amicable
Anglo-American relations and preventing Germany from dominating
the European continent. Of the three men, House unquestionably
enjoyed the most influence with the president in strategic questions
and relations with Great Britain, particularly after the United States
entered the war in April 1917. Lansing, a realist in foreign affairs,
provided Wilson with legal justifications for the use of force.20 But his
basic incompatibility with the president placed him increasingly on the
fringes of vital questions in Anglo-American relations once America
entered the war. Page's strong pro-British sentiments eventually cost
him Wilson's confidence, to the extent that the president refused even
to read his cables from London.
House's intimate relationship with the president and consequent
influence in foreign affairs declined after Wilson remarried. Edith
Boiling Gait over time replaced the colonel in the president's affec-
tions.21 On geopolitical and strategic questions and relations with the
British, however, House retained his dominance, in considerable part
because of an extraordinary breakdown in ambassadorial relations
between London and Washington.22 By persuading the president (not
without some justification) that Page and the irascible and nervous
British ambassador in Washington, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, were incapa-
ble of competently representing Wilsonian views, House increasingly
made himself the essential link between London and Washington.
The Wilson-House relationship remains one of the most contro-
versial partnerships in American foreign affairs.23 An honorary Texas
colonel, House was small in stature, stylishly dressed, wealthy, and
cosmopolitan. As the president's special representative he achieved
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intimacy with many British leaders through his self-effacing and in-
gratiating ways. By collecting and swapping information, he helped
shape the president's perceptions of the British government. Unfor-
tunately, he often heard only what he wanted to hear. Certainly his
diary provides an unreliable record of his conversations with Wilson
and foreign statesmen.24 Many of the entries seem to have been
written to justify his own views on international events. An un-
suspecting Wilson believed that House had no political ambitions but
only wanted to serve as the president's instrument in achieving a new
order in international affairs. "All he wants to do is to serve the
common cause and to help me and others," Wilson once wrote of his
adviser.25
This was not true. The president's almost total and essentially
remote control of American policy afforded House, with his ready
access to the Oval Office, the opportunity to achieve his ulterior
objectives. In 1911-12 he had written anonymously a novel in which one
Philip Dru, an enlightened dictator of the United States, created a
world peace league through cooperation with Great Britain.26 "Worst
of all, in his near mystical identification of Wilson with Philip Dru,"
John Milton Cooper has astutely noted, "House spun fantasies that
loosened his grip on reality. Often he did not realize how badly he
misrepresented situations or how desperately he was seeking to em-
body his dreams through Wilson and others."27
No previous American leader had ever had such great global
responsibilities thrust upon him as Wilson, and no other president has
assumed a decisive international role with such detachment. "The
President lives enveloped in mystery and there are strange stories of
the difficulty which is encountered by anyone even in the highest
position who desires to have access to him," wrote Spring Rice in
describing Wilson's aloofness to his government.28 Wilson the presi-
dent resembled Wilson the introverted university professor in making
difficult decisions in foreign affairs. His favorite retreat in the White
House, his second-story private study, certainly had the appearance of
a professor's office. His desk was stacked with papers and books; a
portable Corona typewriter, with which he personally triple-spaced
many important diplomatic notes, rested in the corner. Before reach-
ing a decision, it was his habit to retire to this study to reflect. Slow to
make up his mind, he stubbornly clung to decisions made. He did not
read widely in newspapers, and his circle of advisers was small.
Confident of his judgment, he often relied on his own principles and
instincts. His chief source of information for Anglo-American relations
was House, who at critical times, although not always intentionally,
did not accurately represent either the president's or the British posi-
tion. The result was that neither Wilson nor the British government
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had a consistently correct reading of the other's intentions when
House served as the conduit of diplomatic exchange.
British leaders, who were not without experience in clothing their
country's self-interest in moralistic terms, expected sympathy, if not
outright support, from their Atlantic cousins in the war against Ger-
man expansionism. Prime Minister Herbert H. Asquith pledged his
government to the destruction of the "military domination of Prussia"
soon after the war began. The British leadership then and later be-
lieved that the great sacrifices of Britain and its empire would have
been in vain if the German leadership were not taught that military
adventurism did not pay. An unrepentant Germany would continue to
threaten the European equilibrium and menace Britain's global posi-
tion. Statements in this vein were made repeatedly in their inner
councils of war during any discussions of peace. The destruction of
German militarism (easier to condemn than to find a practical means to
end, as the outbreak of another world war was to demonstrate) con-
stituted Britain's major objective in Europe, surpassing even the libera-
tion of Belgium. Outside of Europe the British linked world stability
with the preservation of the British Empire. They took for granted that
their world leadership "conduced to the general welfare and they felt
that all Americans should be able to perceive this obvious fact unless
blinded by prejudice."29
Wilson, however, did not identify British interests with those of
the United States. German U-boats increasingly forced him to take a
stand against Berlin to protect American lives at sea, but he remained
determined to keep the United States out of the war. As the fighting
continued into 1916 with no end in sight, Wilson became bolder in his
efforts to mediate the conflict as a means of keeping his country from
becoming entangled in the European hostilities. Foreign Secretary Sir
Edward Grey, representing the dominant school among British states-
men who believed that present and future British national security
depended upon an Anglo-American partnership, was prepared to go
quite far in appeasing Wilson. But Grey insisted that if peace negotia-
tions were successful, the United States should continue to play a
responsible international role through participation in an international
organization that would foster disarmament and peace.30 Grey was
realistic in his concern that America might not prove to be a reliable
partner on the international stage after the war. There was a real
danger that the United States might turn its back on Europe with the
restoration of peace. Given Wilson's desire to shape any peace settle-
ment along the lines of his revolutionary world views, however, the
immediate danger was that he would prevent the achievement of a
peace that satisfied Britain's vital interests.
On February 17, 1916, Grey and House drafted and initialed in
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London the controversial House-Grey Memorandum, which seemed
to promise American entry into the war on Britain's side if Germany
refused to participate in peace discussions or proved unreasonable
once brought to the peace table. In his eagerness to end the war
through mediation, House, as Wilson's special emissary, was less than
forthright with both Grey and his president. He convinced the British
foreign secretary that Wilson was prepared to "intervene on the side of
the Allies" if Germany proved to be intransigent.31 On the other hand,
House seriously misrepresented London's willingness to accept the
American definition of a favorable British peace at the beginning of
1916. House was not entirely to blame in this respect. British efforts to
avoid offending Wilson did not lead to straight talk on their part.
The House-Grey Memorandum forced the British leadership to
confront directly for the first time the consequences of what America's
participation in world politics might mean for the future security of the
British Empire. The desired outcome of peace discussions would be
American military cooperation, which might shorten the war. Al-
though confident of victory, the British were becoming concerned
about the heavy war burden being placed upon them. With significant
help from the Empire, Britain was now playing a central role in the
land war in Europe to preserve the anti-German coalition. France had
suffered horrendous losses in 1914-15. Russia had been thrown back
from the borders of East Prussia and driven from Poland. In south-
eastern Europe and the Near East, following the failure of the Dar-
danelles and Gallipoli ventures in 1915, the Central powers were
dominant.32
As 1916 began, the British government's adviser on grand strategy,
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir William Robertson,
exacted a general commitment (though final approval was not forth-
coming until early April) from his government to employ the largest
force that Britain had ever sent to any theater of operations in a massive
offensive on the western front. With fiscal, manpower, and industrial
resources already extended, the maintenance of this vast force on the
Continent further threatened to undermine the economy. "We have
reached a stage in the development of our resources," Robertson
warned the civilians, "when those requirements [to maintain the
army's manpower] can only be met by putting the same strain upon
the social and business life of the community as has long been borne in
France."33 Although further mobilization for total war might make
Britain financially dependent on the United States, the British felt that
they had no choice but to support their allies to the fullest as pay-
master, shipper, arsenal, and now major participant on the western
front.
Despite the apparent advantages of gaining America as a cobellig-
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erent, there were many dangers, not the least of which was the threat
posed by Wilson's peace program to the unity of the alliance and to
future British security. A British peace could not be obtained just by
preventing German hegemony on the Continent; the global threat
posed by Berlin's overseas possessions, which was of secondary inter-
est to Britain's European allies, also had to be removed.
In his discussions with the British leadership in January and Febru-
ary, House had seemed to offer a territorial settlement that left intact
Germany's overseas possessions, strengthened Berlin's position in
Eastern Europe, and left unchecked German influence in the Near
East. Moreover, Poland was to be freed from Russian domination,
perhaps ruled by a German prince, which in effect would mean the
"annexation of Russian Poland to Germany—an outcome that would
alienate tsarist Russia, whose contributions to the Allied cause were
immense. Berlin was also to be given all or part of Anatolia as "com-
pensation for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine."34 The British were to be
compensated by the liberation of Belgium.
What to Colonel House was a balanced peace was clearly a disaster
to the British. To be sure, they had initially gone to war in response to
Germany's invasion of Belgium, but that country's independence no
longer represented a satisfactory end to the war. To achieve a sound
peace, German militarists had to be taught a lesson, German expan-
sionism in the East thwarted, and the future security of the British
Empire secured through the elimination of Germany's colonies. Given
what is now known about the determination of both the civilian and
military leadership of Imperial Germany to become a world power,35
the American conception of a balanced settlement (in the unlikely
event that Germany accepted American terms) would have been detri-
mental to the long-range security of both Britain and the United States.
On balance, then, the opening of general peace negotiations threat-
ened to result, first, in a serious division of the anti-German coalition
over war aims and, second, a peace settlement that would leave an ex-
pansionist Germany unhumbled. And there remained the vital ques-
tion of whether the United States would join the anti-German coalition
if peace negotiations collapsed. Wilson's motives for peacemaking
were understandably suspect to many British leaders, although not
to Grey.36
The first official discussions of the House-Grey Memorandum took
place in the War Committee on February 22 and March 21 as the British
wrestled with the difficult choices required to achieve a favorable
British peace.37 Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchener raised a
central question: what if Berlin unexpectedly took a reasonable stance,
accepted Wilson's intervention to end the war, and agreed to the status
quo ante bellum? Reginald McKenna, chancellor of the exchequer, noted
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that "the Americans considered that the end of the war would be a
draw." In that case, Asquith retorted, a draw would be "much the
same as a defeat." Moreover, how could the British be certain that
Wilson's mediation efforts were not, in Asquith's words, "humbug,
and a mere manoeuvre of American politics?"38 Britain might be
walking into a trap. If peace negotiations began and Berlin would not
accept the original American formula, would Wilson really destroy his
chances for reelection by declaring war on Germany? "[Wilson]
might," Edwin S. Montagu, the Anglo-Jewish millionaire and Liberal
political leader, wrote Asquith on March 18, "with the best will in the
world be confronted by a demand for what might appear to him slight
modifications or the failure of the conference." 39 In that event British
security would almost certainly be sacrificed for Wilson's political
career. First Lord of the Admiralty Arthur Balfour, a champion of
Anglo-American ties, spoke for the British inner political leadership
with the exception of Grey when he said during the War Committee's
second discussion of the House-Grey Memorandum that the proposal
was at that time "not worth five minutes thought."40
Wilson's qualified promise to become Britain's ally in the event
that Germany blocked a negotiated settlement, however, tilted Amer-
ican policy in favor of the British and constituted an unneutral act. But
was he gambling for peace without the military resources or will to
back his bluff if it were called? The president naturally was concerned
with American domestic considerations and attentive to the over-
whelming American desire to remain distant from European affairs.41
He genuinely sought to open general peace negotiations not to involve
the United States in war but to protect American neutrality through a
negotiated settlement before his hand might be forced by events
beyond his control, such as Germany's campaign of undersea assault.
On March 24,1916, a German submarine attacked an unarmed French
passenger vessel, the Sussex, injuring several American passengers.
Wilson responded on April 18 by threatening a diplomatic rupture
with Germany unless Berlin restricted its use of submarine warfare.
The British, having broken the German code, were privy to what
Wilson told the German ambassador in Washington.42 They dared to
hope that German torpedoes might force Wilson to shift his attention
from achieving a balanced peace through mediation to seeking a
military victory over Germany.
On April 26 Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, attired in full dress
uniform, discussed German provocations with the American military
attache, Lieutenant Colonel George O. Squier, who was paying his
respects to the secretary of state for war before returning to the United
States. Kitchener, no doubt hoping that his words would influence the
American administration, spoke enthusiastically about the president's
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stern note, expressing the belief (which he surely did not actually hold)
that American intervention would bring the war to a close before the
end of 1916. Kitchener attempted to assure Squier that Britain, unlike
its allies, was "in this war solely on principle, and wants absolutely
nothing." With the "two English-speaking peoples working together
on broad principles," a "lasting peace" might be ensured. Kitchener
concluded his conversation with what must have been the first British
attempt to forge a special military relationship with the United States
and to involve American soldiers in Western Europe in the event of
American belligerency. "Tell your Secretary of War, if he will merely
send me a wire for any assistance that I can give, it will be given
immediately without the necessity of regular diplomatic channels." He
also suggested that American troops complete their training in France,
enabling them to enter combat "in the shortest possible time."43
Wilson almost certainly never read an account of this interview,
nor was he apparently shown by the War Department a paper pre-
pared at the beginning of April by American military and naval at-
taches in London and Paris and two American officers attached to the
BEF. These officers suggested that plans immediately be prepared for
the mobilization of American shipping to convey an American army to
Europe in the event of war.44 This astonishing though realistic pro-
posal was not considered at this time by the Joint Army and Navy
Board; America's military leadership was all too aware that the furthest
thought from the president's mind in April 1916 was sending American
forces to Europe. He had taken a tougher diplomatic stance with
Germany, in all likelihood, to promote his standing as a peace medi-
ator with the Allies. After the Germans gave an evasive response on
May 4, the so-called Sussex pledge, Wilson pressed the British to avail
themselves of the House-Grey Memorandum.
The British War Office, despite the soothing words of Kitchener,
remained adamantly opposed to a Wilsonian peace. When Wilson
pressed the British government in late May to take up the House-Grey
Memorandum, the Army Council, the governing board of the British
army that included Kitchener and Robertson among its members,
threatened resignation "if the War Committee insisted on an inquiry
into the peace question."45 With the BEF in the final stages of prepara-
tion for its great offensive on the Somme, the army leadership re-
mained optimistic about Britain's ability to defeat the German army.
Another vital consideration for the British civilian leadership con-
tinued to be America's apparent unwillingness to back its diplomacy
with force—or even to understand the need of coordinating national
goals with military policy. When House had discussed American
mediation with the inner circle of the British government, David Lloyd
George had emphasized the connection between a program of naval
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and military preparedness and the success of American diplomatic
efforts.46 What were the British to think of the scholar-statesman who
earlier had been "too proud to fight" after the sinking of the Lusitania?
At first glance the president seemed oblivious of the realities of
power politics. The president's first vivid memory as a child growing
up in Augusta, Georgia, had been the outbreak of the Civil War. As he
was playing in front of his home, he heard a man exclaim, "Lincoln is
elected, and there'll be war."47 Although Augusta remained on the
fringes of that destructive conflict, Wilson developed a hatred for war.
During his earlier career as an academic, warfare had never engaged
his scholarly attention, not even in his account of the Civil War. As
president, he tended to be bored by military questions and was un-
comfortable in the presence of soldiers. On the eve of American
belligerency he told a journalist that "he'd rather have done anything
else than head a military machine. All his instincts were against it."48
Notwithstanding his hatred of war, Wilson was clearly not averse
to the employment of force as a last resort for righteous purposes. "If I
cannot retain my moral influence over a man except by occasionally
knocking him down, if that is the only basis upon which he will respect
me, then for the sake of his soul I have got occasionally to knock him
down," he explained before the National Press Club on May 15,1916.
"If a man will not listen to you quietly in a seat, sit on his neck and
make him listen."49
Some historians have had difficulty reconciling Wilson's aversion
to war with his readiness to utilize force to support his diplomacy in
Mexico and the Caribbean. Before America intervened in the Great
War, Wilson had employed American armed forces in Mexico (twice),
Haiti, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic. In fact, he involved his
country in more military interventions than any other American presi-
dent before or since. Yet that statement, although true, is misleading
without elaboration. Wilson truly hated war and feared that it would
foster militarism in the United States. With the exception of his dis-
patch of the AEF to Western Europe, Wilson's use of force was ex-
tremely limited, involving only a handful of casualties, and was more
in line with a police action for economic, humanitarian, or liberal
political objectives. The president's rigid control of the military's in-
volvement in Mexico at Veracruz in 1914—and during the Punitive
Expedition in 1916—provides an excellent illustration of his carefully
managed employment of force to support his diplomacy.50
Wilson's view of his constitutional position as commander-in-chief
reinforced his determination to assert civilian authority over the army
and navy establishments; these he deemed instruments of a national
policy to be determined solely by civilians. At the same time, rejecting
the idea that he had a dual civilian and military role as commander-in-
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chief, he reacted angrily in 1918 when someone sent him an etching
that depicted him in military dress.51
A serious consequence of Wilson's rigid separation of military and
civilian authority was that he ignored the machinery that had been
created for formulating the nation's strategic policy.52 He had sug-
gested to the British that he might become their ally without pre-
paring for or even examining the consequences of U.S. belligerency.
American generals and admirals were kept in the dark about the
House-Grey Memorandum, and no contingency plans were made for
collective security.
On Elihu Root's recommendation, the War Department General
Staff had been created by an act of Congress in 1903. Its head, the chief
of the General Staff, who replaced the commanding general of the
army, served as strategic adviser to the secretary of war and the
president. As the "brain" of the army, the General Staff was expected
to develop into an organization capable of mobilizing, organizing,
training, transporting, and supplying the army in time of war. An-
other essential duty of the General Staff was to gather intelligence and
to develop plans for the strategic deployment of the nation's armed
forces. In 1908-10 the General Staff had been divided into two sections,
one housed in the War Department and the other, the War College
Division, placed across town with the Army War College at Wash-
ington Barracks. The War College Division (renamed in February 1918
the War Plans Division) was given the responsibility for intelligence
gathering and war planning.53
In August 1915 the president's hand had trembled with rage as he
pointed to a lead article in the Baltimore Sun with the provocative
heading, "May Call 1,000,000 Men." This article purported to give an
account of the General Staff's plans for war with Germany, based on
sending an army to Europe. The president believed that American
neutrality and contingency planning for any cooperative or offensive
military effort were incompatible, even when it appeared that war
might be forced upon a reluctant America. The chief of the War College
Division of the General Staff, Brigadier General M.M. Macomb, issued
a heated and honest denial: the U.S. Army had no plans for offensive
war with Germany. Rather, the General Staff had developed fragmen-
tary plans for calling up 1,000,000 men only if Germany attacked the
Atlantic coast.54 The war planners from 1914 to 1916 were strictly
defensive in their appreciations, with other formal war plans focusing
on defending the west coast against a Japanese attack and countering a
British attack on New York.55 The possibility that the United States
might have to fight Germany on European soil was not considered.
Aware of the existing political realities, the General Staff had been
treading very warily. Before the Baltimore Sun affair, Chief of Staff
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Hugh L. Scott, prompted by the secretary of war, had ordered all
officers at the Army War College not to discuss in any public forum the
course of the war in Europe. A further directive at the beginning of 1916
cautioned all civilian employees of the War College not to discuss the
war while at work or offer "any views of a partisan nature in connec-
tion therewith."56 Congress delivered a further blow to the General
Staff's effectiveness in its National Defense Act of 1916 by restricting
that body to a chief of staff, two general officers of the line, ten
colonels, ten lieutenant colonels, fifteen majors, and seventeen cap-
tains—a total of fifty-five officers. No more than half of these were
allowed to serve in or near the District of Columbia. When war did
come, only nineteen officers were attached to the General Staff, eleven
of them assigned to the War College Division. With the General Staff
limited in personnel and mission, the possibility that the United States
might engage in collective military action with Britain or any other
power went unexamined. The consideration of such vital questions as
the transport, equipment, logistics, and theater of operations for any
expeditionary force was left until the eve of American belligerency.
As was the case with the army, American isolationist sentiment
precluded any possibility that the U.S. Navy's General Board—the
naval general staff, authorized by Congress in 1900—might develop
plans for American participation in the European war. Nor did the
Joint Army and Navy Board, created in 1903, ever become an effective
means of coordinating army and navy planning; after 1913 it practically
ceased to exist. The unfortunate consequences of the inability of the
General Staff, General Board, and Joint Army and Navy Board to carry
out their intended role in the development of the nation's strategic
plans was never more apparent than during the ill-conceived pre-
paredness campaign in 1916.
Circumstances by 1915-16 had forced the president to link Amer-
ican military power to the credibility of his efforts to protect American
neutral rights and to play a more active role in international affairs. As
he told opponents of preparedness in May 1916: "A nation which, by
the standards of other nations, however mistaken those standards
may be, is regarded as helpless, is apt in general counsel to be regarded
as negligible."57 After the sinking of the Lusitania, the president em-
braced an ambitious naval construction program with the goal of
making the U.S. Navy second to none. The subsequent Naval Act of
1916, which appropriated money for a battleship-dominated fleet, did
not, however, prepare the United States to participate in the current
conflict on the Allied side. A great battle fleet might enable the United
States to hold its own with the great naval powers following the
conclusion of World War I, but it would be ineffectual in containing the
German U-boat threat. Hence the U.S. naval building program ul-
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timately constituted a graver future threat to British primacy on the
high seas than to German interests.
The effect of the 1916 preparedness movement on the U.S. Army
was even more disappointing to the British. Wilson had campaigned
hard in January and February for a buildup of the army as well as the
navy. Momentarily, he even supported the War Department's pro-
posal for a national reserve force, the Continental Army, over the
opposition of important members of his own party. Unable to muster
the necessary votes in Congress, despite his attempt to take the issue
to the people, Wilson retreated and left the question of strengthening
the army to the isolationist Congress.58
The issue of army preparedness, however, would not go away,
given American military intervention in Mexico in retaliation against
Pancho Villa's raid on Columbus, New Mexico, in March 1916. As the
Punitive Expedition advanced into the Mexican interior, Congress
passed its first comprehensive plan of national security, the National
Defense Act, which Wilson signed into law on June 3, 1916. But this
bill, reflecting the dominant isolationist sentiment in Congress and the
country, did not prepare the army to fight in Europe. Conscription was
rejected, and the mainstay of American land warfare became the
militia, a primitive fighting force by twentieth-century European stan-
dards. Congress also refused to sanction either the plans or the ma-
chinery for national mobilization, which would have been rightly
interpreted by the public as the first step toward an interventionist
military policy.
As constituted, the U.S. Army was clearly incapable of participat-
ing in the European war. Its armament was obsolete and its supply of
munitions hopelessly inadequate. Its field artillery had enough rounds
to sustain a bombardment on the western front for no more than a few
minutes. With no poison gas, flame throwers, tanks, mortars, hand
and rifle grenades, heavy field howitzers, or modern aircraft, the U.S.
Army remained a nineteenth-century force and a very small one at
that. In 1916 it ranked seventeenth in the world.
As the presidential campaign of 1916 intensified, Wilson's actions
more and more symbolized the noninterventionist sentiment of the
country. When Lindley M. Garrison resigned in protest over Wilson's
abandonment of the Continental Army idea, Wilson selected a pacifist,
Newton D. Baker, to replace him as secretary of war. With Josephus
Daniels as secretary of the navy, both branches of service now had
pacifistic civilian leadership. Another signal of American intentions
occurred during the Democratic convention in St. Louis in 1916. Key-
note speaker Martin Glynn, former governor of New York, praised
Wilson for keeping the country out of the war. Spontaneously, mem-
bers of the audience began to chant, "What did we do? What did we
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do?" Glynn riposted: "We didn't go to war." During the subsequent
campaign, "He kept us out of war" became a powerful Democratic
slogan. The British rightly feared that the American political situation
rendered worthless Wilson's assurance that he would "probably" en-
ter the war if Berlin did not accept a reasonable peace settlement.
Congress would never declare war over such an issue. Just as impor-
tant, the American preparedness campaign was clearly not designed to
enable the Americans to cooperate with the British against Germany.
American actions in the military realm during the months imme-
diately following the House-Grey Memorandum thus did nothing to
alter Asquith's initial reaction that he did not see where "the coercive
power of the United States" lay. David Lloyd George, then minister of
munitions, had agreed and said that the Americans would "possess no
coercive power this year."59 It was natural for the British to assume
that the American commitment to ending the war, which suggested
the possibility of military cooperation with the British, was insincere.
Lloyd George and Asquith were wrong about America's inability
to back its diplomacy with power. America would possess "coercive
power" in 1916, not its army or navy but its emerging economic ascen-
dancy over Britain. Given the growing dependency of Britain on
America for credit and supplies, this form of American diplomatic
leverage represented a far greater threat to British interests than it did
to the Central Powers.
The long-awaited British offensive on the Somme in July 1916
momentarily pushed British thoughts of peace into the background.
The initial phase of the attack was an unmitigated disaster. Although
shaken by the massive casualties suffered by the BEF and its Com-
mander-in-Chief Sir Douglas Haig's frank admission that his attacks
must "go well into the autumn" and that another prolonged offensive
would be required in 1917, the War Committee at the beginning of
August nonetheless supported the continuation of the offensive.60
During August, with the enemy launching costly counterattacks, the
BEF inflicted heavy losses on the Germans. Elsewhere, the French
fought stubbornly at Verdun; the Russian steamroller advanced
against Austria-Hungary; and the Italians applied pressure on the
Isonzo.
The simultaneous pressure on the Central Powers on all major
fronts caused some British leaders to worry that Berlin, fearing defeat,
might use Wilson to arrange an armistice. When this prospect was
discussed by the War Committee on August 10, Grey accurately ex-
pressed the sentiments of his associates: Britain wanted any proposal
for an armistice with the enemy to be based on conditions "that the
United States would accept, which at the same time would be impossi-
ble for Germany to accept unless owning that she was beaten."61 This
22 Trial by Friendship
was wishful thinking, and the British knew it. If Germany sought
a ceasefire through Washington, it would almost certainly cinch
Wilson's reelection. Wilson, now growing wary of working for peace
through London, might try to use the growing British economic de-
pendence on America to force Britain to silence its guns. Lloyd George
could bluster that "it would be a declaration of war if they [the United
States] stopped the supply of cotton,"62 but that could not change
Britain's economic vulnerability, which was increasing by the week.
Continuing British commitment to victory placed Anglo-American
relations in serious jeopardy during the summer and fall of 1916. British
retaliation against American firms suspected of trading with Ger-
many—the so-called "black list"—and the suppression of the Easter
Rebellion in Ireland provoked an angry reaction in the United States.
More ominously, Wilson, angry that the British had not taken up his
peace plan, now had serious reservations about London's motives.
Having "lived with the English statesmen for the past two years and
seen the real inside of their minds," he believed that British goals rep-
resented the European militarism and imperialism he so despised.63
The British began to harden their position as well. Through the
interception of German messages between Washington and Berlin,
Asquith's government knew that Wilson had told the German ambas-
sador that it was "in the interest of America that neither of the combat-
ants should gain a decisive victory." M It was axiomatic to most British
leaders that not only the British Empire but Western civilization as well
depended upon the defeat of German militarism. In memoranda circu-
lated within the Cabinet, war objectives were frequently articulated
that went beyond the peace terms discussed by Grey and House at the
beginning of 1916.65 Despite the growing strain, the British were in no
mood to halt the war until the German threat was destroyed. "It is
horrible to allow oneself to think even for a moment that the fruits of
victory may be spoiled for us by unsatisfactory terms of peace," Mon-
tagu asserted. American efforts for peace, he continued to emphasize,
were "contemptible and untrustworthy" and did not consider "civil-
isation, merits, or the future security of peace, but only the immediate
political interests of either party." In equally bitter language the Earl of
Crawford, president of the Board of Agriculture, charged that "Presi-
dent Wilson, whose recent action shows how deeply he is obsessed by
electioneering ambition, will be quite ready to make such an [armis-
tice] offer, even though he anticipates a refusal, provided his party can
profit thereby."66
What some British leaders were saying in private, Lloyd George,
who had succeeded Kitchener as secretary of state for war, said in
public as September came to an end. Lloyd George was pro-American
and genuinely believed that the best hope for future world peace
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depended upon the creation of a Pax Anglo-Americana. "If the United
States would stand by Great Britain the entire world could not shake
the combined mastery we would hold over the seas," he had told
House at the beginning of 1916.67 Beyond the obvious need to humor
the president, Lloyd George had been sincere in his desire to create a
"special relationship" between the world's two great English-speaking
nations; he was to return to this idea again and again. But he viewed a
soft peace as disastrous to British national interests and future world
stability. With the climax of the American presidential campaign ap-
proaching, he feared that Wilson would take preemptive action to
force negotiations upon the British at a time when Allied military
fortunes were ebbing. The result might be catastrophic for British
efforts to gain a stable peace through the smashing of German military
despotism.
In a calculated move in early September, Lloyd George allowed the
publication of a War Office interview with an American journalist, Roy
Howard. The result was sensational. No British leader had ever spo-
ken so bluntly to the president. The hawkish Welshman warned
Wilson not to " 'butt in' for the purpose of stopping the European
war." Such American intervention in itself would constitute an un-
neutral act. Having "invested thousands of its best lives to purchase
future immunity for civilisation," the British Empire was determined
to fight the war "to a finish—to a knock-out."68
Grey was naturally furious at Lloyd George's extraordinary inter-
vention in the realm of Anglo-American relations. "It has always been
my view," he wrote, "that until the Allies were sure of victory the door
should be kept open for Wilson's mediation. It is now closed forever
as far as we are concerned." Lloyd George was unrepentant. The
American politician has no "international conscience," he replied, and
"thinks of nothing but the ticket, and he has not given the least
thought to the effect of his action upon European affairs."69
Lloyd George was not overly concerned about the possibility that
Wilson might retaliate by taking advantage of British reliance on Amer-
ican industry, finance, and raw materials. The war had been responsi-
ble for America's biggest economic boom in history. Just as British
finances were dependent on America, so also was American pros-
perity becoming increasingly dependent on its trade and financial ties
to the Allies. The former chancellor of the exchequer told the War
Committee on October 5 that Britain should, if anything, increase its
dependence on America because large orders gave the British "a
greater political pull in that country." Big corporations in the United
States were very powerful, and "we could use them if we handled
them properly." With extraordinary prescience, he also predicted
that Germany, growing frustrated over British access to American
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resources, was becoming desperate.70 The United States might soon
have no choice but to fight to protect itself from German outrages on
the high seas. The risk that Lloyd George was prepared to take was
that the militarists in Berlin would force Wilson's hand before the
president's mediation efforts created a rupture between Washington
and London that might be fatal to British hopes for victory.
Turbulent waters lay ahead for Anglo-American relations. "Here
we regard the White House rather as Vesuvius is regarded in Naples,
that is as a mysterious source of unexpected explosions," Spring Rice
reported to London.71 An angry President Wilson seemed bent on
making the British, especially the pugnacious Lloyd George, pay for
ignoring his peace efforts.
2
From Mediator
to "Associate Power"
Wilson's mediation efforts made the British government confront for
the first time an America suggesting that it was prepared to take a
decisive part in world politics. Confident of victory, the British be-
lieved during the spring and summer of 1916 that they could rebuff
Wilson's potential threat to a favorable British peace without serious
consequences. As the military stalemate continued into the fall, how-
ever, this was no longer true. America's economic ascendancy over the
British grew by the day. In contrast to Lloyd George, many British
leaders were not so sanguine over their country's economic and finan-
cial dependency on the United States. Forty percent of British war
expenditure was being spent on supplies from North America. On
October 31 Maurice Hankey, the secretary of the War Committee,
warned in a general review of the war that the Achilles heel of the
Entente members was their "staying-power, owing to the prodigious
strain of the American orders on their financial resources." If this trend
continued, "the Allies will, within the next few months, become
entirely dependent upon the goodwill of the President of the United
States of America for their power to continue the war."1
The deteriorating financial situation was only one of many con-
cerns for the British political leadership. Britain's European allies were
nearing exhaustion. Uncertain of their continued reliability, the British
were themselves confronted with a serious manpower crisis. Hard
fighting on the Somme had cost the BEF almost half a million casu-
alties. Yet, in Robertson's words, the Germans continued to fight
"with undiminished vigour." Robertson's grim forecast was that Brit-
ain "must expect, and at once prepare for, harder and more protracted
fighting and a much greater strain on our general resources than any
yet experienced before we can wring from the enemy that peace which
we have said we mean to have."2 The Army Council warned that
British forces, depleted by a year of hard campaigning, faced a crisis in
1917. Unless extraordinary measures were taken to bring in more men,
it would "be impossible after April next to keep the armies up to
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strength." Drafting men up to fifty-five years was one extreme meas-
ure advocated.3
German undersea assault also represented an accelerating threat.
Walter Runciman, the president of the Board of Trade, issued a dire
warning in early November: "My expert advisers believe that I am far
too sanguine in advising the War Committee that the complete break-
down in shipping will come in June, 1917; they are convinced that it will
come much sooner than June."4 These estimates were based on the
questionable assumption that Germany planned to continue limited as
opposed to all-out U-boat warfare.
Under the circumstances it is not surprising that the prospect of a
peace mediated by President Wilson began to be viewed seriously in
some quarters. Lloyd George's position of fighting the war "to a
finish—to a knock-out" was questioned within the British government
by the respected Unionist leader and former foreign secretary, Lord
Lansdowne. In a memorandum to the Cabinet, dated November 13, he
asked the pertinent question: Would the pursuit of Lloyd George's
"knock-out blow" against Imperial Germany destroy rather than save
civilization?5 There now seemed the prospect that the United States
might offer the British future security. Wilson, in an extraordinary
break with American isolationist tradition, told Grey (through House)
that he could be sure "the United States would go any length in
promoting and lending her full might to a League for Peace" in the
event of a compromise settlement.6
But did Wilson really speak for his people in promising a global
role for the United States? "The President's assurances as to the desire
to take part in the permanent settlement are undoubtedly genuine,"
Spring Rice reported from Washington. "But between this and the
performance there is a gulf. This people will have to abandon the
Monroe doctrine and the Washingtonian tradition against entangling
alliances. They will also have to have an army and a fleet ready on an
instant and distant call for foreign service. The people who could not
spare one word to Belgium are now to engage to send their armies and
navies to the defence of threatened right. This is a big change."7
Renewed American pressure on London to end the hostilities
seemed likely because Wilson had been reelected in early November
and his opposition to American participation in the war had been a key
element in his narrow victory. Now, in an effort to stop the war before
German undersea assault forced his hand, he chose to push aggres-
sively a new peace initiative, seeking to arrange a peace conference
over which he would preside. Angry with the British, he no longer
based his peace formula on Anglo-American cooperation but viewed
British navalism in the same light as German militarism.8 If Berlin
responded favorably to his peace efforts and the British did not, he
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considered pressuring the British to the peace table with America's
financial leverage. "We can determine to a large extent who is to be
financed and who is not to be financed," he had declared in a public
speech as November began.9 By the end of the month, he had moved
to put these threatening words into action by encouraging the Federal
Reserve Board to adopt a policy that was tantamount to destroying
British credit in the United States. On November 27 the Federal Re-
serve Board cautioned American banks and private citizens against
investing in foreign short-term securities. The following day, when the
press reported the Federal Reserve Board's warning, the value of
Allied bonds dropped precipitously.10
On November 28 the British War Committee held a grim council
over the Federal Reserve Board's action, which Balfour characterized
as "more serious even than the submarine menace." If the United
States withheld credit, announced Reginald McKenna, chancellor of
the exchequer, Britain could not purchase the wheat and munitions
essential to victory. Montagu expressed an even more alarmist view:
"At our present rate of living and of expending munitions we should
very shortly have to close down, possibly within a month, if the
American supplies were shut down." The British at this time did not
have any evidence that Wilson had staged this shock to the British war
effort, but Grey and others suspected as much because of Wilson's
growing estrangement from London. On November 24 he had in-
structed House to inform Grey that Americans were now as angry with
London as they were with Berlin because of the war's growing in-
fringements on American neutrality.11
Had it faced almost certain defeat, Asquith's coalition government
might have endorsed peace negotiations. The British leadership, how-
ever, did not believe that the Allied military position was desperate.
Germany held most of Belgium and the richest part of France, domi-
nated central and southeastern Europe, and had Russia on the ropes.
For their part, though, the Allies had strengthened their position on
the periphery against Turkey, maintained a tight and painful naval
blockade, and still held the strategical initiative on the western front,
with almost four million French, British, and Belgian soldiers facing
two and a half million Germans. On the other hand, the British did not
reckon that the balance of forces so favored them that they could be
certain of a favorable negotiated peace. Asquith's rejection of a negoti-
ated peace, however, did not save him from the "ginger" faction,
which demanded greater sacrifices from the country for victory on the
battlefield.12
On December 7 Lloyd George, the author of the "knock-out blow,"
became prime minister and immediately reorganized the government,
creating a War Cabinet of himself and four others. This directorate,
From Mediator to "Associate Power" 29
committed to seeing the war through to victory rather than peace by
negotiation, included Andrew Bonar Law, the Canadian-born leader
of the Conservatives; Lord Milner, who was popular with the Tory
intelligentsia and the leading advocate of New Imperialism; and Lord
Curzon, a former proconsul like Milner and a leading Conservative
statesman, who was especially interested in the eastern possessions of
the British Empire. The common bond linking these three Conserva-
tives was that they opposed a compromise peace, desired more ex-
treme measures to mobilize Britain for total war, and emphasized the
security of the British Empire.13 The fifth member of the War Cabinet,
Arthur Henderson, chairman of the Parliamentary Labour party, was
known for his strong support of the war against Germany. The new
spirit in London boded ill for Wilson's peace plans. No one in the inner
circle of the government had spoken more strongly against keeping
the future security of the British Empire out of the uncertain hands of
President Wilson or was more identified with fighting the war to a
finish than Lloyd George.14 He was now surrounded with men of like
mind.
The view that financial exigencies would have forced the British to
accept an unsatisfactory peace underestimates both their moral fiber
and the hatred of the enemy aroused by the unprecedented sacrifices
being made in the land war in Europe. Unlimited warfare led to the
expectation of victory. "The cry which united most British politicians
was a demand for victory at almost any price" is the conclusion of the
most recent study of British politics during the war.15 That a compro-
mise peace in 1916 was analogous to defeat was just as true for the
working class as it was for the political leadership. In January 1917 the
Labour Conference at Manchester overwhelmingly passed a resolu-
tion supporting a "fight to the finish."16 The German people during
this period, it should be remembered, were suffering severe hardships
because of the British blockade. During the terrible "turnip winter" of
1916-17, the average caloric intake of the German people fell to 1,000
calories per day. In time perhaps as many as 750,000 Germans starved
to death. Yet their government chose more extreme measures to win
the war—not a compromise peace.
With Lloyd George's government adamantly opposed to an un-
satisfactory peace, Wilson's use of economic pressure, although clearly
capable of damaging the British war effort, would have undermined
Anglo-American relations even more. If a frustrated Wilson had per-
sisted in economic blackmail to start general peace negotiations, the
unthinkable might have occurred: Anglo-American relations could
have been ruptured, with America assuming an openly unfriendly or
even belligerent position. This frightful possibility of Wilson's high-
risk peace strategy certainly occurred to the leaders of both countries.
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On November 15 Wilson told House that "if the Allies wanted war with
us we would not shrink from it. . . . He thought they would not dare
resort to this," wrote House, "and if they did, they could do this
country no serious hurt."17
On December 21 Robertson suggested to the new Lloyd George
government that it might be necessary to warn the Canadian govern-
ment secretly "of the possibility of trouble arising with the United
States."18 Robertson's warning was precipitated by Wilson's inten-
sified pressure on the belligerent capitals for a negotiated peace. On
December 12 Berlin, in a surprising and misleading move, had ex-
pressed a willingness to negotiate an end to the war. On December 18,
as a prelude to a general peace conference, Wilson asked all the
warring nations to state their war objectives.
Some British radicals applauded Wilson's peace kite. Henry W.
Massingham, editor of The Nation, wrote Lloyd George that Wilson's
peace initiative was "the best news since Bethlehem" and a way for the
world to "escape from its impending ruin."19 Massingham's favorable
view sharply contrasted with the indignant reaction of much of the
London press and the new British government. In addition to the
dangers implicit in a Wilsonian peace, what infuriated the British was
that Wilson publicly put them on the same moral level as the Germans,
by implication rejecting their contention that the survival of civilized
international behavior depended upon an Entente victory. In a speech
to the Senate on January 22, 1917, Wilson spoke directly about the
peace he wanted. Arguing that "only a peace between equals can last,"
he committed the United States to a "peace without victory."20
Robertson rather than Massingham spoke for most of his coun-
trymen when he wrote Lord Milner on December 18: "We must have
no 'peace' yet. We can bring Germany to her knees if only we persist.
Peace now means an intolerable existence la ter . . . . I think we ought to
be very firm with the U.S. We have more supporters in the U.S. than
Germany has. Wilson is a poor creature. Let us treat him as Germany
has hitherto done."21
A break between London and Washington was largely averted by
two factors. First, key members of Wilson's foreign affairs establish-
ment—most notably House and Lansing, who earlier had tried to
dissuade Wilson from an independent, actually more neutral, peace
initiative—falsely reassured the British that the president's primary
motive in pressing for general peace negotiations was to pave the way
for America's entry into war on the side of the Entente.22 Second and
more important, the Germans no less than the British opposed a
compromise peace. On January 9,1917, the German leadership made
its fateful decision at a crown council to defy Wilson and launch
unlimited submarine warfare at the beginning of February.
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This bid for victory was made on the advice of Germany's army
and navy leaders, who overestimated the effect of unlimited sub-
marine warfare on Britain and underestimated the ultimate impor-
tance of American participation in the war. The German Admiralty
had prepared a position paper arguing that the British would be
starved out of the war before the next harvest, and Germany's military
leadership was supremely confident that the United States could not
affect directly the outcome of the land war in Europe. Admiral von
Holtzendorff, chief of the Naval General Staff, promised: "I guaran-
tee on my word as a naval officer that no American will set foot on
the Continent!" Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, the German
supreme commander, was equally contemptuous of America's land
forces. "We can take care of America," he blustered.23
Wilson's mediation plans were destroyed when he learned on
January 31 that Germany was resuming unrestricted submarine war-
fare. No longer could the president realistically play the role of me-
diator. During the next two months he agonized over America's
response to this German challenge, moving from the severance of
relations with Berlin, to an attempt at a negotiated peace through war-
weary Austria-Hungary, to armed neutrality.
While Wilson deliberated, popular pressure for war mounted with
each new German outrage. On March 1 the nation was shocked at the
revelation of a provocative telegram sent by the German foreign secre-
tary, Arthur Zimmermann. A banner headline in the New York Times
announced: "Germany Seeks Alliance against U.S., Asks Japan and
Mexico to Join Her." Meanwhile, unrestricted German submarine
warfare took its toll of American lives. On March 18 it was announced
that fifteen Americans had been killed when the Germans sank three
American merchant ships.
As war fever swept the country, there was little understanding by
America's political leadership of what war with Germany might ulti-
mately entail. The existing machinery for the harmonization of military
policy with national policy continued to be kept in the background.
The chief of staff was Major General Hugh L. Scott, a West Pointer,
who had first served in the Seventh Cavalry, replacing an officer killed
at Little Bighorn. This old soldier, only months away from retirement,
and the General Staff he headed have been unfairly made scapegoats
for America's unpreparedness for war.24
Scott's assistant chief of staff was Major General Tasker H. Bliss,
who briefly succeeded Scott before becoming the American military
representative on the Supreme War Council. The son of a classics pro-
fessor, Bliss was America's most erudite general. He knew geology,
history, the arts, French, Spanish, Italian, Russian, Latin, and Greek.
A bald man with a drooping mustache, he was as economical with his
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THE LAST THROW.
Germany resorts to unrestricted submarine warfare.
From Punch, February 21,1917.
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words in conference as he was prolific in reports and correspondence.
Scott, Bliss, and the skeleton General Staff were arguably out of their
element in mobilizing the country for total war, but they were not to
blame for inadequate war planning.25 Restrictions placed on long-
range strategic planning by Wilson and Congress had kept the General
Staff from preparing for the war that the United States was most likely
to fight."Any reference to what the army would do if we were drawn
in," Bliss's biographer Frederick Palmer has written, "was as heretic as
for an American soldier to take sides in partisan politics. It practically
amounted to insubordination."26
As soon as unrestricted German warfare began, however, the
General Staff turned its attention to the possibility of raising a large
American army. In personal correspondence Scott wrote, "At the
present time we are going ahead and doing what we can in a quiet way.
The President desires no step taken towards mobilization. I suppose in
the hope that Germany will not do any overt act."27
If the political leadership decided to extend American power some
3,000 miles to France, the General Staff would truly face an awesome
task. Given the magnitude of the effort required, the U.S. Army was
less prepared to fight than during the War of 1812 or even the American
Revolution.28 Wilson's refusal to give the military a role in formulating
national policy had prevented any interaction between America's civil-
ian and military leadership concerning the possible consequences of
America's extra-Continental involvement. The United States had nei-
ther the men, the arms, nor a military plan of action to confront a
powerful adversary such as Germany. The separation of civil and
military responsibilities meant that the 1916 "preparedness" campaign
had had almost no connection with the war that the United States was
most likely to fight. In part this was due to the general perception that
America must prepare to defend its interests against the victor powers
rather than to intervene in the European conflict.
Scott had asked Congress for 1,000,000 men in 1916, a request, he
wrote, that was received "with great hilarity. I was asked 'What do you
want with a million men. The United States will never be at war with
anybody. Do you want them to eat? You certainly cannot have any
other use for them.' "2 9 On the eve of war the army was some 20,000
men under strength, with only 5,791 officers and 121,797 enlisted men.
An additional 80,446 National Guardsmen were on federal service.
With no fully organized divisions, corps, or armies, the United States
in reality did not have a real army. Moreover, "preparedness" was a
word that did not describe the naval establishment. America entered
the war with nine out of ten warships inadequately manned, two of
three not materially fit, and the required antisubmarine ships, mine-
layers, and auxiliaries yet to be produced.30
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Despite these grave deficiencies, the United States had enormous
though largely untapped military potential. In addition to burgeoning
industry, the country's greatest asset was its vast manpower. Almost
24,000,000 registered for the draft during the war. Washington had
more men available to it than France and Great Britain combined; of the
European powers, only Russia had a larger population.
On the day after Germany announced the resumption of unre-
stricted submarine warfare, Scott directed the War College Division to
"submit without delay a statement of a plan of action that should be
followed by the United States in case hostilities with Germany occur in
the near future." The War College Division's response two days later
was to recommend the building of an army of 1,500,000 men through
conscription; until this army was organized, trained, and equipped,
the War College Division "earnestly" advised that no American troops
be sent to Europe. It also emphasized that the success of any military
venture would depend on achieving "some definite understanding
between ourselves and other belligerents engaged in seeking a com-
mon end." The American military cooperation would have to be con-
fined initially to naval and economic support, "but ultimately it may
include joint military operations in some theatre of war to be deter-
mined by agreement with other nations."31
Initial considerations of the employment of American forces over-
seas did not include the placing of American soldiers alongside the
Anglo-French forces in the trenches of the western front.32 Instead,
General Staff attention focused on a theater of operations that Amer-
ican arms might dominate. The first proposal for an expeditionary
force to Europe actually predated the resumption of unrestricted Ger-
man submarine warfare. In a series of reports to the War Department
in November and December 1916, Captain Edward Davis, the Amer-
ican military attache in Athens, advocated sending an American expe-
ditionary force of 500,000 men to Macedonia. Given the White House's
attitude toward military contingency planning, the War Department,
which forwarded Davis's reports to the War College Division on Janu-
ary 17, viewed these reports with understandable trepidation. The
chief of the War College Division, Brigadier General Joseph E. Kuhn,
warned Davis that both Scott and Secretary of War Baker were "some-
what apprehensive that reports of this character are fraught with
possibilities of harm, in the event that their contents become known to
others than the authorities of the War Department."33
Davis's reports are of particular interest because of his emphasis
on the political as well as the strategical implications of American
involvement in a Balkan campaign. Davis, like most policymakers in
Washington, believed that America's ideals in international affairs
might be tainted by involvement with European powers in a coalition
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war against the Central Powers. On the other hand, if the United
States chose noninvolvement, the result might be a peace settlement
that would be detrimental to American national interests. Davis was
particularly concerned that the Entente might try to purchase direct
Japanese involvement in the European conflict at the expense of Amer-
ica's Far Eastern interests. "It is not only possible but it is probable that
the future welfare of the United States will be seriously and adversely
affected by decisions made without her knowledge in councils where,
as matters now stand, she has neither voice nor authority." He also
warned against accepting "some humiliation of a repugnant nature."
By turning the other cheek, America might place in jeopardy "the
future welfare of the nation."
Davis made the erroneous but appealing argument that America
could maintain her complete military and political independence by
establishing a front against Bulgaria through operations emanating
from a Macedonian port. Ignoring the failures of previous attempts to
find "a way around" the siege warfare of the western front, including
the deployment of an Allied force against Bulgaria operating from
Salonika, Greece, Davis was confident that an American expeditionary
force in Macedonia "would be employed in striking hardest, and in the
softest part, that antagonist who will quit the easiest." If Bulgaria were
driven from the war, Davis predicted, Turkey and Austria-Hungary
would soon collapse. American soldiers might not even have to shed
their blood to remove the Bulgarians from the war. The armed pres-
ence of America, with its "fair diplomacy," would probably encourage
Bulgaria to begin peace negotiations.34
Davis, it is now known, did more than write strategic apprecia-
tions for the War Department. Exceeding his authority, he discussed
American involvement in the Balkans with the commander of the
Allied forces there, General Maurice Sarrail. Sarrail was as enthusiastic
as Robertson was cool when he learned of Davis's efforts. When the
Chief of the Imperial General Staff informed the British War Cabinet
that the American army was totally unprepared for intervention in the
Balkans, the civilians decided to offer Washington no encouragement
for military ventures in the eastern Mediterranean.35
Despite the amateurish, even daft, quality of Davis's strategical
ideas, his advocacy of an independent American theater apparently
intrigued Scott and Kuhn. According to Davis, the United States
might fight in Europe to protect its national interests yet maintain
complete independence in both the military and the political realm.
On February 2 Kuhn directed the War College Division to refer to
Davis's reports in preparing plans for waging war against Germany;
on the following day, Scott, believing that the Dutch might abandon
their neutrality because of German attacks on their shipping in the
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North Sea, requested a study of an attack on the German army by
way of Holland.36
There is no evidence that Wilson knew of these strategical appre-
ciations of a land war against Germany that in fact had much to say
about America's ability to influence the outcome of the war. Possess-
ing a love for the sea—he had once thought of attending Annapolis—
Wilson demonstrated a strong interest in naval matters, but his in-
clination was not to interfere with his secretary of the navy and
admirals.37 On the other hand, he immediately foresaw a role for the
U.S. Navy in the war, and he urged the expansion of its personnel
and sought to open lines of communication with the British Admi-
ralty for possible Anglo-American naval cooperation to protect Amer-
ican shipping.38
As Wilson struggled with the question of war or continued neu-
trality, the only strategic appreciation he apparently saw was one
written by Herbert Hoover, an engineer who had made a fortune in
worldwide mining operations and had become a public figure as head
of the Commission for the Relief of Belgium. In a memorandum to
House, Hoover argued against sending an American force to Europe;
the difficulty of organizing and transporting such a force in the near
future seemed insurmountable. Moreover, coalition warfare with the
Entente powers would create "political" problems. To help the anti-
German coalition, Hoover suggested that the Entente be allowed to
recruit in America to fill its depleted ranks. Hoover also advocated
having a strong home defensive force "in being when peace ap-
proaches. As our terms of peace will probably run counter to most of
the European proposals, our weight in the accomplishment of our
ideals will be greatly in proportion to the strength which we can throw
into the scale." House passed this memorandum on to Wilson, who
noted that he was favorably impressed with Hoover's suggestions
when he forwarded it to Baker on February 16.39
Although Wilson personally visited Baker in the War Department
in early February and was decisively involved in the question of
whether to adopt the draft,40 he apparently did not think that an
American declaration of war would involve the United States in the
land war in Europe. On the eve of his ill-fated peace offensive in
December 1916, the president had ruminated about the nature of
modern warfare and the course of the great European conflagration.
Since this is almost the only record of his thoughts on the trench
warfare of the western front, his words require careful attention.
Wilson saw no "glory" in the "systematized destruction" of mod-
ern warfare. "Never before in the world's history have two great
armies been in effect so equally matched; never before have the losses
and the slaughter been so great with as little gain in military advan-
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tage. . . .  The mechanical game of slaughter of today has not the same
fascination as the zest of intimate combat of former days; and trench
warfare and poisonous gases are elements which detract alike from the
excitement and the tolerance of modern conflict. With maneuver al-
most a thing of the past, any given point can admittedly be carried by
the sacrifice of enough men and ammunition. Where is any longer the
glory commensurate with the sacrifice of the millions of men required
in modern warfare to carry and defend Verdun?" 41
It is doubtful that Wilson had changed his mind about the futility
of the great offensives on the western front. Hence, he almost certainly
opposed committing American forces to the attrition warfare that
characterized the bloodstained battlefields of France and Belgium.
Believing that American support in the form of finance, war supplies,
and naval action would decisively tip the military balance in favor of
the Allies, he expected the war to end quickly. The cannons would be
silenced not through the sacrifice of thousands of young Americans
but because of German recognition that their cause was hopeless once
America joined the Allies. "Both sides have grown weary of the appar-
ently hopeless task of bringing the conflict to an end by the force of
arms; inevitably they are being forced to the realization that it can only
be brought about by the attrition of human suffering, in which the
victor suffers hardly less than the vanquished. This may require one
year, maybe two," he had written in late November 1916.42 His faith in
reason led him to believe that the threat more than the employment of
American land power would demoralize Germany and give the peace
elements there the upper hand. The U.S. Army's role was largely
destined to be psychological.
At this juncture, by giving his General Staff no part in the formula-
tion of national policy, the president obviously did not understand
what might be involved in the use of American power to influence
events in faraway battlefields. Nevertheless, the prospect of war
forced him increasingly to link his interventionist diplomacy to either
the employment or the threat of military force. He told members of the
Emergency Peace Federation who visited him in the White House on
February 28,1917, that "as head of a nation participating in the war, the
President of the United States would have a seat at the Peace Table, but
that if he remained the representative of a neutral country he could
at best only 'call through a crack in the door.' "4 3
By stages, Wilson had arrived at the unhappy conclusion that a
liberal peace settlement could not be obtained through American
neutrality. A danger he saw in choosing sides against Germany, how-
ever, was that American involvement would encourage extremism in
Allied war objectives and make impossible his "peace without vic-
tory." On March 19 he held an extraordinary interview in the White
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A DEAD FROST.
President Pygmalion Wilson: "The durned thing won't come to life!"
From Punch, January 31,1917.
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House with Frank Cobb, editor of the New York World.44 "What else can
I do?" he is said to have told the journalist. "Is there anything else I can
do?" Germany was forcing his hand, but he worried that American
participation would guarantee an Allied victory, making a just peace
difficult to achieve: "A declaration of war would mean that Germany
would be beaten and so badly beaten that there would be a dictated
peace, a victorious peace."45 These words proved to be prophetic, but
one wonders on what military premises Wilson could make such a
prediction. Germany was not going to be defeated if America concen-
trated, as Hoover suggested, on building a powerful home defense
force to use as a negotiating ploy on the eve of peace discussions.
The following day the president placed the question of war or
continued armed neutrality before his administration. As excited re-
porters, clamoring for news, packed the corridors, Wilson canvassed
his Cabinet members. The national agitation and the warlike temper of
the nation was reflected in the small rectangular chamber where the
Cabinet met. According to Lansing's account, every man at this meet-
ing except the president, who was noncommittal, spoke in favor of a
declaration of war. The secretary of state characterized the two-and-a-
half-hour discussion—significantly, the only attempt by Wilson to
involve his Cabinet in the appropriate American response before his
war speech to Congress—as a meeting that promised to "change the
course of history and determine the destinies of the United States and
possibly of the world."46
True enough. The emergence of the United States as a great power
in Europe proved to be a turning point in the destinies of both the
United States and Great Britain in the twentieth century. But this
meeting continued to reflect considerable confusion on the part of the
civilian leadership about the global military role that the United States
might play. Many Cabinet members apparently shared the president's
view that American belligerency would hasten the end of the war
without much greater sacrifice than the continuation of armed neu-
trality. Certainly, none of those present seemed to believe that Amer-
ican intervention was necessary at this juncture to save the Entente
from defeat.47 Probably only Lansing believed that the future security
of the United States depended upon a British victory.48
Initially, America's right to trade across the seas, which had been
challenged by both London and Berlin, had been viewed as America's
primary national interest in the war. Recent German outrages now
made American honor and self-respect an important factor in the
Cabinet's decision for war. Believing that an Entente victory was
assured, America's leaders did not think their country's participation
in the war automatically involved military cooperation with the British
and French armies, yet Berlin's acts of aggression made the Cabinet
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members fighting mad and determined to teach Germany's warlords a
lesson. Albert S. Burleson, the Texan who headed the Post Office
Department, wanted to show the German leadership that they had
"woke up a giant." Other Cabinet members talked of doing "every-
thing possible" and "employing] all our resources" to "aid in bringing
the Kaiser to his knees." With the U.S. Army lacking the men and
equipment to take on the German army, however, the American
leadership was inclined to think more in terms of assistance to the
Allies in the form of money, ships, and supplies.
With no military or naval professionals invited to this crucial
meeting, Baker and Daniels were left to speak for the armed services.
Daniels, his eyes brimming with tears, saw no alternative to war but
offered no specifics about the role that the U.S. Navy might play. Baker
spoke more to the point. The secretary of war favored raising a large
army and even of sending that force to Europe, if the Allies at a later
date appeared in danger of losing because of manpower difficulties.
On the other hand, perhaps echoing a prior discussion with the
president, Baker held out the hope that "the very knowledge of our
preparations" would force the Central Powers "to realize that their
cause was hopeless."49
On March 29, only four days before the president's war message to
Congress, the General Staff produced its first strategic appreciations of
a war on European soil. These campaign plans, which concentrated on
the Balkans and a surprise attack via Holland on the unprotected
German flank in Belgium, had been requested on February 2-3 by the
chief of staff. One suspects that they were held back until it was clear
that Wilson had decided on war with Germany.
In theory, the proposed theaters of operations in Holland and
Macedonia, as alternatives to taking part in the trench warfare of the
western front, seemed to promise America a considerable measure of
independence. Under professional scrutiny, the reality was seen to be
quite different. In the Balkans, where a considerable Entente force had
been operating against Bulgaria from the Greek port of Salonika since
late 1915, it would not be feasible for the Americans to establish an
independent front with their own port of supply. It would be practica-
ble only to operate from the Allied port of Salonika; just as obviously,
the American forces would have to coordinate their plans with—
really, subordinate them to—the existing strategy of the Entente forces
in the Balkans. Cooperation with Entente general staffs would be just
as essential if America attempted operations in Holland. The element
of surprise, essential to a successful attack upon the rear of the western
German army, would be lost if America attempted to send its forces
piecemeal to Holland. A large force of some 1,000,000 men would have
to be assembled in England prior to any cross-Channel demarche.
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Kuhn emphasized the obvious when he asserted that it was "im-
possible" for America to launch land operations against the Central
Powers "except in cooperation with the Entente powers." To do other-
wise "might aid Germany by embarrassing the armies now operating
against her."50
After seriously considering war with Germany for almost two
months, the War College Division, which apparently did not agree
with Wilson that the war was nearing an end through mutual exhaus-
tion, came to appreciate more than ever the difficulty of posing a
credible military threat to Germany. First, even if Wilson approved
and Congress supported the draft that the General Staff deemed es-
sential, it would take many months to organize and equip an expedi-
tionary force of 500,000 to 1,000,000 men. Then the vital question of
shipping remained.
The United States lacked a fleet adequate to the enormous task of
transporting and supplying such a force. The Civil War was a distant
memory, but the American merchant marine had never recovered
from the losses inflicted by Confederate raiders. America's total gross
tonnage in 1917 seemed impressive until examined: of 8,800,000 gross
tons, 6,300,000 were either coastal or confined to rivers or the Great
Lakes.51 With only 10 percent of its foreign commerce carried in Amer-
ican bottoms, the United States was less able than Norway to transport
and supply an army overseas.52 The War College Division estimated
that it would take ten months to transport a force of 500,000 to the
Balkans, assuming that 50 percent of American's available oceangoing
tonnage could be utilized. Shipping 1,000,000 men and their supplies
some 3,000 miles across the Atlantic for any invasion through Holland
would take longer, at least fourteen months. This depressing arith-
metic indicated that it would probably be 1919 before the United States
could organize and transport a formidable force to any European front.
A "serious mistake" that America must avoid, Kuhn emphasized, was
to rush one or two divisions to Europe "that could not exert any
important influence on the war" but would denude the army of many
officers necessary to the development of a mass American force.53
The president apparently made his decision for war after his
discussion with his Cabinet. On March 21 he called Congress into a
special session to begin on April 2. He then closeted himself in his
private White House study to prepare his war message, which the
Cabinet would not be allowed to review. Wilson seems to have identi-
fied no strategic interest in becoming Britain's war partner other than
earning a decisive role in the peace settlement. Britain's war, in his
mind, was not America's war. An overwhelming British victory, sup-
ported by American power, would actually make a balanced and
durable peace more difficult to achieve. Compelled to fight, he was
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determined that the American war effort—whatever form it might
take—would support American national interests (which he inter-
preted as the "freedom of the seas" and the higher interests of man-
kind) rather than the unenlightened and selfish interests of London
and other European governments. "We desire no conquest, no domin-
ion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation
for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions
of the rights of mankind."54
The British government resented Wilson's assumed moral superi-
ority, but it welcomed his promises of support. The United States, the
president proclaimed, was prepared "to exert all its power and employ
all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to
terms and end the war." Wilson also expressed support for "the
utmost practicable cooperation in counsel and action with the govern-
ments now at war with Germany."55
Despite his promise to the Allies of full American support and
cooperation, Wilson continued to maneuver to protect his position as
the honest broker between the warring nations. "The United States
Government," Spring Rice informed the Foreign Office, "is going into
the war, not as an ally of governments or monarchies, but as the
standard bearer of democratic ideas and as the eldest child of free-
dom."56
To a remarkable degree, the president followed the advice of the
nation's leading newspapers on the eve of war, as interpreted by
Joseph Tumulty, his secretary. On March 24 Tumulty gave Wilson a
summary of editorial opinion which echoed the president's fears that
the United States, with no choice but to fight, would lose its innocence
and moral superiority in league with European powers who placed
national self-interest over the rights of mankind. Tumulty made three
points: "If we are driven into war by the course of Germany, we must
remain masters of our own destiny. If we take up arms against Germany, it
should be on an issue exclusively between that Empire and this Repub-
lic. And . . . the United States must retain control of that issue from
beginning to end."57
Wilson—no doubt because this advice mirrored his own views—
pursued these goals, with important ramifications for the American
military role in the war. Determined to distance himself from Allied
war aims, Wilson chose the designation of "associate" rather than
"allied" power. He also made it clear that he was fighting against
Imperial Germany and not its allies. (Although the United States did
declare war on Austria-Hungary on December 7,1917, it remained at
peace with Turkey and Bulgaria.)
A dual and conflicting focus existed in Wilson's approach to mili-
tary involvement in the European war. In defense of American neu-
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trality he had tentatively employed his country's position as a world
power to influence the outcome of the war. His interventionist foreign
policy initially involved U.S.-sponsored mediation without any con-
sideration on his part of the deployment of fleets and armies. Ger-
many's unrestricted U-boat warfare, however, led him to conclude
that his peacemaking efforts were futile without, at the very least, the
clear threat of America's participation in a collective military and naval
effort against Germany. Yet he balked at departing radically from the
American tradition of noninvolvement in European affairs. Rather
than become a full-fledged member of the anti-German alignment (for
example, he would not even accept the earlier Entente agreement
against separate peace negotiations with the enemy), the president
sought to maintain his country's independence, militarily as well as
politically, in order to assert American exceptionalism in foreign pol-
icy.58 Although he spoke of a collective military effort, he treated
American belligerency almost as a private affair with the German
government.
On April 6,1917, the House of Representatives, as the Senate had
done two days earlier, overwhelmingly approved the war resolution.
The United States had taken a giant step into the unknown. Wilson
talked of holding back none of America's resources in fighting to make
the world safe for democracy. But did the president really expect that
American arms would play a pivotal role in the war in Europe? It
is more likely that he had spoken these words on April 2 to frighten
the Germans out of the war. An American threat to employ all its
resources, House had told him earlier, was "bound to break their
[the Germans'] morale and bring the war to an earlier close."59 What
House and Wilson did not recognize was that Germany's leaders had
already made their assessment of America's potential threat to them.
In launching unrestricted U-boat warfare, they were treating the
armed services of the United States with contempt.
3
The Balf our Mission
and Americans Abroad
The assessment by the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff of
America's ability to influence the outcome of the war differed little
from that of the German warlords who gambled for victory with the
resumption of unrestricted U-boat warfare in February. On February
13, 1917, Robertson wrote a fellow general, Sir A.J. Murray: "I do not
think that it will make much difference whether America comes in or
not. What we want to do is to beat the German Armies, until we do that
we shall not win the war. America will not help us much in that
respect."1
Robertson's views were based on reports from British represen-
tatives in America and the evaluation of his own staff. The British
military believed that the United States was incapable of rapidly de-
veloping a mass army. After one year, assuming weapons and equip-
ment were available, the British General Staff predicted that "not more
than 250,000 men could be put into the field."2 British pessimism
about America's ability to field an army was hardly surprising or
demeaning to the American military establishment. Although short of
professional and experienced officers, the British New Armies (com-
posed of volunteers) still had available to them more regular staffs and
regular regimental officers than the U.S. Army. Turning civilians into
soldiers is a slow process in the best of circumstances. Lord Kitchener
had taken a minimum of eight months, typically a year or more, to
prepare his New Army divisions for the field.
An even greater concern was that the United States might remain
aloof from the European war. Colville Barclay, the British charge
d'affaires in Washington, warned that "there appears to be a strong
feeling in the States in favour of limited co-operation for purely Amer-
ican purposes." American leaders would probably "dissociate them-
selves" from Entente war objectives and not contemplate any military
involvement.3
The immediate help America could give was thought to be pri-
marily in finance, the possible addition of neutral shipping because of
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American participation, and a boost to Allied morale. Significantly,
Barclay emphasized that belligerency would not really enhance the
value of American industry to the Entente cause. America was not a
supplier of such modern weapons as tanks, machine guns, and air-
planes; it produced primarily munitions, not the weapons that fired
them.4 With Anglo-French production of munitions now sufficient to
meet Entente needs, any increased American production in this area
would be of no real assistance. Barclay's assessment proved correct.
The U.S. Army in fact was largely equipped for modern war in 1917-18
by Anglo-French industry.
British and American evaluations of America's ability to influence
the course of the war in 1917 and even 1918 resulted in many similar
conclusions. If America began to prepare immediately and to ship
piecemeal divisions to Europe, it would still take a year to put a token
force of some 250,000 men on the European continent. Such a small
and inexperienced force, whatever its impact on Entente morale,
would have no direct influence on the monster battle with the German
army. On the other hand, if America, as Hoover recommended to
Wilson, initially shipped no troops to Europe but rather concentrated
on building a powerful army "in being" at home, American help would
be at least two years away. A year or more seemed necessary just to
transport an army, once formed, to Europe.
Wilson's inflated view of America's ability to hasten the defeat of
Germany and his wishful thinking that the conflict was rushing to a
conclusion had been reinforced by Lloyd George, who had suggested
to him in February 1917 that American participation "would shorten
the war, might even end it very quickly." 5 These sentiments in no way
represented Lloyd George's real position. He saw little likelihood of
ending the war within the near future, but he was still confident of
victory, especially if he could extract greater sacrifices from Britain and
the Dominions and redirect the British military effort away from the
western front.6 On March 20 he told the representatives of the Domin-
ions, who attended the inaugural meeting of the Imperial War Cabi-
net, that it was unlikely that Germany could be forced to accept a
British peace that year. Nonetheless, the British Empire must make a
supreme effort in 1917 because of the decline of its allies. Victory would
come in 1918.7 British belief in ultimate victory was not at this time
dependent upon American military contributions.
It has often been argued—most recently by Robert H. Ferrell—
that when America came into the war, "the Allies stood in dire
peril of failure—of losing the war." Ferrell contends that had Wilson
adhered to neutrality, the Entente would soon have been forced
"to ask Germany for terms."8 However true this may seem in
hindsight, it was not the view of the British political and military
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leadership on the eve of American belligerency. Firmly rejecting any
peace negotiations with Berlin, the British saw their country as the
most powerful military member of the anti-German coalition.9 As
Lloyd George declared on March 20, the victory would be "a victory in
which the British Empire will lead. It will easily then be the first Power
in the world."10
This statement followed on the heels of the British conquest of
Baghdad in Mesopotamia, a victory of much greater political than
strategical value. On the western front the Anglo-French forces, still
holding the strategical initiative with their superior numbers, were
poised to launch a spring offensive, which the new French com-
mander-in-chief, Robert Nivelle, rashly promised would smash
through the German trenches in twenty-four or forty-eight hours. The
role of the British in this offensive was to draw off German reserves at
Arras; their attack on April 9 against Vimy Ridge was a brilliant
success, initially surpassing any achievement by British arms on the
Somme in 1916. It is true that the overthrow of the tsarist monarchy in
mid-March introduced an element of uncertainty about Russia's future
stability. On the other hand, Austria-Hungary seemed increasingly
inclined toward peace.
Finances aside, the gravest threats to Britain's survival as a great
power when America entered the war were German undersea assault
and the emerging manpower crisis. April was the most successful
month of the war for German submarines. The Allies lost a staggering
881,027 gross tons, of which the British share alone was over 500,000
gross tons. If successful measures were not found—and soon—
against submarine warfare, the war might indeed be lost. At the end of
April the Admiralty began the innovative convoy system. Many anx-
ious months lay ahead, but in time the convoys exceeded all expecta-
tions.
An answer to Britain's worsening manpower question proved
more difficult to find. On March 21 Lord Rhondda, who chaired a
committee to examine means to keep the army up to strength, warned
"that the strain on the man-power of the country is becoming acute,
especially in view of the heavy industrial and financial responsibilities
which have to be borne by this country."11 Britain naturally began
casting covetous glances toward what appeared to be America's almost
unlimited reserves of men. Solving British manpower difficulties
through the utilization of America's vast population became in time a
central theme of London's attempts to coordinate war policy with the
United States. Lloyd George and others came to believe by the winter
of 1917-18 that Britain's survival as a great power depended upon
substituting Americans for their own soldiers. In no other way, they
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thought, could British industry and the British army both be kept of the
first rank.
Spring Rice, whose advice on the United States was usually very
perceptive, had reported on February 23,1917, that it was "wholly out
of the question" to expect America to send a large expeditionary force
to Europe. The "utmost" it would do, he informed Arthur Balfour,
who had replaced Grey as the British foreign secretary in Lloyd
George's government, "would be to encourage enlistment."12 If this
were really true, an advantage in enlisting Americans into the Entente
forces was that Yanks could be introduced to combat within months
rather than years. Lord Eustace Percy, a junior member of the Foreign
Office who specialized in American affairs, argued in a paper on April
4 that "an American Expeditionary Force of any size can neither be
trained, armed nor transported in time to make itself felt. The only
sound war policy the United States can pursue is to encourage enlist-
ment in the British and French Armies."13
Although Robertson himself urged this policy upon the civilians,
he had little confidence that American public opinion would tolerate
sending U.S. citizens to serve as cannon fodder for the Entente forces.
On April 12 he wrote Charles a Court Repington, the influential mili-
tary correspondent for The Times (London): "The Americans now with
the Canadian Corps are showing a desire to fight under the American
Flag."14
Robertson was especially interested in educating the American
military and political leadership about the enormous task of taking on
the German army. Hence, the American military attache in London,
Lieutenant Colonel Stephen L'Hommedieu Slocum, was invited to
observe the British Expeditionary Force in France (apparently Amer-
ican neutrality had precluded a previous visit). After visiting the
British front, April 19-25, Slocum reported to the War Department,
"One simply cannot appreciate the magnitude of this struggle until
one comes into contact with it. . . . the British have a tremendously
effective military machine in France, and one of vast proportion. . . . If
the submarines do not cut off the vital food supplies, England will
drive hard for some time to come."15
The practical-minded Robertson wanted to send a military mission
to Washington as soon as possible to advise the Americans on training
and equipment.16 He and other British leaders naturally assumed that
Americans would welcome advice and direction from their more war-
experienced British cousins. Lord Percy, the American "expert" in the
Foreign Office, believed that America understood "little or nothing of
the way in which a war is conducted. The first and main point is that
for this reason the administration in Washington will be very ready to
follow our lead."17 The inevitability of an Anglo-Saxon alignment
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against the Hun seemed confirmed by reports from the head of British
intelligence in the United States, Sir William Wiseman, who, as the
confidante of Colonel House, reported: "It is generally realised (al-
though, of course, never mentioned) that the war has come to a
struggle between Germany on the one side and England and America
on the other."18 It was neither the first nor the last time that the British
were deceived by pro-British sentiments expressed by Page, Lansing,
and especially House. Unfamiliar with America, many British leaders
overestimated the willingness of the American military and political
elite to subordinate their country's war policy to what the British
perceived as the common good.
As the British assessed the tenor of American belligerency, Presi-
dent Wilson was forced to come to grips with a pivotal question:
whether to expand the armed services through volunteers or compul-
sion. On the day before Wilson's March 20 meeting with his Cabinet,
Colonel House had spoken against organizing a large conscript army;
he favored permitting "volunteers to enlist in the Allied armies."19
Faced with war, however, Wilson took the most crucial step of the first
days of his war administration, the decision that ultimately made
possible an American Expeditionary Force of some 2,000,000 men.
Abandoning his 1916 position, he sided with Baker and the General
Staff in supporting compulsory military service.
At the time, Wilson did not link his support of the draft with
sending a large U.S. force to fight on foreign soil. His position was
primarily shaped by domestic considerations, especially the attempt
by his old political rival, Theodore Roosevelt, to raise a volunteer army
corps to fight in Europe.20 Opposed to limiting the American role in
the war, Roosevelt, who had earlier advocated a volunteer force to
fight in Mexico, sought a dramatic military debut for the United States.
He agitated for the dispatch to the western front of an all-volunteer
force—largely commanded by Ivy Leaguers and including a black
regiment and a German-American regiment—to assist the Allies in
smashing the forces of Kaiser Bill.
The General Staff objected to Roosevelt's volunteer force of adven-
turers on the grounds that it would lead to a premature commitment of
American arms to battle. When asked by Baker to comment on the old
Rough Rider's attention-grabbing proposal, Bliss condemned it as both
impractical and detrimental to America's long-range military role in
the war. In his critical evaluation, which applied equally to the sending
of a token regular army division to Europe for political effect, Bliss
stressed that any small American force sent into combat would have
to be "accompanied by two or three times its strength in order to
promptly meet the excessive losses that an insufficiently trained force
will incur. We will have to feed in raw troops to take the place of raw
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troops." How would the reckless slaughter of young Americans con-
tribute to support for the war in the United States or, for that matter,
among the Allies, Bliss pointedly asked. Still, Bliss did agree with
Baker that critical Allied manpower needs might force America to
commit its soldiers prematurely to the European conflict to save the
anti-German coalition from defeat. In that event, green American
forces should be sent to France, Bliss argued, but only in numbers
(eventually totaling 1,000,000 men) calculated to have a real impact on
the fighting.21
Wilson, who may not have seen this paper by Bliss, was motivated
more by political than by military considerations in reaching a decision
on the draft. Roosevelt's plan represented a serious challenge to the
president's war leadership and threatened to politicize the formation
of America's land forces. The pro-British ex-president in charge of an
American force in the coalition war might also threaten Wilson's
efforts to maintain American independence and effect a balanced
peace settlement. Another consideration for the president was his
desire to organize efficiently for war through "selective" service, which
would lessen the damage to industry by keeping skilled workers out of
the army. His support of the draft also effectively sidetracked sugges-
tions, such as the one made by House, that the United States should
serve as a recruiting ground for Allied armies rather than raise a large
force of her own. Wilson clearly did not want to dissipate America's
influence on the peace settlement by encouraging American citizens to
give their lives under foreign flags.
From the very first he was leery of America's being co-opted by the
anti-German coalition. When the French and British bombarded the
War Department with proposals for coordinating the American mili-
tary effort with their own, Wilson held back.22 He was also cool to the
War Cabinet's proposal to send a British mission headed by Balfour to
Washington. "The plan has its manifest dangers," he wrote House on
April 6. "A great many will look upon the mission as an attempt to in
some degree take charge of us as an assistant to Great Britain."23
In the end, Wilson decided that he could not refuse a visit by Allied
missions (the French decided to send one as well, to coincide with the
British mission). On April 13 the British group led by Balfour left
Liverpool. The War Cabinet could have chosen no better diplomat to
represent its interests in the White House. Wilson's intellectual equal,
dignified and tactful, Balfour believed that the continuation of the
Anglo-American partnership after the war was as essential to peace as
the defeat of Germany. He, unlike Lloyd George, attempted then and
later to be as candid and open with the American leadership as possi-
ble. The War Office chose a wounded veteran, Lieutenant General
Tom Bridges, to accompany Balfour as head of the military mission.
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To hasten America's impact on the course of the war, the War
Cabinet instructed Balfour to encourage Wilson to explore every
means of rapidly expanding his country's shipping tonnage. Hoping
to have access to American bayonets as well as ships, Balfour was also
instructed to request that a small force of American regulars be sent to
France immediately. A battalion would do. An American presence on
the continent was certain to lift the war-weary spirits of the Allies. But
Robertson had another, more practical motive. As he wrote Haig on
April 10, "I am also urging them to send some troops to France at once
even if only a brigade. It would be a good thing to get some Americans
killed and so get the country to take a real interest in the war."24
Balfour was further directed by the War Cabinet to request that this
token force be followed by a larger force in August or September. The
next two requests on the British wish list required the greatest diplo-
macy. The War Cabinet hoped, first, that Balfour could persuade the
American military and political leadership to send partially trained
units to complete their training in France; and, second, that the British,
Canadian, and French governments would be allowed to recruit indi-
vidual Americans for service in their armies.25
When the British mission arrived at Halifax, Nova Scotia, on April
20, an urgent message from Spring Rice was waiting. The British
ambassador warned that Balfour's task might be more difficult than
anticipated: Wilson was being accused of becoming a tool of the
British. "The reason which no doubt is at the bottom of antagonism of
Americans to Great Britain is the fear of being thought to be relapsing
into the condition of a colony," he explained. "There would be the very
greatest reluctance to taking part in the war under British control or as
part of a British campaign."26
On Sunday, April 22, a special train carrying the British mission
pulled into Washington's Union Station. Awaiting its members on the
platform were Secretary of State Lansing and other American digni-
taries. As the British delegation, escorted by cavalry, drove away from
the station down streets flying British and French flags, "Washington
cheered, clapped, honked, tooted and in other noisy ways showed its
approval."27
On Monday the capital returned to normal. General Bridges found
the streets empty at midday: "There is no hustling, but rather the calm
of a university town and little conception of the need for haste." 28 The
sleeping giant was emerging from its slumber, but the shape of Amer-
ica's involvement in the war was as unclear in Washington as it was
in London. Confusion and uncertainty characterized the first days of
American belligerency. The existing source of strategic advice and
plans for mobilization, the understaffed and unprepared General Staff
(the War College Division had only eleven officers), did not seem up
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to the great task. Bridges reported to Robertson: "There is at present in
the War Department and the General Staff considerable confusion and
lack of grasp of the situation." 29 Confusion certainly abounded within
the hodgepodge of offices assigned to the War Department in the
State, War, and Navy Building across from the White House, with no
priorities being established or supplies allocated. But what surely
concerned Bridges most was his discovery of the General Staff's strong
opposition to bringing American power to bear in the trenches of the
western front until an American army had been organized and trained.
With not a single fully organized division in existence, much less corps
and armies, significant American intervention in the land war ap-
peared at least two years away.
Bridges's advice to his American comrades in arms was often as
subtle as a cannonshot. His first approach was to argue that it was not
possible for America to organize, train, and transport a force to Europe
in time to influence military events there. Following Robertson's in-
structions, he bluntly asked for American recruits to man British
divisions. After both houses of Congress accepted the Draft Bill on
April 28 by large majorities, Bridges wrote Scott: "If you ask me how
your force could most quickly make itself felt in Europe, I would say by
sending 500,000 untrained men at once to our depots in England to be
trained there, and drafted into our armies in France." After only nine
weeks' training in England and nine additional days in France, Bridges
claimed, these Americans could be killing Germans. He attempted to
sugarcoat this extraordinary proposal by making an even more far-
fetched suggestion. Given America's "enormous man power," he
asserted, drafts dispatched to England might not prevent America
from organizing its own army. "The drafts sent to us could eventually
be drafted back into the U.S. Army and would be a good leavening of
seasoned men."30
This letter was apparently seen by Wilson. Not surprisingly,
Bridges discovered that "he was on the wrong path" and had had to
"drop the proposal like a hot potato!"31 When Bridges saw Wilson in
person, he could make no impression on America's commander-in-
chief. "He would talk to me of American labour problems, railways
and even golf, but of war, not a word, and the hundred and one
questions to which I had prepared answers remained unasked."32
The British, together with the French, were more successful in
pressuring Wilson to send American units to France immediately so
that the Stars and Stripes might boost Allied morale. This decision was
prompted more by political than military considerations and was
approved by Wilson and Baker over the American General Staff's
opposition. Marshal Joseph Joffre, the head of the French military
mission, had first broached the subject of immediately sending an
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American force to Europe at a conference at the Army War College just
before Congress accepted conscription. Alarm rather than excitement
was the general reaction of the staff officers at the prospect of coming
to grips with the German army so soon. When the War College
Division submitted a memorandum on the possible organization of a
division for action in France, Kuhn emphasized that the early dispatch
of an American expeditionary force was unwise "from a purely mili-
tary point of view." One of Kuhn's subordinates, Colonel W.H. John-
ston, was more emphatic in his opposition. Johnston perceptively
argued that an expeditionary force, no matter how small, would serve
as a magnet to attract additional men and equipment to the European
theater, subverting attempts to develop a powerful, independent force
in America.33
The General Staff's opposition to depleting the small trained nu-
cleus of its army through an expeditionary force was overcome by
intense Entente pressure on the president. The British and French
military representatives in Washington agreed that their first priority
should be to persuade the Americans to show the flag in Europe
without delay. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, Secretary
of State for War Lord Derby, Robertson, and Haig personally lobbied
Slocum, the American military attache in London.34 Wilson, influ-
enced by the potential psychological and political effects of the pres-
ence of American troops on European soil, bowed to this demand for a
symbolic demonstration of America's commitment to the Allies. He
told Marshal Joffre on May 2 "to take it for granted that such a force
would be sent just as soon as we could send it."35 This pledge was
followed on May 14 by a formal agreement between Baker and Joffre on
the dispatch of an expeditionary force to train with the French army.36
Stressing common language ties, Bridges had initially lobbied for
placing American units with the BEF. Wilson, however, having al-
ready agreed to Anglo-American naval cooperation, wanted American
soldiers to assist the French on land. Bridges immediately conceded
this point—at least for the moment.37 Reflecting the anti-French bias of
many senior British officers, he did not believe for a moment that
Americans would for long choose the French over the British.38 If
anything, Bridges believed, the Americans' initial contacts with the
French would hasten the day they changed their minds. "There will be
friction and difficulties but the French will be saddled with them," he
wrote Robertson.39
As concerned as they were about their own worsening manpower
condition, some British leaders for the moment welcomed Wilson's
decision to commit the first American troops to the war-weary French.
Following the failure of Nivelle's offensive, the demoralized French
poilu needed encouragement more than the British Tommy. When
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Slocum visited British headquarters in late April, Haig took him aside
and urgently told him that America must come to the aid of the French,
who were "flagging." With French politicians declaring that their
country would not survive another winter, Haig thought it imperative
that Washington take some action "to hearten them and stimulate
them."40
Wilson's pledge to Joffre, however, did not at the time signify his
acceptance of a major American role in the land war in Europe. Nor
was his support of the draft related to any belief on his part of the
inevitability of large-scale American military operations on foreign
soil. As essential as these two decisions were to the defeat of Germany,
they had not been made with long-range strategic considerations in
mind. The French and British governments told him that they desper-
ately needed a concrete display of American support to keep their
peoples behind the war. In a face-to-face meeting with a famous
French military leader, he had been unable to refuse this request,
especially in the aftermath of the disastrous Nivelle Offensive (the
Second Battle of the Aisne). But at this juncture, in correspondence
with Baker, he agreed only to send one division while another was
being formed in the United States, "ready to follow fairly shortly, so as
to get the advantage of the training received by the first division and be
able to supplement it should battle losses or sickness diminish its
numbers."41 That was all. It was by no means clear that Wilson had
accepted the need for a massive commitment to the war of attrition in
Europe.
It is true that the French version of Baker's formal agreement with
Joffre on May 14 included the sentence "The secretary gives me to
understand that, from now on, the efforts of the United States will be
restricted only by transportation difficulties."42 This statement, how-
ever, had little practical signficance. America's lack of preparation,
even more than its "transportation difficulties," suggested that the
U.S. Army could not take a meaningful part in the fighting until late
1919. Hence, Wilson can be forgiven for believing in mid-May that
there was no pressing need to make a firm decision on the extent of the
army's participation. Preparation for, rather than involvement in, the
land war might be sufficient to enforce America's moral position in
the event of peace negotiations and to demonstrate to Germany's
military and autocratic leadership that it could not achieve a victor's
peace.
With Wilson's oral approval, Baker selected John J. Pershing to
command the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). Ramrod straight
and extraordinarily self-disciplined, Pershing was every inch a soldier.
Few World War I generals had greater presence, stubborn determina-
tion, or driving ambition. He stood only five feet and nine inches tall,
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yet his formidable bearing led many to think him above six feet. A
Republican, Pershing initially had his doubts about Wilson's war
leadership. When the president made his "too proud to fight" com-
ment after the sinking of the Lusitania, Pershing had exploded: "Isn't
that the damnedest rot you ever heard a sane person get off?"43
Wilson's increasingly militant reaction to Germany's resumption of
unrestricted submarine warfare, however, apparently changed Persh-
ing's mind. Before becoming commander of the AEF, he wrote that
Wilson "is going down in history as one of the three greatest presi-
dents, if not the greatest. . . . It is also gratifying to a soldier to have
such confidence in his leader."44
If Pershing admired Wilson, the president's opinion of his AEF
commander came perilously close to blind faith. The two men met only
once during the war: on May 24 Pershing and Baker called on Wilson at
the White House. The possible bloody price of America's part in what
had become a stalemated war on the western front was uppermost in
Wilson's mind. House had just sent him a brief analysis of the siege
trench warfare by an amateur strategist, George G. Moore, a retired
New York businessman; he had made frequent visits to the British
front as a guest of Sir John French, the British commander-in-chief who
had been replaced by Haig in late 1915. Moore stressed the "impossi-
bility" of breaking through the German defenses in 1917 and warned
that "political urgency and the personal ambition of commanders have
caused a hideous wastage of the man-power of England and France in
attacks from which there was no intelligent hope of success." Rather
than "rush troops" to France to engage in the senseless bloodletting,
Moore wanted to delay American intervention in the land war until a
well-equipped, 2,000,000-man force was created. Wilson wrote Baker
on the day before his interview with Pershing that Moore's views had
made "a considerable impression on me and I should very much like to
discuss it with you when we have the next opportunity."45 Now he
told Pershing that the AEF should avoid repeating the bankrupt tactics
of the Allied commanders. The president also talked about transport-
ing American troops to Europe and Pershing's knowledge of France.
He said nothing, however, about cooperation with the Allies or his
conception of America's commitment to the land war, perhaps because
in his own mind he had not yet decided.46
Although he had skillfully guided the draft bill through a hesitant
Congress and adopted a forward, though by no means unlimited,
policy in Europe by agreeing to send a token expeditionary force to
Europe and dispatching destroyers to the war zone, Wilson was clearly
uncomfortable discussing military matters with either American or
foreign soldiers. He almost never talked with the bookish Bliss, who
headed the General Staff throughout most of the last half of 1917. The
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evidence suggests that during the formative stage of America's in-
volvement in the European land war, he relied on Baker, in whom he
had absolute confidence, and amateur strategists such as Moore.
What Moore was saying, of course, was essentially what the
American General Staff had initially urged: from a purely military
point of view, the U.S. Army should not participate in the European
war until it was capable of fighting as a large, independent force.
Shipping American troops piecemeal to France to receive their training
from the French army involved a considerable risk. With no indepen-
dent American army operating in Europe, the Allied leaders would be
encouraged to resume their demands for amalgamation, thereby un-
dermining the significance of the American military role.47
On May 25 Bliss, who had become acting chief of staff when Scott
was sent to Russia with the Root mission, painted an ominous picture
of Allied intentions: "It seems to most of us that what both the English
and French really wanted from us was not a large well-trained army
but a large number of smaller units which they could feed promptly
into their line as parts of their own organizations in order to maintain
their man power at full strength." If the Allied leaders succeeded, a
million Americans might fight as "parts of battalions and regiments of
the Entente Allies" with "no American army and no American com-
mander." When the war ended, Bliss suggested, America's contribu-
tions to victory might be obscured, with the Stars and Stripes not flying
over a single mile of captured enemy territory. Bliss wanted his gov-
ernment "with all the force at its disposal" to urge the Anglo-French
forces to "stand fast" until a great American force could be created to
deliver "the final, shattering blow."48
Pershing was given a copy of Bliss's alarmist memorandum. He
also received two sets of instructions. When he made his last visit to
the War Department before sailing for Europe, Baker told him: "Here
are your orders, General. The President has just approved them." This
was not the only letter of instruction he received however, a state of
affairs that mystified Pershing then and historians later. What appar-
ently happened was that Bliss, as acting chief of the General Staff,
signed one letter which had been prepared by Pershing and his chief of
staff, Colonel James G. Harbord. But Bliss's May 25 warning that
cooperation with the Allies might mean the destruction of the identity
of American forces had apparently greatly alarmed Wilson and Baker.
Hence, a second letter, with Baker's signature affixed, was written by
Colonel Francis E. Kernan on instructions from the secretary of war,
though it seems likely that its precise language about the protection of
the "identity" of the AEF was added by Wilson and Baker. This second
letter began with the words, "The President directs me to communi-
cate to you the following." As in the other letter, Pershing was ordered
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to cooperate in the joint military effort against Imperial Germany and
was given total control over the extent and timing of this military
cooperation. Unlike the instructions over Bliss's signature, however,
these orders used very direct language to insist that "the underlying
idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a
separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity
of which must be preserved."49
The powers conferred upon Pershing were truly remakable. Wil-
son had kept soldiers in the background throughout his administra-
tion, allowing them no role in the formulation of national policy. Yet
now he gave Pershing virtual control over America's contribution to
the European war. No other American field commander in history has
been given a freer hand to plan and conduct military operations. The
fact that the United States was involved in a coalition war made
Pershing's position all the more extraordinary.
Allied statesmen and soldiers soon despaired over Pershing's
leadership of the AEF and sought his dismissal. A chief complaint was
his refusal to accept the amalgamation of American units into Allied
forces. But Pershing was following the orders of his political superiors
in Washington to maintain the identity of American forces; a primary
reason that the president continued to give Pershing such remarkable
freedom is that his field commander's position on amalgamation mir-
rored his own. Nevertheless, if Pershing had accepted the Entente's
dire view of the military situation during the first half of 1918 and
recommended feeding American troops into Allied armies to save the
Entente from defeat, it would have been extremely difficult for Baker
and Wilson to overrule him.
Although the granite-willed Pershing became a major obstacle to
providing the Allies immediate help through amalgamation, he played
a pivotal role in developing the trickle of American soldiers crossing
the Atlantic into a flood. Pershing did not want American arms to play
a secondary role in Germany's defeat. He wanted a force large enough
to fight as an independent army on its own front and with sufficient
strength to deliver the death blow to the German war machine. Con-
sequently, his demands on the War Department for more American
soldiers escalated dramatically: first he wanted twenty divisions, then
thirty, and finally more than a threefold increase to one hundred. If
this last (and impossible) request had been met, the AEF would have
easily outnumbered all other Allied armies on the western front com-
bined. Pershing's demands for more men began as soon as he arrived
in France. He wrote Bliss from Paris requesting "at least 1,000,000
men" by early spring 1918, with half that number on the line. This
meant that the War Department would have to ship "the equivalent of
at least four divisions per month between now and next May."50
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By the time Pershing's letter arrived, the General Staff, following
the lead of Baker, had abandoned its opposition to transporting Amer-
ican forces to Europe before they had been completely organized and
trained in the United States. The General Staff now favored a continu-
ous flow, with training on both sides of the Atlantic. Beginning on
August 1, the War College Division contemplated "sending approx-
imately 120,000 men with their equipment and paraphernalia per
month." To relieve the "critical situation now existing in France," the
General Staff had also begun a program to expand the army to a force
of approximately 1,000,000 men within the next four months. "Mani-
festly," the War College Division asserted, "this force is being raised
for the purpose of placing it, at the earliest practicable date, alongside
the forces of other nations at war with Germany."51
What the president had initially approved, a symbolic show of
force on the western front, had by early June in the planning of the
General Staff become a million-man expeditionary force. Compelling
military and political considerations were at the heart of this decision.
As late as his interview with Pershing, Wilson was apparently reluc-
tant to make a firm decision on deploying a massive American force in
"the mechanical game of slaughter." Baker played the crucial role in
getting the president to support a large-scale commitment of American
manpower. The secretary of war had come to appreciate the time
element: America simply did not have the luxury of following Moore's
advice and organizing a great fighting force before shipping it to
Europe.
When the president continued to equivocate, Baker sent him an
unusually sharp letter on May 27. America, he noted, might not have
any allies left by the time it was finally able to conduct great military
operations of its own. Not only would delay prolong the war and make
victory less likely, but important political considerations also had to be
taken into account. The secretary of war warned that American inac-
tion might demoralize Americans as well as citizens of the Entente
nations, provoke harsh domestic as well as foreign criticism of Wil-
son's war administration, and make the president's claim that he
sought to "make the world safe for democracy" a source of ridicule.52
Baker's arguments seem to have been decisive in shattering Wil-
son's illusion that he might be able to dominate the peacemaking
without great loss of American lives. On June 14, the day the first units
of the AEF embarked for Europe, Wilson proclaimed in his Flag Day
Address: "We are about to bid thousands, hundreds of thousands, it
may be millions, of our men, the young, the strong, the capable men of
the nation, to go forth and die beneath [the flag] on fields of blood far
away—for what?" The Wilson who delivered this address was not the
same Wilson who had attempted in December 1916 to force on the
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British a compromise peace that would have left Imperial Germany
and its allies in control of the heart of Europe and in a forward position
in Asia, able to resume the war at a time of their choosing. To justify
their coming sacrifices to the American people, Wilson now accused
the "military masters of Germany" of attempting to extend "a broad
belt of German military power and political control across the very
centre of Europe and beyond the Mediterranean into the heart of
Asia." If German expansionism should succeed, he warned, "America
will fall within the menace. We and all the rest of the world must
remain armed, as they will remain, and must make ready for the next
step in their aggression."53
Although Wilson's mid-June statement appeared to embrace the
British view of the war in many of its essentials, this appearance was
misleading. Potentially the most divisive question in Anglo-American
wartime cooperation was the threat posed to the future security of the
British Empire by the president's revolutionary diplomacy in the cause
of liberty and justice. During the British mission's visit to Washington,
Balfour and Wilson had circled Entente war aims rather than confront-
ing them directly. Contrary to Wilson's subsequent statements, Bal-
four did discuss British war objectives in Europe and the Near East
with both House and Wilson, later furnishing the president copies of
inter-Allied agreements. No mention was made, however, of the
British Empire's interest in the conquered German colonies, a matter
not covered by Allied secret treaties.54 Whether Wilson chose to read
the secret treaties between Britain and its allies is not clear. What does
seem certain is that Balfour was reasonably forthcoming about the
Entente's territorial objectives as spelled out in those agreements.55
The British foreign secretary surely breathed a sigh of relief that Wilson
displayed no desire to make trouble over these annexationist treaties.
Apparently Wilson never considered making American support
conditional upon the Allies' modification of their war aims. The presi-
dent may have understood that the secret treaties, acting as a guaran-
tee of good faith, served to unify the Allied coalition, and that any
attempt he might instigate to revise them would be extremely divisive.
"If the Allies begin to discuss terms among themselves, they will soon
hate one another worse than they do Germany and a situation will
arise similar to that in the Balkan States after the Turkish War,"56
House cautioned the president. Britain might be divided from its
European allies, a wedge driven between London and Washington,
and the anti-German coalition generally weakened.
Wilson's tact on Allied war objectives in no way meant that he
planned to utilize American manpower to underwrite the imperialistic
secret treaties.57 America's military involvement was designed to drive
Germany's "military masters" from power and to impose Wilson's
The Balfour Mission and Americans Abroad 61
liberal peace program on victor and vanquished alike. As he wrote
House in July, "England and France have not the same views with regard to
peace that we have by any means." This would matter little if victory were
obtained through ever increasing American assistance. Wilson could
then dominate the peace conference and force the Entente powers "to
our way of thinking because by that time they will, among other
things, be financially in our hands."58
It is not surprising that Wilson stressed the Entente's financial
dependence on the United States while American military power was
still very much in its embryonic phase. The Balfour mission, although
a great public relations success, had failed to convince Washington
to accept emergency measures that could have provided immediate
American assistance but were thought to be anathema to American
interests. Understandably, the Americans had refused to serve as a
recruiting ground for the French and British armies. Less defensible
was the Shipping Board's refusal to respond to British requests for
assistance in shipping.
As difficult as it was for America to create an army from scratch,
the transportation of large numbers of soldiers to Europe presented
even greater problems. The army had few troop transports capable of
making the round trip to Europe. In April the U.S. Navy possessed one
unseaworthy transport and the U.S.S. Henderson, yet to be commis-
sioned.59 But also in April, by adding to available American ocean-
going tonnage confiscated German and Austrian ships that had been
in American ports since 1914, the General Staff lowered estimates for
the time it would take to transport an American force to Europe.
Within seven months, the General Staff claimed, 500,000 troops (or
roughly eighteen divisions) could reach France.60 This proposal
proved to be wildly optimistic.
The British had pressed the importance of shipping on the Amer-
ican government from the first. On the day that the United States went
to war, London informed Washington that "the most vital thing for the
Allies at present is the provision of shipping."61 The shipping mission
that accompanied Balfour hoped to spur American construction of
merchant ships and to gain acceptance of Allied utilization of neutral
shipping. William Denman, head of the United States Shipping Board,
was wary of British intentions, however, suspecting that London
hoped to use the war to steal a march on American merchant ship-
ping.62 He was especially concerned about previous British orders for
ship construction in American shipyards; in Balfour's words, Denman
feared that "the industry of the United States is to be upset in order that
Great Britain may, at the end of the war, find itself in possession of a
mercantile marine built in United States yards, by United States la-
bour, with the assistance of the United States Government, and at the
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cost of the United States public."63 Denman also believed that the
British planned to continue their dominance over the United States as a
merchant sea power by safeguarding their own shipping while putting
American merchant ships in great peril of undersea assault.64
These anti-British views meant the "near total failure" of the Brit-
ish shipping mission.Denman refused to release the neutral shipping
under his control for Allied purposes, demanded that Britain turn over
British shipbuilding orders in United States shipyards to him, and
chose a grandiose long-term plan, rather than immediate action, for
the expansion of American shipping.65 Nonetheless, the opening of
American financial coffers provided some measure of relief for Allied
shipping. The British were no longer forced to make shipping deci-
sions based on considerations of national fiscal policy. Rather than
transporting wheat from Australia, for example, the British Admiralty
could save many sea miles by buying it from America.66
Alarmed by the submarine peril above all else, British political and
naval authorities also wanted Washington to delay its ambitious cap-
ital shipbuilding program in favor of the construction of destroyers,
which were vitally needed to conduct antisubmarine warfare. But the
American naval establishment, with an eye to the postwar situation
and especially the growing naval threat that Japan posed to American
interests in the Pacific, initially opposed building destroyers instead of
battleships.
A way out of this impasse was suggested by House on May 13
when he talked to Sir Eric Drummond, Balfour's private secretary.
Could not the British, House suggested, promise to lend the United
States battleships from its own fleet in the event of any near-term
postwar Japanese threat? But the possibility that the German fleet
would survive the war might make any such British promise inimical
to British security, Drummond countered. One may surmise that
House was speaking for Wilson up to this point in his discussions with
Drummond, but he surely went beyond anything that the president
had contemplated when he next proposed a startling solution to future
American naval security concerns: a secret Anglo-American alliance
whereby the two countries would agree to lend battleships to each
other in an emergency.67
When Balfour was brought into these discussions, he was tremen-
dously excited by the long-range potential of a defensive naval alliance
with the United States. Such an arrangement, which would guarantee
the Atlantic powers' domination of the postwar globe, was far beyond
anything anticipated by his mission to Washington. But was House's
suggestion too good to be true? When Balfour informed London of
these unofficial discussions, he warned that both America's isola-
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tionist tradition and the U.S. Constitution made such an alignment
unlikely.68
Balfour at first discounted the possibility that a naval alliance with
the United States would destroy the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which
had supported British interests in the Far East for fifteen years. But the
Foreign Office and War Cabinet did not. Believing that the prospects
for the U.S. Senate's approval were remote at best, the War Cabinet
was not prepared to pursue the chimera of an Anglo-American naval
alliance at the risk of destroying the Anglo-Japanese agreement.69
Balfour, however, would not let the matter die. Immediately upon
his return to London, he became the catalyst for renewed discussions
within the War Cabinet of a possible defensive naval alignment that
would encourage the United States to alter its capital shipbuilding
program. Balfour now focused on a multilateral rather than a secret
bilateral arrangement between London and Washington. To mollify
Tokyo, Balfour suggested in a terse, one-sentence proposal that Japan
be included in a defensive naval league with the United States, Britain,
Italy, France, and Russia for a four-year period following the end of the
war.70
Pressed to elaborate upon this plan, which included all of the
world's major powers except Germany, Balfour prepared a more
lengthy proposal, which was discussed by the War Cabinet on July 3.
An Anglo-American naval alliance would have "the immense advan-
tage of being both simple and adequate," he noted, "and I confess that,
for reasons of high policy, there is nothing I should like more than a
defensive Alliance with America, even for four years, as would be
capable of extension and development, should circumstances prove
auspicious." But he was forced to admit that coalition politics, es-
pecially Japanese sensibilities, made a bilateral treaty with Washington
impossible. With little confidence that he would succeed, the War
Cabinet authorized the foreign secretary to begin confidential negotia-
tions with President Wilson for American participation in a multilateral
naval alliance.71
When House received Balfour's proposal for a multilateral naval
alliance, he passed it on to the president on July 8 with the comment,
"That is not quite what we had in mind." After all, in the event of any
conflict with Japan, the United States would receive no help from the
other signatory powers, who would remain neutral. House wanted to
return to "our first proposal," the British loan of battleships to the
United States.72 House's use of "we" and "our" suggests that the
president was involved in his alter ego's initial unofficial feelers of May
13 to allow the United States to change its building program from
battleships to destroyers without undermining its future naval posi-
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tion in the Pacific. It seems equally obvious that House had gone well
beyond the president's intent when he had also advocated a secret
Anglo-American naval alliance during his May 13 conversation with
Drummond. All of Wilson's actions then and later indicate that he
wanted no special relationship with the British, much less a secret
naval alliance. Nor was he prepared to consider American participa-
tion in any naval league.
In a meeting with Sir William Wiseman in his study on July 13,
Wilson sent a clear message to Balfour that he opposed any British
initiative that would involve the United States in a collective naval
security scheme. The president, who had already radically departed
from American diplomatic tradition by dispatching ships and men to
participate in a great European war, expressed a willingness for the
United States to "take her place as a world-power." But in projecting its
power abroad, America wanted to "play a 'lone hand,' and not to
commit herself to any alliances with any foreign power."73 A secret
Anglo-American naval treaty so appealing to House and Balfour, or
even a multilateral arrangement that included the United States, was
obviously a nonstarter. David F. Trask, who devotes an entire chapter,
"The Abortive Secret Treaty of 1917," to these confidential Anglo-
American discussions, has read too much into this incident.74 Every
instinct of the president in 1917 was against a naval alliance with
Britain. Equally, the War Cabinet recognized the great American con-
stitutional and political obstacles to such an arrangement and was not
prepared to sacrifice its valuable alliance with Japan. Happily for the
Allied naval war against Germany, the United States soon decided on
its own to emphasize destroyer over battleship construction.
Despite the unfeasibility of an Anglo-American naval alliance and
the limited results of their negotiations to increase American shipping
contributions, the British were encouraged by the apparent willing-
ness of the United States to cooperate with the Royal Navy in Euro-
pean waters. Even before America entered the war, the president had
sought close communications with the British Admiralty to protect
American merchant shipping. Canadian-born Vice Admiral William S.
Sims, known for his strong and independent thought, was sent to
London as the Navy Department's representative abroad. While Con-
gress was considering and passing a declaration of war, Sims, in
civilian dress, was en route to Great Britain.
Unlike many in the Navy Department who viewed the Royal Navy
as a future rival as well as a present ally, Sims thought that American
and British naval interests were identical. He was soon at sixes and
sevens with Admiral William S. Benson, the chief of Naval Operations,
who was responsible for advising the government on the strategic
deployment of the navy. Before Sims left for London, Benson told him:
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"Don't let the British pull the wool over your eyes. It is none of our
business pulling their chestnuts out of the fire. We would as soon fight
the British as the Germans."75 Germany's success with unrestricted
U-boat warfare, however, provided Sims with a powerful argument
for cooperation with the British Grand Fleet, even if circumstances
demanded that American naval forces be given a subordinate role on
the European maritime front.
One week after its declaration of war, the United States decided to
send a flotilla of six destroyers to the European war zone to assist the
British in protecting Allied shipping. Before the end of April the
General Board recommended a major reinforcement of the American
presence in European waters, a suggestion that was slow to be imple-
mented.76 Eventually Anglo-American naval cooperation saw a level
of amalgamation never achieved by American land forces with the
British and French, but not without serious disagreements over pri-
orities and strategy.
Wilson, in contrast to his detachment toward the land war during
the formative stages of the AEF, took a very active interest in naval
matters. Favoring convoys, he was contemptuous of the British Admi-
ralty's efforts to contain the U-boat threat. "In the presence of the
present submarine emergency they are helpless to the point of panic,"
he told Sims. "Every plan we suggest they reject for some reason of
prudence."77 In opposition to the British, Wilson also favored an
offensive policy against German submarine bases.
As the Balour mission, which had begun its return voyage on June
3, approached the Irish coast, it was escorted home by four American
destroyers. This was an encouraging but misleading symbol of Amer-
ican participation. After three months of being at war, America's direct
contribution to the defeat of Germany consisted of six destroyers in
European waters and the crucial commitment, backed up by Persh-
ing's arrival with a small staff in Liverpool on June 8, eventually to
wage war against the main body of the German army in France.
Despite Washington's acceptance of a forward policy on the land and
maritime fronts in Europe, the Balfour mission had failed in its assign-
ment of persuading the Americans to take the extraordinary steps that
would have provided the Entente with immediate shipping and man-
power assistance.
The precipitous decline of the French army was very much on the
mind of the British government on the day Pershing arrived in Great
Britain. General Sir Henry Wilson, who was at this time the chief liaison
officer between the BEF and the French army, reported growing unrest
in the French sector. At a meeting of the War Cabinet he "expressed
grave doubts as to whether we could count on the continued resistance
of the French army and nation until such time as effective military
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SWOOPING FROM THE WEST."
"It is the intention of our new Ally to assist us in the patrolling of the
Atlantic." From Punch, April 18,1917.
The Balfour Mission and Americans Abroad 67
assistance could be received from the United States of America."78
Lloyd George, who believed that Americans were too inclined to limit
their war mobilization to "festivities and banner-waving," was in-
clined to pressure President Wilson. Sir Edward Grey, who was
known to be admired by both Wilson and House, had been suggested
as Balfour's successor in Washington. But Lloyd George was unenthu-
siastic; he feared that Grey and President Wilson "would be talking of
peace when they ought to be preparing for War." 79 To the horror of the
Foreign Office, the prime minister wanted to send the aggressive and
unpredictable press proprietor Lord Northcliffe to the United States as
Balfour's successor.80 Fearing that the megalomaniacal Northcliffe
might disrupt Anglo-American relations, Drummond warned of "de-
plorable consequences" if Northcliffe attempted "to hustle them [the
Wilson administration] unduly."81 Although Northcliffe was sent to
Washington as head of a British war mission, many British leaders
agreed with Drummond that the president must be handled with kid
gloves.
America's reaction to the first Allied war missions in April and
May has been interpreted quite variously. In Pershing's view, the
United States freely offered the Anglo-French missions "not only all
that we had but all we could hope to have, and it may be truly said that
never did a nation engaging its resources and the lives of its citizens do
less bargaining or show more complete response than we did on that
occasion."82 Conversely, it has been suggested that American aid
during the first months of American belligerency was "deliberately
rationed."83 This wording gives a Machiavellian twist to the Wilson
administration's response to Allied pleas for assistance. The actions of
the president and most of his chief advisers, however, did not really
reflect a deliberate and coordinated policy of rationing their country's
military and naval assistance to place the Allies at the mercy of Amer-
ican political objectives. Rather, America's initially limited assistance
was a result of its isolationist tradition, its almost total unpreparedness
to fight on European soil, the Wilson administration's failure to appre-
ciate that massive as well as early American involvement in the land
war was required to thwart German expansionism, and a natural
reluctance to accept extreme Allied positions (such as requests for
amalgamating American units in Allied military formations) that were
considered demeaning as well as detrimental to American national
self-interests.
Russia's and France's decline in the spring of 1917 made Britain the
cornerstone of the anti-German coalition. Difficult and critical deci-
sions had to be made in London before the United States assumed a
large part of the burden of fighting Germany. Lord Milner, who after
the prime minister was the most influential civilian in formulating
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British war policy, feared that his country would drift toward disaster
during the coming months. He wanted a comprehensive strategic plan
based on what might ultimately be expected from the United States.
"The entrance of America into the war has introduced a new factor, of
great ultimate promise but small immediate value," Milner wrote to
the War Cabinet. "What are we doing to do to fill up the time before the
weight of America can be thrown into the scale? How do we hope to
get the greatest benefit from her assistance in the long run?"84
4
Britain as the Cornerstone
While the Balfour mission lobbied for American support in Wash-
ington, Entente fortunes took a serious turn for the worse. After bitter
controversy with his high command, Lloyd George had succeeded in
placing the BEF under the strategic direction of Nivelle, the French
commander-in-chief, before the Allied spring offensive got under way
on the western front. But Nivelle's offensive, which began on April 16,
fell far short of achieving its grandiose objectives. On April 18 Robert-
son told the War Cabinet that "generally speaking, the French attack
ha[s] not achieved apparently the results expected." More ominous
than Nivelle's failure to drive through the German defenses in his
promised twenty-four or forty-eight hours were reports of a new mood
in France. With America as an ally, the French were inclining toward a
defensive posture. News from Russia was equally depressing. The
overthrow of the tsar had not revitalized the nation. Robertson be-
lieved that the Russian army had "fallen to pieces" and would be
unable to maintain pressure on the Central Powers in either Europe
or Asia.1
With the Russian army on the verge of collapse and the French
hoping to defer action while waiting for America, the British were
forced to reevaluate their war strategy.2 Military events were increas-
ingly shifting the burden of fighting the German army to Britain,
placing even greater strain, both economic and military, on British
manpower resources. On the same day, April 18, that the British lead-
ership began its debate over the altered strategic landscape, Hankey
finished a twenty-nine-page review of the war for the prime minister's
private perusal. As he had done in the past, Lloyd George was sub-
stituting the advice of this former member of the Royal Marine Artil-
lery, who has been described as "an intellectual in uniform," for that
of the Imperial General Staff.3
Writing while the Balfour mission was on its way to America,
Hankey was overly optimistic concerning the manpower help that the
United States might provide in the near future, arguing that Russia's
decline would be balanced by American participation: "The Allies will
have great resources, not only of labour, but of fighting manpower to
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draw in the United States (to say nothing of coloured labour), providing
they can restore their failing maritime resources, and the prolongation of
the war, if we are to achieve the victory we desire, will be indefinite."
Believing that the war might "last through 1918, and perhaps longer,"
Hankey linked Britain's staying power to the continued health of the
British economy. If Britain were forced to wreck its economy by denud-
ing its industry of workers, it might destroy national morale: "Man-
Power is now the most difficult of the problems which the War Cabinet
has to face under the economic head. . . . with the probability of a
prolongation of the War, the Government feel it to be more and more
dangerous to mortgage the future by reducing our man-power by any
drastic steps."4
To Lloyd George's disappointment, Hankey did not rule out a
major British offensive on the western front following the collapse of
Nivelle's offensive. Unlike President Wilson, Lloyd George had an
interest in defense policy and strategic questions that predated 1914.5
Although his military experience was almost as limited as President
Wilson's—a short and undistinguished stint in the pre-Haldane mili-
tia—he refused to give his generals a free hand in conducting the war
against Germany, establishing himself as Britain's most important
opponent of prolonged, costly, and, in his view, ultimately fruitless
attacks against the ever more sophisticated German defenses of the
western front. Lloyd George had been selected prime minister because
of his commitment to total victory and the mobilization of British
resources to that end, but he remained equivocal about the high cost
and efficacy of any British effort to defeat the German army in France
and Flanders. A common thread in his war strategy was limiting
British casualties. At the conclusion of the war he did not want the BEF
reduced to a second- or even third-rate force with a resulting loss of
influence over the peace settlement.6
Another source of conflict between Lloyd George and the lead-
ership of the British army was that the prime minister always consid-
ered the political ramifications of military action. His support for
military operations was largely determined by their relationship to
securing Britain's global position, their potential to limit British casu-
alties and lift war-weary spirits on the home front, their prospects of
forcing Britain's weaker foes to the peace table, and their role in
holding the anti-German coalition together. He had given tentative—
and temporary—support to the Somme offensive in 1916 to assuage
French fears that the British were unwilling to do their fair share of
fighting against the German army; pressed for sending guns and
munitions to the eastern front to enable Russian manpower to wear
down the enemy; lobbied for intervention in the Balkans to enlist the
support of Balkan powers; urged attacks against Turkey that would
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serve to secure the British Empire against the Turko-German menace
but not involve the same commitment of British forces as did the
western front; and sought a diversion of British resources to the Italian
front where the Italians would do most of the fighting and dying.7 He
had thrown his support to Nivelle's offensive in 1917 because the BEF
was assigned a secondary and less costly role in the attack; moreover,
he believed that a prolonged and futile attack would be avoided
because Nivelle had promised that the success or failure of his opera-
tion would be known almost immediately.8
Lloyd George knew that the failure of the French offensive would
revive Haig's plan of a gigantic offensive to clear the Belgian coast of
German submarine bases. Rejecting the French desire to stand on the
defensive and wait for America, Hankey told Lloyd George that Britain
must not "sit still. We must do the enemy all the damage we can. This
can best be done by fighting a great battle with the object of recovering
the Flanders coast, which would be the most effective way of reducing
our shipping losses," he wrote on April 18.9 Nivelle's failure gave
Lloyd George limited room in which to maneuver. His underhanded
tactics in placing Haig under Nivelle had angered his generals, under-
mined his credibility in military affairs, and endangered his political
support. France's and Russia's decline also presented a strong case for
a more active BEF role on the western front to sustain the alliance.
Hence Lloyd George's opposition to a major British offensive was
initially muted. If he had been confident of early and substantial
American military support on the western front, he would certainly
have aggressively supported the French standstill policy until the
Yanks arrived to share the burden of wearing down the German army.
Reports from the returning British mission confirmed earlier pessi-
mistic British military estimates of the military significance of Amer-
ica's entry into the war. American belligerency did not seem to
guarantee victory in either 1917 or 1918. In what Lord Curzon called
"the most depressing statement that the Cabinet had received for a
long time," General Bridges informed the civilians in mid-June that "it
seems probable that America can have an army of 120-150,000 men in
France by 1st January 1918, and of 500,000 men by the end of 1918."
Significantly, Bridges stressed that this estimate left "all matters of sea-
transport out of the question."10
America's inability to transport its own forces to Europe was now
well known in the British government. In London, Pershing had
emphasized America's lack of tonnage in discussions with Lloyd
George and Robertson. Disappointed by their response, Pershing then
and later viewed with considerable cynicism British explanations of
why they had no tonnage to spare for the transport of American
troops.
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Britain's shipping crisis was real enough. The German submarine
guerre a I'outrance continued to inflict heavy losses on Allied ships. A
week after he talked with Pershing about snipping, Robertson wrote a
fellow officer: "Generally speaking we are in a position probably never
foreseen. Ever since I can remember and years before then it has
always been assumed that we would have command of the sea and
everything was based upon that hypothesis, and if anybody had
thought it should be based on any other hypothesis they would have
been classed as fools. As a matter of fact we have not got command of
the sea. In every theatre we are suffering from shipping shortage."11 If
the British diverted scarce shipping to the transport of Pershing's raw
troops, operations in other theaters would be placed in jeopardy.
Furthermore, they would have to sacrifice their own supply of food,
raw materials, arms, and munitions, thereby weakening the Allied war
effort and lowering morale on the home front. And for what? Even if
Pershing had the men, the British military authorities believed that he
would not be able to organize them into effective divisions, corps, and
armies for a long time to come. Only if American units were merged
with existing Allied military formations with their sophisticated logis-
tical systems did the diversion of British shipping to the transportation
of doughboys appear to make military sense.
On May 1 Lloyd George almost certainly expressed his real views
when he claimed to be playing devil's advocate at a meeting of the War
Cabinet to discuss Britain's position at a forthcoming Allied conference
in Paris. The French, he told the British leaders, would argue that the
Entente did not possess "the superiority of men and material neces-
sary for a successful offensive" in the West. "They would further urge
that the blockade was telling on the enemy: that by 1918 the Russian
situation would have cleared up definitely one way or the other, and
that the United States of America would be able to put half a million
men in the field. Even if the shipping conditions did not enable the
American Army to be transported to the Western Front, it could be
sent to Russia. . . . They would advocate that for the present our policy
on the Western Front should be defensive, and that in the meantime
we should use our surplus strength to clear up the situation else-
where—in Syria, for example—and to eliminate first Turkey, then
Bulgaria, and finally, perhaps even Austria from the War." Lloyd
George admitted that these arguments "made some appeal to him."12
With the British Empire never far from the thoughts of the War
Cabinet, Lloyd George took care to emphasize the political advantages
of a peripheral strategy. "If Russia collapsed it would be beyond our
power to beat Germany, as the blockade would become to a great
extent ineffective, and the whole of the enemies' forces would become
available to oppose the Western Allies. We could not contemplate with
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equanimity the prospect of entering a Peace Conference with the
enemy in possession of a large slice of Allied territory before we had
completed the conquest of Mesopotamia and Syria."13
Lloyd George's civilian colleagues, however, expressed little sup-
port for adopting a defensive position in the West in 1917; Anglo-
French military inactivity against the Germans might allow Berlin to
finish off Italy and Russia, and shipping losses might make impossible
a great effort later. A decisive contribution to the discussion was made
by Jan Christiaan Smuts, the South African soldier-statesman, whom
Lloyd George would soon invite to become a member of the War
Cabinet. Smuts argued that Britain had to apply pressure on the
German army on the western front to prevent defeatism from spread-
ing within the alliance. "To relinquish the offensive in the third year of
the War would be fatal, and would be the beginning of the end," he
warned. If the British could not break the enemy's front, "we might
break his heart." u British losses were certain to be gigantic. And the
British were naturally inclined to look to the United States eventually
to replace these losses.
Lloyd George, with little confidence that he would be successful,
was forced by the War Cabinet to press the French to continue their
spring offensive. "We must go on hitting and hitting with all our
strength until the German end[s], as he always [does], by cracking," he
told an Anglo-French conference in early May.15 The prime minister's
fighting words, however, could not revive French morale, which was
worse than even he suspected at the time. Without American and now
French support, he believed that it would be disastrous for Britain to go
it alone on the western front. To counter Smuts's argument that Britain
must keep the pressure on Berlin until the United States became a
major factor in the land war, he argued that it was even more impor-
tant for Britain to maintain its staying power by limiting its losses. The
minutes of the War Policy Committee (which had been created to
assess the new military realities) reflect his anxiety about the political
and economic consequences if Britain tried to fight Germany single-
handedly in 1917: "The burden on us, therefore, was very great, and it
was very important not to break the country. Yesterday the Committee
had been considering the shipping situation, and there again the
demand for men was more insistent every day. He wanted the country
to be able to last. He did not want to have to face a Peace Conference
some day with our country weakened while America was still over-
whelmingly strong, and Russia had perhaps revived her strength. He
wanted to reserve our strength till next year."16
If Lloyd George had dominated British strategy, he would have
diverted Britain's military emphasis away from the West to the war
against Turkey or to the Italian front (where, he argued, Austria-
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Hungary could be forced out of the war). His colleagues, however,
could not be persuaded to adopt this high-risk strategy. Britain needed
its European allies more than they needed Britain. Imperial-minded
statesmen such as Smuts and Curzon gave him no support for con-
centrating on areas such as Syria and Mesopotamia to gain negotiating
chips for any peace conference. Only by maintaining its commitment
to fighting the main body of the German army could Britain force the
enemy to withdraw from Belgium and France, Curzon stressed. "If
these two objects were made the subject of an offer by Germany at an
earlier date, while her military strength and that of her Allies is still
unbroken, it could only be at the price of conditions which Great
Britain alone would have to pay and which would purchase the safety
of our Allies by the acceptance of a grave peril to the future of the
British Empire."17 Despite the great loss of life in the trenches of the
western front, Britain could not run the risk of losing its Continental
allies by lessening its commitment to them.
After weeks of agonizing debate within the War Policy Committee,
the civilians gave Haig permission on July 20 to proceed with the
Flanders offensive that he had been preparing for months. Haig's
optimism was in sharp contrast with the almost fatalistic mood of the
civilians. He commanded five armies in France and Flanders, compris-
ing sixty-two divisions, a total strength of some 1,500,000 men. Believ-
ing that the enemy he faced across no-man's-land was nearing the
breaking point, he hoped to rupture the German line, take the Belgian
coast, threaten vital rail communications, and perhaps force a general
German retirement from Belgium.
C.R.M.F. Cruttwell, one of Britain's most distinguished World
War I historians, has suggested "that Haig was obsessed with the
determination to exhaust the enemy before the arrival of the Amer-
icans in such strength that their intervention might reduce Great
Britain to a secondary role."18 Haig unquestionably believed that the
BEF was the best army in the world in 1917 and the only one capable of
defeating Germany. But his papers provide no evidence that in 1917 he
was worried that American intervention might deny the BEF the
prestige of playing the leading role in the destruction of German
militarism.19
As Haig's big guns pounded German defenses in Flanders in a
prelude to his infantry assault, the British had their attention focused
on developments in the East. Events there could be interpreted either
in favor of or in opposition to Haig's campaign, which was certain to
be costly to British manpower. Russia's feeble attempt to launch an of-
fensive in July had resulted in the disintegration of its army. On July
29 Robertson reported to his government the results of an Austro-
German counterattack: "The Russians broke, with the result that three
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Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary
Force. Courtesy of Special Collections, U.S. Army Military History In-
stitute.
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Russian armies comprising some 60 to 70 divisions, well equipped
with guns and ammunition, are now running away from some 18
Austrian and German divisions."20
The Russian debacle and the deterioration of the French army
(which was daily becoming clearer in London) forced the British
leadership to think beyond the British offensive in Flanders. For the
moment Haig's forces were capable of putting intense pressure on
Germany. But what would be the situation in 1918 if Haig depleted his
forces without decisive results? An Allied military conference attended
by Pershing on July 26 considered the doomsday prospect that the
Central Powers might be able to mass some 273 divisions in the West
by June 1918. If every possible Allied division were concentrated in the
West, the Allied inferiority would still be between forty and fifty
divisions, giving the strategic initiative to the enemy unless America
could fill this void.21 Pershing promised to have twenty U.S. divisions
in France by June 1,1918, if transportation were made available; there-
after the United States would continue to furnish divisions "up to the
limit of her resources," which Pershing believed to be between twenty-
five and thirty additional divisions.22 Robertson, however, informed
the War Cabinet that he was certain there was no chance of America's
deploying and maintaining fifty divisions in France "for two years
or more." 23
Lloyd George had argued during the debate over Haig's Flanders
offensive in favor of a standstill strategy in the West until American
units started arriving in force. But waiting for America while Britain
collected imperial plums in Palestine and elsewhere might mean the
political disintegration of the Entente, should Germany offer generous
terms to Britain's European allies. Lloyd George's expectation that the
war-weary Italians would either drive Vienna from the war or keep the
German army occupied in 1917 was wishful thinking at best. A majority
of the British leadership concluded that Britain, now the cornerstone of
the Entente, had no choice but to apply pressure on the German army
in 1917. Otherwise, the tottering anti-German coalition might collapse.
Unlike Haig, however, the British civilians did not think that the
German army could be defeated in 1917.
On July 31 Haig's infantry left the trenches to begin an assault
against the German army that would last into November. The un-
answered question for Lloyd George, who had rejected Haig's invita-
tion to observe the launching of the British attack, was whether Britain
could save the alliance in the summer and fall of 1917 without exhaust-
ing itself in the process. Because America's entry in to the war had thus
far not lifted the heavy burden that the failing fortunes of the anti-
German coalition had placed on the British Empire, a negative answer
to that question remained a frightening yet real possibility.
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Despite the many uncertainties of the military situation, the War
Cabinet was determined to fight on. Smuts admitted in a paper for the
War Cabinet that "the situation for us is going to be much darker than it
is at present . . .  the nadir of our fortunes has by no means been
reached." Yet he thought that the "issues at stake are too vast for us to
ever to contemplate a peace which will in effect mean a defeat."24
Fearing that the war might continue into 1919 or even 1920, Lloyd
George and other British civilians now saw their future salvation in
what Smuts called "the incomparable resources in material and man-
power of America." 25 On the day that Haig launched his controversial
Flanders attack, it was noted in the War Cabinet that "eventually we
might have to contemplate a situation in which the burden of the War
was sustained entirely by the British Empire and the United States of
America."26
With victory and a British peace being pushed further into the
future, the politico-strategic conundrum for the British leaders was
how to prop up their allies without eventually becoming totally depen-
dent upon the United States, militarily as well as financially. A wor-
risome point continued to be Wilson's commitment to "peace without
victory." The America leader almost certainly would oppose prolong-
ing the war to secure the British Empire at Germany's and Turkey's
expense. As Spring Rice reminded Balfour on July 27, "It must not be
forgotten that this country is under no obligation to continue the war
beyond the moment when it is America's interest to continue it or to
wage war in any way which will not further first of all American
interests alone."27 Lloyd George might be prepared to trade con-
quered enemy territories for a favorable peace, but many of his Tory
colleagues and the Dominions were not.28
As the strain on British resources continued to mount, the failure
of the British mission to coordinate Anglo-American military efforts
that would ease the future burden on the British Empire was very
much on the minds of British leaders. The most important achieve-
ment of British (and French) diplomacy in Washington had been
gaining the president's commitment to the land war in Europe. But
since then the French had lost heart, and the Russian army was in
headlong decline. With the AEF attached to the French army, the
British were being forced to assume the primary burden of taking on
the German army without any assurance that the BEF could count on
American manpower to replace its losses. As July ended, an anxious
Lloyd George told some of his colleagues that he wanted Wilson to
come to Britain "and swear to support us."29
Although he was serious, Lloyd George did not know how to
approach the president. Wiseman strongly resisted any proposal to
invite Wilson to London. The president of the United States could not
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be summoned to London for discussions as if he were a Dominion
prime minister. America leaders, Wiseman told London, "consider
that Washington has become the diplomatic centre of the world."
Another consideration for Wiseman was his belief that the chemistry
between Wilson and Lloyd George and his Tory-dominated War Cabi-
net was wrong.30
Discouraged from inviting Wilson to London, Lloyd George—
inclined to the grand gesture—decided to visit America, something no
head of a British government had ever done.31 Given his anxiety over
the military situation and his political insecurity, this proposal was
extraordinary, especially since such a visit would take him away from
London for a long period. Yet Lloyd George was full of this idea during
the first days of August and raised the possibility of a trip to Wash-
ington in the autumn.32 Alas, the American government did not put
out the welcome mat. House told Lord Northcliffe, the powerful
British press baron who headed a special war mission to the United
States, that a visit by the prime minister should "be reserved for an
occasion when he would be very much needed."33
It is tempting to imagine a meeting between Lloyd George and
Wilson, the two most powerful leaders of the anti-German coalition in
the summer and fall of 1917. Both men sought dominance in foreign
policy. Wilson, with the primary assistance of House, was his own
foreign secretary on questions that he considered vital. He also kept
his distance from his wartime partners as an "associate power." Lloyd
George, his freedom of action in foreign affairs limited by his Con-
servative-dominated ministry, the Dominions, and the restrictions
imposed upon him by alliance politics, did not enjoy the same inde-
pendence as Wilson. Fearing to act directly against Balfour and the
Foreign Office, Lloyd George nonetheless attempted to achieve his
objectives with backstairs intrigue, the employment of personal repre-
sentatives such as Smuts and Reading on foreign missions, and per-
sonal diplomacy. There were in reality two British foreign policies, the
Foreign Office's and Lloyd George's.
If Anglo-American relations had been left largely in the hands of
the Foreign Office and the State Department, the wartime partnership
between London and Washington would almost certainly have been
more congenial. Balfour and Cecil were convinced that the future
peace and security of the British Empire depended upon postwar
cooperation between the two great English-speaking democracies.
House, Lansing, and the foreign policy establishment in the United
States were also more inclined to link American to British security
interests than was their nation's political leader. At times Lansing
and House even worked behind the president's back to keep Anglo-
American relations on an even keel. Hence, personal diplomacy as
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represented by a face-to-face meeting between the president and the
prime minister was risky for both countries. Lloyd George, a born actor
and a man of tremendous energy and personal charm, would have
attempted to work his wizardry on Wilson. "The great bamboozler is
now at work; the victim is being covered with saliva," was the way one
of Lloyd George's secretaries described his technique.34
The president and the prime minister had some interests in com-
mon: both loved golf, a good joke, and singing. The president enter-
tained his Cabinet with jokes in almost perfect dialect. Lloyd George
enthusiastically sang Welsh hymns with Hankey and others, and
Wilson once sang "Oh, You Beautiful Doll" to his second wife during
their courtship. Both also had superb political instincts and were two
of the best public communicators of their time.35
Their differences, however, were great and almost certain to lead
to misunderstandings and conflict. Wilson often came across as aloof
and cold; a journalist once likened his handshake to "a ten-cent pickled
mackerel in brown paper."36 He was deliberative and had the ana-
lytical mind of an academic. Lloyd George, both calculating and spon-
taneous, learned from people rather than books, put few of his
thoughts on paper, and developed ideas from talking. The Welshman
was opportunistic and explosive, a risk taker. It was said of him that he
changed principles as frequently as others changed clothes. Lloyd
George excelled in private negotiations and the art of compromise.
Wilson's actions were more rooted in principle. His religion-inspired
self-righteousness was reinforced by House's flattery. "America will
not and ought not to fight for the maintenance of the old, narrow and
selfish order of things. You are blazing a new path, and the world must
follow, or be lost again in the meshes of unrighteous intrigue," House
wrote Wilson on August 24.37 Knowing where he wanted to go but
cautious in the road he took, the president was not about to be rushed
off his feet by Lloyd George or any other European statesman. With
God as his compass and confident of America's exceptionalism, he
proceeded at his own pace.
Wilson wanted to make the world safe for democracy—not for the
British Empire. Lloyd George, however, saw no conflict between the
lofty, humanitarian ideals he shared with Wilson and the protection of
Britain's overseas position from the Turko-German menace. A crip-
pled British Empire and the continued menace of Germany and its
Asian ally Turkey to British global interests did not equal future world
peace and stability in his mind.
The most immediate war objective that the British and Empire
statesmen shared with the president was the necessity of defeating
German militarism. But there were important differences as to how
this might be achieved. In opposition to Lloyd George, Wilson hoped
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to achieve "peace without victory" and rejected the necessity of a
crushing defeat of Germany. His war speeches carefully separated the
German people from their government. His continued hope was that
once it was understood in Germany that American participation made
a victor's peace impossible, the liberal elements in that country would
triumph over the autocratic and military clique, making it possible for
the United States to be the peace broker between the Allies and a new,
liberal Germany.
As Lloyd George's government began to link a British victory with
an American role in the land war subordinate to British military and
political objectives, the differences between the two countries' ends
and means in war policy became more prominent. Lloyd George's
proposed summit meeting with Wilson offered no better prospect than
had the earlier Balfour mission of bridging this gulf during the for-
mative stages of American participation in the European war. Second
only to the defeat of German militarism, Wilson wanted to maintain
his country's freedom of action in diplomacy. American independence
was also the determining factor as the AEF leaders developed their
tactical and strategic objectives for war against Germany.
5
Pershing's War Plans
The pace of the war was initially quite frenetic for Pershing. He had
reported to the War Department on May 10 to be told officially that he
would command the AEF. Eighteen days later he and his hastily se-
lected staff were aboard the transport Baltic on their way to France.
Their previous education and combat experience had not prepared
them for the siege warfare of barbed wire and trenches. Nor did they
appreciate how thoroughly high-explosive shells and rapid-fire weap-
ons dominated the battlefield. Through its emphasis on the American
Civil War, the Army War College had reinforced an image of nine-
teenth-century battle, stressing offensive and maneuver warfare. As
junior members of the anti-German coalition, the American officers
could have learned from the earlier mistakes of the British and French
generals, who initially had been baffled by the stalemate. Certainly a
serious examination of the evolution of tactics on the killing fields of
the western front, 1914-17, would have been more informative about
the effect of the new fire weapons than studying earlier wars and
touring Civil War battlefields. Unfortunately, however, the presi-
dent's 1914 admonition to his fellow countrymen about being "impar-
tial in thought as well as in action" had encouraged the military
professionals to adopt an ostrichlike position.
Although Pershing would be a commander without an army for
many months to come, he never thought small. His mind focused on
the expectation that America would play the dominant role in the war
against Germany. As the Baltic crossed the Atlantic, he and his staff
officers—many of whom had studied the Franco-Prussian War at the
General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth—took charge of future
American military operations. Given freedom of action by his political
superiors, Pershing at once made the theoretical "brain" of the army,
the General Staff in the War Department, largely irrelevant in such
critical areas as the AEF's theater of operations and offensive objec-
tives.
The AEF's location in western Europe was crucial to both Amer-
ican and British political and military plans. The British military had
been quick to make suggestions. When Slocum had visited Haig's
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headquarters in April, General John Charteris, chief of intelligence,
had suggested that the Americans replace an isolated French division
on the northern end of the British-Belgian front.1 In Washington with
the Balfour mission, Bridges had suggested to Scott that any American
force, if not placed along the British front, should be located between
the British and French forces, where it could be directed by the French
and supplied by the British. When Bridges learned that the French
wanted the AEF to be placed at the southern end of the line at Belfort,2
he warned Pershing "not to get jammed up against the Swiss frontier,"
where American forces might be cut off if the French front disinte-
grated.3
Ignoring the British, Pershing pleased the French by selecting
Lorraine, the area between the Argonne Forest and Vosges Moun-
tains, as the American sector. He rightly suspected the British of
attempting to harness American military power to their own. He
wanted to control his logistics, which would not be possible if he used
the British ports on the Channel; without his own supply lines he
would never have a truly independent army. Proximity to the BEF
would also increase the pressures and dangers of the amalgamation of
American and British forces. Additionally, once Pershing succeeded
in creating an independent American force, it would inevitably be as-
signed a secondary role if it fought alongside the British on the sea-
ward side of their front or at the joint of British and French forces. The
French, who sought to protect their great-power status through align-
ing American forces with their own, could be counted upon in the
future to oppose British efforts to create any Anglo-American front.4
The war on the western front had in many ways become a war of
railroads as well as artillery, and the importance of rail communica-
tions to his selection of a theater has been emphasized by Pershing and
others. The Lorraine front would allow the AEF to utilize its own ports
of supply along the southwestern French coast, and a railway network
running south of Paris would permit American troops and supplies to
flow along less-congested though distant lines of communication.
It was strategical and political rather than logistical considerations,
however, that proved decisive in Pershing's decision. The commander
of the AEF never discussed his plans to defeat Germany with President
Wilson or with Baker, his civilian superior in the War Department.
There was to be none of the civil-military debate that had preceded the
massive British Somme and Passchendaele offensives. His instructions
from Wilson and Baker had only assigned him the general objective of
cooperating with Entente forces to defeat the German army. In Per-
shing's view, collective military action did not mean that the ever
increasing number of Yanks crossing the Atlantic would play a second-
ary role in Germany's defeat. From the first, he wanted American arms
Pershing's War Plans 83
to dominate the battlefield, and he planned accordingly.5 President
Wilson remained ignorant of the specifics of Pershing's strategy, but
he could not have found (more by happy coincidence than by design) a
military commander better suited to his political aims. Decisive mili-
tary action by the AEF would, in all likelihood, give Wilson a controll-
ing influence during the peace settlement.6
To understand Pershing's bold thinking, one has only to recall the
caliber of his first troops to arrive in France. American soldiers were
taller than their European counterparts, robust, and of excellent mo-
rale. But they were totally unprepared to take on the Imperial German
Army. The First Division, the "Big Red One," though considered
regular army, was dominated by citizen soldiers; half its company
commanders did not have even six months' experience. Quite cor-
rectly, the General Staff had kept many of the regular army officers at
home to train the mass conscript army being formed. Hence, most of
the newly arrived American troops and many who followed knew little
of military life and nothing of modern war. Only July 4 a battalion of
the Sixteenth Infantry, First Division, paraded through Paris. The
broad-brimmed hats they wore, designed for campaigns in the Amer-
ican west, delighted the enthusiastic crowd—"les hommes au chapeau
de cow-boy." The hats as well as the men who wore them, however,
were unsuited for trench warfare. Steel helmets could be purchased
from the British, but preparing the AEF for siege warfare was another
matter. One can well imagine what went through a French general's
mind when he approached one of Pershing's men on sentry duty: the
soldier handed the French officer his rifle, sat down, and rolled himself
a cigarette. "This was not an army; this was a rabble," according to
Pershing's most recent biographer, Donald Smythe.7
With his eyes fixed firmly on the future, Pershing ordered his
operations section, headed by Colonel Fox Conner, to prepare a strate-
gical appreciation that concentrated on the German defenses running
from Verdun to the Swiss frontier.8 The resulting memorandum,
dated September 25, 1917, and titled "A Strategical Study on the
Employment of the A.E.F. against the Imperial German Government,"
decisively shaped the American role in the land war for the remainder
of the conflict. American officers echoed Wilson's view that American
military operations, unlike those of their European partners, were not
directed toward '"territorial or economic aggression or indemnity."
Contrary to what the shell-shocked German soldier might later believe
on the Meuse-Argonne battlefield, the AEF planners also echoed
Wilson's sentiment that the United States had no quarrel with the
German people. As the title of the September 25 memorandum sug-
gested, the AEF operations section believed that its primary mission
was the "displacement" of the Imperial German Government.9 The
I American troopsmarch in Paris,
July 4,1917.
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apparent harmony between the objectives of the president and his
military leaders concealed one basic difference. Wilson, still believing
that the peace elements in Germany might triumph over the Kaiser
and the military leaders, was inclined toward limited military opera-
tions and still talked of "peace without victory," whereas the AEF
leaders placed their faith in "peace through victory," or the total defeat
of the German army.
Cooperation with the British in 1918 or 1919, even if the BEF found
itself in dire straits, was firmly and specifically rejected with the
possible exception of naval assistance along the Belgian coast. Accord-
ing to the authors of the AEF's strategic bible, "it seems out of the ques-
tion for us to take over any section in the British line. If the British
cannot hold, etc., their own line, certainly our entrance therein cannot
produce any decisive results." Equally unattractive was placing Amer-
ican forces at the juncture of the British and French trenches, for this
would also assign American arms "an indecisive part."
For the ambitious strategy of Pershing and his staff to be realized,
American forces would have to be largely withheld from battle in 1918.
As members of the operations section saw it, "Piecemeal waste of our
forces will result from any other action and we will never have in
France the power to accomplish our objective." Still, the AEF's lead-
ership realized that American (as well as Allied) public opinion ex-
pected American troops to fight in 1918. Therefore, "minor offensive
operations preparing for the 1919 offensive should be used for this
purpose."
Pershing and his staff saw important strategic opportunities in
Lorraine to the east and west of the extensively fortified city of Metz.
The AEF's plan of September 25 aimed at the capture of German
railway lines running laterally between the German right and left
wings. It was anticipated that the loss of these vital communications
would collapse the German southern defenses and force the enemy to
withdraw beyond the Rhine or "at least to the eastern part of Belgium."
Another advantage of an advance in this direction would be the
possible capture of some of the enemy's important coal, salt, and iron
resources, which would cripple—or so it was thought—the German
economy.
The first phase, viewed by its designers as a minor operation in
1918, was conceived as prelude to a massive American offensive in
1919. The pronounced salient of St. Mihiel, southwest of Metz, was to
be eliminated with the assistance of the French. With the AEF's line
straightened at St. Mihiel and the threat of a German counterthrust
from Metz neutralized, the AEF's war-winning offensive, with an an-
ticipated army of five corps (or 1,272,858 men when line-of-communi-
cations troops were included), would be launched in 1919 to the east
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of that fortress city in conjunction with other Allied attacks against the
German defenses on the French and British fronts.10
When asked by a reporter at a press conference in the fall of 1917 if
he thought a breakthrough possible after three years of stalemate,
Pershing retorted: "Of course the western front can be broken. What
are we here for?"11 His optimism was in sharp contrast to prevailing
Entente military thinking. With a breakthrough and distant and impor-
tant strategic objectives in mind, Allied generals had earlier launched
massive preliminary artillery bombardments in an attempt to smash
and destroy the enemy's trench system and neutralize its artillery.
After a lengthy bombardment (the British preliminary bombardment
on the Somme had lasted ten days), the infantry would be sent in
waves across no-man's-land with the mission of occupying territory
that supposedly had already been conquered by the high-explosive
shells of the big guns. Once a gap had been opened along the enemy's
front, the cavalry was expected to provide the advance into open
country with the necessary momentum to prevent the retreating forces
from regrouping and digging in once again. These offensives, which
consumed massive amounts of material and numbers of men, saw real
advances in preparation and execution in 1916-17. They succeeded in
breaking into the enemy's ever thickening defenses but not completely
through them. New fire weapons, especially the machine gun, served
to strengthen the defense more than the offense. Meanwhile, the
fortified positions became more difficult to penetrate when elastic
defenses were adopted: "defense in depth" thinned the troops in the
first lines, thereby reducing artillery-inflicted casualties.
Poison gas, flame throwers, grenades, airplanes, and other ad-
vances in weapons had not provided the solution to the deadly dead-
lock. The technology did not yet exist to maintain the momentum of
the attack and prevent enemy reserves from being brought up by rail
and new trench lines established. When the cavalry proved no match
for machine guns and barbed wire, the British introduced tanks on the
Somme in 1916. Though promising, these clanking iron monsters did
not prove to be war winners. They struck terror in the hearts of
German soldiers and helped capture enemy trenches, but in their
primitive phase they were too unreliable and slow to turn the stale-
mate into a war of movement. The inability of the Allies to break
through enemy defenses usually meant that ambitious and prolonged
attacks cost the attacker more dearly than the defender.
The artillery's high-explosive shells (along with poison gas) in
massive quantities and judicious and flexible use of infantry attacks
increasingly became the tactics of choice. Success was seen in carefully
prepared, limited attacks to destroy enemy divisions and the expen-
diture of metal rather than men.12 What led to confusion and later
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recrimination between the British civilians and Haig during discus-
sions of the Flanders offensive was that Haig, too, sought the destruc-
tion of German reserves and proposed what appeared to be a cautious
step-by-step offensive against the German defenses in Flanders. He
viewed this as the "wearing-out" phase, not an end in itself but a
prelude to a breakthrough.13 He thus blurred the distinction between
his ultimate goal—breaking through the enemy's defenses with his
infantry and cavalry—and limited attacks, which the civilians and the
French high command saw as a means to maintain pressure on the
enemy without exhausting their manpower.
When the French and British generals discussed future military
operations in the immediate aftermath of Nivelle's failure at a break-
through, they had agreed that "it is no longer a question of aiming at
breaking through the enemy's front and aiming at distant objectives. It
is now a question of wearing down and exhausting the enemy's
resistance, and if and when this is achieved to exploit it to the fullest
extent possible."14 To Petain (who replaced Nivelle) and the Anglo-
French political leadership, this understanding represented an at-
tempt to limit Allied losses in 1917. An unspoken hope was that the
United States would eventually tip the scales in favor of the Allies—if
the Allies could maintain their staying power in the interim. Ironically,
the cautious Petain was Pershing's favorite foreign general, but his
soulmate for the single, deep-objective, and decisive offensive was
Haig.
Central to the AEF planners' prolonged offensive with distant
objectives was their assumption of American superiority in fighting
men and tactics. To be blunt, Pershing believed that the Americans
had almost nothing to learn from French and British officers, who had
for three years paid dearly in "wastage" (as the British military called
casualties) for their knowledge of siege warfare and the lethality of the
new military technology. Repington's view of Pershing's staff in the
fall of 1917 was harsh but not far off the mark: the famous British
military correspondent for The Times found many American officers to
be "keen, intelligent, and zealous" but "taken aback by the immensity
of the problem before them"; he metaphorically characterized them as
wearing "a child's suit among Allies completely armed in mail." Much
could be imparted about the modern battlefield if Americans would
only listen, but Repington was sure that they would not. Perhaps
thinking of the contempt with which British senior officers viewed
French practices of warfare, he noted: "No one in this world learns
from the experience of anybody else. It will not do to try and force
things on the Americans."15
Intense rivalry between national armies is commonplace, espe-
cially at the command level, and it was perhaps asking too much to
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expect the American military leadership to be any less nationalistic or
parochial than their European comrades-in-arms. Pershing was con-
vinced that the Anglo-French armies were spent forces whose offen-
sive spirit had been destroyed by stalemated trench warfare. His
answer to breaking the stalemate was the aggressive American rifle-
man, whose tradition of marksmanship and frontier warfare, he be-
lieved, made him uniquely suited for open warfare.
European general staffs had begun the war with a similar commit-
ment to open warfare and an emphasis on the elan of individual
soldiers. Their nineteenth-century image of warfare led them to be-
lieve that the soldier holding the weapon was more important than the
weapon itself. The massive casualties inflicted by machine guns and
artillery, however, had forced many European officers to adjust to the
new technology of warfare. Pershing, although he had observed the
trench warfare of the Russo-Japanese War in Manchuria, had yet to
reconcile his deeply rooted traditional military values with the indus-
trialization of battle. He recognized that the new military technology,
especially rapid-fire weapons and improved artillery, had changed
warfare; but in important ways, his prewar image of war was not
altered by the new battlefield conditions. To him the valiant soldier
and his trusty rifle, not the adaptation of the new weaponry to siege
warfare, were paramount to success. As he explained, "Close ad-
herence is urged to the central idea that the essential principles of war
have not changed, that the rifle and the bayonet remain the supreme
weapons of the infantry soldier and that the ultimate success of the
army depends upon their proper use in open warfare." Training
instructions for the AEF, published in October 1917, emphasized that
"an aggressive spirit must be developed until the soldier feels himself,
as a bayonet fighter, invincible in battle."16
What is remarkable is that Pershing, despite his extensive ex-
posure to the siege warfare of the western front, never changed his
belief in the rifleman's paramount role. "Ultimately, we had the satis-
faction of hearing the French admit that we were right, both in empha-
sizing training for open warfare and insisting upon proficiency in the
use of the rifle," he triumphantly proclaimed in his war memoirs. No
such admission by any of the French war leaders, however, could be
found by one of his research assistants assigned to the task.17
Pershing's strategy and tactics, however questionable, were de-
signed to give America the leading role in the last phase of the great
European civil war. Pershing feared that acceptance of Anglo-French
strategy and tactics would force a subordinate role upon the United
States, and in this respect the American field commander had the
unequivocal support of his civilian superior in the War Department.
When Colonel House expressed concern to Baker in July 1917 that the
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AEF might repeat the costly blunders of the European armies, the
secretary of war emphasized the link between military and diplomatic
independence: "In order to avoid misunderstanding, it has seemed to
me from the beginning, better for us to have our own doctrine, and be
soon in a position to occupy an independent place on the line." This
would enable the United States to be "a great power conducting pro
tanto a war of our own, rather than having our force merged with that
of one or the other combatants, and losing its identity."18
Long before the British took American land power seriously, Per-
shing had thus developed plans that profoundly shaped America's
participation in the anti-German coalition until the end of the war.
With unbending determination, Pershing and his staff sought the
creation of an independent American army and the husbanding of the
necessary resources for the elimination of the St. Mihiel salient in 1918
and a war-winning offensive in Lorraine in 1919. Pershing's ears were
deaf to any British entreaties for assistance which impinged funda-
mentally upon this grand design.
As the AEF's leadership looked toward 1919, Haig's attack, often
called the Passchendaele Offensive, was mired in mud. Buckets of
rain turned the shell-churned Flanders battlefield into a quagmire.
"Wounded men falling headlong into the shell holes were in danger
of drowning," the commander of the Fifth Army, General Hubert
Gough, later wrote. "Mules slipped from the tracks and were often
drowned in the giant shell holes alongside. Guns sank till they became
useless; rifles caked and would not fire; even food was tainted with the
inevitable mud."19
Lloyd George's frustration knew no bounds. He had never be-
lieved in Haig's plan and feared that the BEF rather than the German
army would be exhausted. Unlike Nivelle, however, Haig had not
promised quick results; as long as he could claim that he was wearing
down the enemy, his attack could not be deemed a failure. Lloyd
George, uncertain of his political support, lacked the courage of his
convictions: rather than issue a direct order to Haig to stop his attack,
the prime minister chose indirect means to escape the mud of Flan-
ders. Complicated and devious, his approach to political obstacles was
as roundabout as his peripheral military strategy. As Smuts once told
a British officer, "L.G. has the guerrilla war mind . . .  entirely out of
place in this war."20 The prime minister's tactics ranged from seeking
President Wilson's support in diverting military resources from the
western front to considering a compromise peace with Germany at
Russia's expense. The political risks of confrontation with the high
command were great for his government, but he believed that the
stakes for the nation were higher. Nothing less than the survival of
Britain as a world power was at issue.21
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Excited by a misleading report on August 26 of Italian progress
during the Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo, the prime minister believed
that if British assistance were quickly sent, the defeat of Austria-
Hungary was in the offing. He considered ordering the BEF to divert
guns and divisions south of the Alps. With new reports that the Italian
army was stalled, however, and finding little support from his political
colleagues, Lloyd George temporized. It is fortunate that he did be-
cause Italy was as war-weary as Austria-Hungary, and the Italian
Army soon abandoned the offensive for the rest of the year.
Frustrated by his inability to win support for his indirect strategy in
London and Paris, Lloyd George in late August looked to Washington
for help. The Welshman had wisely abandoned his idea of attempting
to strengthen Anglo-American ties by visiting President Wilson, but,
unable to employ his political legerdemain in a face-to-face meeting, he
still sought to enlist the support of the distant and aloof American
leader through personal and unofficial channels. The route to redirect-
ing Allied strategy might be through Washington. Hankey and Lloyd
George's private secretary, Philip Kerr, were set to work drafting a
letter, a task made difficult by Lloyd George's mercurial mood. "I
drafted about 10 letters from LI. G. for Reading to take to President
Wilson," Hankey recalled, "but before we had finished one draft he
would invariably get a 'brain wave' and want a new one."22 In subse-
quent drafts, Hankey succeeded in toning down Lloyd George's attack
on the idea of concentrating Allied military effort on the western front.
Hankey also persuaded the prime minister to read his letter to the
War Cabinet and gain its approval. What Lloyd George apparently did
not reveal to the War Cabinet was that he had in the meantime spoken
more directly about his intentions with Wiseman and with Chief
Justice Lord Reading, who was about to depart for the United States to
discuss financial questions. After presenting his case for the necessity
of knocking either Turkey or Austria-Hungary out of the war, Lloyd
George asked them to seek American support for his position in inter-
Allied councils. He felt that he could not do this himself without
risking his influence at home and in the Allied countries, but the
United States could do it with impunity," Wiseman reported to House.
If the proposal was made by us and insisted upon, [then] he, George,
would yield to our arguments and help force the other Allies into
line."23
The nature of Lloyd George's private and personal letter, which
Lord Reading handed to Wilson on September 20, did not surprise the
president who had been forewarned by House. The persuasive Welsh-
man had chosen his words carefully, coming as close as he dared to
suggesting a special relationship between the English-speaking de-
mocracies in bringing the war to a close. He made the best case possible
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for shifting Allied emphasis away from the "solid and hitherto impen-
etrable" western front, arguing that the "whole enemy military edifice
might fall rapidly in ruins" if one or more of Germany's allies could be
forced out of the war. A satisfactory peace might be gained, he im-
plied, without the bloody sacrifices required to destroy the German
army through a frontal assault.24
The most delicate aspect of the prime minister's appeal was his
suggestion that the British Commonwealth and the United States work
together to direct the anti-German coalition's military and diplomatic
efforts. "I fully appreciate the objections which the American people
feel to being drawn into the complex of European politics," he wrote.
"The British people have always attempted to keep themselves aloof
from the endless racial and dynastic intrigues which have kept Europe
so long in a state of constant ferment, and even to-day their main
desire is to effect a settlement which will have the elements of peaceful
pemanence in itself, and so free them and the rest of the world from the
necessity of further interference." Lloyd George insisted that he had
not "the slightest desire that the United States should surrender the
freedom of action which she possesses at present." At the same time,
he stressed that the coalition's success against the "German military
oligarchy" would depend "more and more upon the British Common-
wealth and the United States." The British and the Americans were
destined to "supply that additional effort which is necessary in order to
make certain of a just, liberal and lasting peace."25
The prime minister's attempt to coordinate British and American
war policy was received coolly by Wilson and House. The British
Foreign Office, especially Balfour and his deputy Lord Robert Cecil,
was held in high regard by the White House, but the War Cabinet,
dominated by Lloyd George and imperial-minded Tories such as Cur-
zon and Milner, was not. Lloyd George's famous "knock-out blow"
speech in response to Wilson's efforts at a compromise peace still
rankled. "The entire British Government is honey-combed with reac-
tionaries," is the way House expressed it.26 Lloyd George in particular
seemed an unscrupulous politician with ulterior motives. As the presi-
dent's chief adviser in 1917 on the geopolitical and strategic aspects of
the war, Colonel House warned Wilson of the link between Lloyd
George's peripheral strategy and the British Empire's political inter-
ests: "The English naturally want the road to Egypt and India blocked,
and Lloyd George is not above using us to further this plan. He is not of
the Grey-Balfour type and in dealing with him it is well to bear this
in mind."27
An awkward reality for Lloyd George and other British leaders
who sought the forging of an Anglo-Saxon alignment was that the
British Empire would never be an attractive partner for Wilson in
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achieving his world of liberty and justice. The president's enthusiasm
for Anglo-Saxon political and legal institutions did not imply a similar
affection for the far-flung British Empire with its millions of subject
African and Asian peoples. As opposed to that of the British, American
leaders viewed their country's expansion from coast to coast and
overseas in the Philippines and elsewhere as the fulfillment of Amer-
ica's civilizing mission rather than conquest.
Nevertheless, Lloyd George's views on the futility of attempting to
breach the German lines seemed to be confirmed by a paper just
received by the president, "Memorandum on the General Strategy of
the Present War between the Allies and the Central Powers," dated
September 6,1917.28 The author, Major Herbert H. Sargent, had been
recalled to active duty to serve briefly in the War College Division.
Sargent was clearly a heretic on the General Staff, which he soon
departed to become a professor of military science and tactics at Prince-
ton. After the war he wrote a polemical account of its conduct and
defended his view that the AEF should have concentrated its efforts
a'vay from the western front.29 His attempt to reverse American strat-
egy through a direct appeal to the president without going through the
chief of the General Staff and Baker was curious indeed.
Sargent opposed sending more Americans to France to be chewed
up by futile attacks against machine guns; American military power
would be "simply bottled up" in western Europe. Sargent's alternative
strategy was to maintain enough soldiers in the West to hold that front
while deploying the main U.S. military effort elsewhere: either in the
Balkans to "cut the Central Powers in two, much as Grant cut the
Confederacy in two," or in cooperation with the British in Meso-
potamia. Sargent made the mind-boggling proposal that American
troops might be sent to the head of the Persian Gulf by way of the
Pacific and Indian oceans.30 A more difficult American theater, with its
extreme heat and endemic noxious diseases, would be hard to imag-
ine.
There is no evidence that Wilson approved of Sargent's sugges-
tions. He obviously had no desire to help the British improve their
position in Mesopotamia, nor were the proposed Balkan operations
with their inevitable political complications likely to appeal to him. The
United States was not even at war with either Bulgaria or Turkey. Yet
Wilson could not ignore the humanitarian and domestic political con-
siderations of pursuing a western front strategy that would kill or
maim hundreds of thousands of Americans without decisive results. If
the AEF suffered half a million casualties in a Somme-like offensive
that brought victory no nearer, the American public might rebel. As
Wilson told House in September, "The American people would not be
willing to continue an indefinite trench warfare."31 On September 22,
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then, at the very moment that Pershing's operations staff was putting
the finishing touches on its ambitious offensive plans for 1918-19, the
president suggested to Baker that the General Staff begin an inquiry
into the "strategic considerations" that had led to choosing France as
"the theatre of operations of our army."32
Wilson's request speaks volumes about the lack of coordination
between the president and his military authorities during the for-
mative phase of America's commitment to the land war in Western
Europe. In May he had overruled the General Staff and ordered a small
expeditionary force to be sent immediately to Europe. He had done
this primarily to boost Allied morale and had agreed to expand this
limited commitment only when pressed by Baker on May 27. Political
rather than strategic aspects had been pivotal in the latter decision.
Wilson's only apparent strategic interest in approving this forward
military policy was the political leverage that might be gained in the
peace settlement. Pershing, Baker, and the General Staff in the War
Department had filled the strategical vacuum once Wilson decided to
send American soldiers to Western Europe, and America's token
commitment quickly grew to a massive military enterprise. Rather
than showing the flag through limited operations with Allied forces,
America's military leaders thought of playing the dominant role in
Germany's defeat.
Prompted by the president's request, a War College Division com-
mittee did consider all possible theaters for American military action,
not just operations in those proposed by Sargent but also intervention
in Italy, in Russia, and on the coast of Asia Minor against Turkey.
General Staff memoranda emphasized fundamental military princi-
ples, such as the interior lines of the Central Powers and concentration
of forces against the main army of the enemy, to debunk the indirect or
peripheral strategies of Sargent and, indirectly, those of Lloyd George.
Military circumstances dictated that the war would be won or lost in
France, the staff officers argued: "Let Germany once get the upper
hand of or defeat France, or even let England and France get the idea
that the United States proposes to embark on questionable, though
highly desired operations elsewhere, and the war is won—by Ger-
many."33 Moreover, logistical considerations, especially shipping,
made military operations more practicable in France than in other
theaters: "The Western Front is the nearest to us; it can be most easily
reached and with the least danger;. . . we can make our power felt on
that front quicker and stronger than anywhere else."34 Additionally,
America would not become entangled in Allied political objectives in
France as was bound to be the case in the Middle East and the Balkans.
Finally, there was the obvious: America was not at war with Turkey,
Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary.
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A WOliD OF ILL OMEN.
Crown Prince (to Kaiser, drafting his next speech): "For Gott's sake,
Father, be careful this time, and don't call the American Army 'con-
temptible.' " From Punch, June 13,1917.
96 Trial by Friendship
The American military elite, in opposition to Wilson's "peace
without victory"—which implied something close to a military equi-
librium between the Allies and the Central Powers—believed in total
victory or the strategy of annihilation, rather than a more limited or
indirect strategy that sought to gain a favorable peace through con-
quest on the fringes of enemy territory or destroying by attrition
or blockade the will of the enemy to continue the struggle. The posi-
tion taken in September by staff officers in Washington and France
reinforces the thesis of Russell Weigley, who has observed: "The Civil
War tended to fix the American image of war from the 1860s into
America's rise to world power at the turn of the century, and it also
suggested that the complete overthrow of the enemy, the destruction
of his military power, is the object of war."35 General Staff officers
argued that Germany would be forced to concentrate its forces on the
western front to counter the arrival of American divisions: "The con-
test will then narrow down to a tug of war like Grant had against Lee
until, by means of our unlimited resources, we are enabled to force a
favorable conclusion." The AEF's numerical advantage would com-
pensate for inexperienced staff work. "We must make our superiority
in men and materials so great that we can be certain of crushing the
enemy in spite of misfortune and errors," Colonel F.S. Young as-
serted.36
The General Staff, then, did not obscure the potentially high cost
of the strategy of annihilation. It advanced no limited or cheap way to
defeat Germany. Victory was to be achieved by weight of numbers and
material. In the view of Colonel P. D. Lochridge, acting chief of the War
College Division, "While matters are now about a deadlock on the
Western Front, a preponderance on this front on the part of the Allies
of two or three million men, which we hope eventually to be able to
provide, will make it only a question of time until they achieve suc-
cess." If the AEF's experiences paralleled those of the Allied armies, it
seemed inevitable that American casualties would run into the hun-
dreds of thousands.37 This was in marked contrast to Wilson's rigidly
controlled and limited use of force as a tool to implement his Mexican
diplomacy.
Baker sent Wilson the General Staff's strategic outlook on October
II.38 In reality, without the president's full understanding, the shape
of America's military role in the war had already been decided by
Pershing, who by then was committed to his Lorraine plan, and the
War Department, which focused its planning toward the development
of a great army in Western Europe. "Our present plan has committed
us to the western front in France. It is impossible to withdraw now,"
one of the General Staff's papers noted.39 The best military opinion in
the War Department, then, with Baker's warm endorsement, sug-
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gested to Wilson that the war was expected to last until American
forces arrived in sufficient number to defeat the German army.
Only the briefest record exists of Wilson's reaction to the vital
military questions being debated. With no American boys yet in com-
bat, he remained strangely aloof from the titanic struggle, even ne-
glecting to follow the course of the conflict on the war maps displayed
in the Cabinet room.40 Later, when Pershing sent him photographs of
America's first assault at Cantigny in May 1918, he wrote in his reply
that the pictures had given him his first opportunity of "visualising the
circumstances of an action like that."41 Before receiving the General
Staff's weighty response to Sargent's strategical views, which he had
requested, he did comment on a succinct General Staff defense of
western strategy which had been prepared for (but never sent to)
Senator George E. Chamberlain. But his response reflected little inter-
est: "I have been able to give it only a cursory reading but I am glad to
keep in touch with these things."42 The more extensive views of the
General Staff on Major Sargent's suggestions, which he received on
October 11, apparently made no great impact on him either; a month
later he was asking Baker about the validity of Sargent's strategic
views. Baker's response was to send him once again the War College
Department's strong defense of the American commitment to the
western front.43 On November 20 the president's response was non-
commital: "I am glad to feel that all suggestions, good and bad, are
being seriously studied."44
Despite his tepid interest in these strategic questions, Wilson
obviously accepted Baker's and the General Staff's views. Two weeks
after his terse note on the General Staff's western stance, he came to
understand more fully the commitment that America was in the proc-
ess of making. A cablegram that arrived at the War Department on
December 5 reported the conclusions of a military conference involv-
ing Bliss, Pershing, Robertson, and Ferdinand Foch, the chief of the
General Staff of the French army. Bliss informed his government that
the United States had been asked as its minimum effort to send
twenty-four divisions to France by the end of June. By the end of the
summer, if the required men and ships could be found, the American
contribution would rise to thirty divisions, or five complete corps—a
figure which, not by chance, was precisely what Pershing's operations
staff in September had deemed necessary for victory in the spring of
1919 45 pershing had in fact been the catalyst for the Allied request, and
the Allied generals, who privately believed that this target was well
beyond America's means, played along. Wilson, shaken by these
numbers, asked Baker, "Is such a programme possible"?46
As the American military leadership embraced the policy of the
"knock-out blow" against the German army and lobbied political au-
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thorities for the draftees to achieve this goal, Lloyd George, the author
of that policy, began to waver. Uncertain that he could enlist Wilson's
support for either the coordination of Anglo-American military re-
sources or a peripheral strategy that would serve imperial interests,
the prime minister began to wonder whether total victory would be
worth the price if Britain were forced to continue bearing the brunt of
the fighting on the western front in 1918. A negotiated peace with
Berlin in 1917 would perhaps give the British Empire a better peace
than a war-exhausted Britain might achieve in an American-domi-
nated peace settlement.
6
The Knock-out Blow
in Question
Before President Wilson acquiesced to his generals' western strategy,
which Pershing believed would result in an American victory in 1919,
Lloyd George began to equivocate on his policy of the "knock-out
blow."1 Significantly, the prime minister became interested in a nego-
tiated peace with Berlin only after America came into the war. Setbacks
to Britain's Continental allies, especially Russia's precipitous decline,
and his pessimism about Haig's offensive weighed far more heavily on
his mind in September than the question of American help during the
last half of 1918 and 1919.2 Russia was hanging in the war by a thread,
with socialists there and elsewhere clamoring for peace negotiations.
The Italian high command had stopped its offensive action for the
remainder of the year. The French had twice postponed their offensive
on the Chemin des Dames, intended to draw off German reserves from
Haig's Flanders front. With American assistance still in the future and
cracks appearing in the anti-German alignment, Haig's single-minded
and single-handed concentration on the German army in the Ypres
salient might be a prescription for national disaster.
As President Wilson considered and rejected Lloyd George's pro-
posal for creating a special Anglo-American relationship to see the war
against German militarism through to victory, the prime minister
contemplated peace negotiations with Germany's warlords. In mid-
September 1917 the startling news was received in London from Spain
and France that Germany might be interested in negotiating a peace on
terms generally favorable to Britain.3 The first of these peace feelers
was official. Initiated by the German secretary of state, Richard von
Kuhlmann, who believed that Britain would make peace if Germany
did not establish itself on the English Channel, the message arrived in
London by way of the Spanish Foreign Ministry. It made no mention of
terms, expressing only the willingness to make a peace offer.
The second peace feeler was unofficial and its roots mysterious, as
Balfour on September 24 tried to explain to the War Cabinet (which
now included Sir Edward Carson, who had been added in July, and
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George N. Barnes, who had replaced Henderson in August as the
Labour party's voice). Baron von der Lancken, an official in the Ger-
man occupation government in Belgium, had on von Kiihlmann's
instructions contacted Aristide Briand, a former French premier,
through one of the Frenchman's acquaintances, a woman who was
half French and half German. The suggested terms from the Lancken-
Briand source, if genuine, represented substantial concessions by
Berlin: Belgium and Serbia were to be restored, Alsace-Lorraine re-
turned to France, Italy compensated with territory, and Britain given
colonial concessions.4 Just as important as what was said in these
suggested terms was what was omitted. No mention was made of
Britain's eastern allies, Romania and Russia.
The evidence strongly suggests that Lloyd George considered
sacrificing Russia to achieve a peace that would generally satisfy the
interests of Britain and her west European allies. He told the War
Cabinet that he thought the Germans "proposed to acquire Courland
and Lithuania, and to make some arrangement in regard to Poland as
her spoils of war." This would mean that "two great Empires would
emerge from the war, namely the British Empire and Germany."5 If
legitimate, the suggested German terms were at least as favorable to
the British as those discussed by House in London during American
mediation efforts in 1916.
Such a peace, however, would not destroy the menace of German
expansionism. Lord Milner was quick to warn his colleagues that "it
would mean Germany coming out of the war more powerful than she
entered it, and another war in 10 years time." Lloyd George certainly
recognized this danger, and he expressed a willingness to fight on,
"but only provided that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff could
advise that we could smash Germany, with Russia out of the war and
the blockade gone. Germany would be able to supply herself in course
of time with wheat, copper, tungsten and other metals."6
Lloyd George wanted to explore with the French the unofficial
Lancken-Briand peace feeler, which could be quickly repudiated if
discovered by the other Allies. Balfour, however, insisted that the
American ambassador, Walter Hines Page, be informed, because Pres-
ident Wilson was "particularly interested in all matters connected with
terms of peace."7 Hankey recorded Lloyd George's disingenuous
response in the secret minutes as follows: "The Prime Minister did not
consider this necessary. At present we wanted the U.S.A. to fight and
there was no need to discuss questions of peace with them."8 The
meeting ended with Lloyd George determined to confine discussions
of the Lancken-Briand channel to his high command and French
Premier Paul Painleve.
A thoroughly alarmed Balfour emerged from the cabinet room.
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Convinced that the German peace offer was genuine,9 he feared that
Lloyd George might explode the alliance. Wilson, if kept in the dark,
would be understandably furious, and the Russians would probably
defect. "I am not sure that I made it as clear as I ought to have done to
the Cabinet this morning how dangerous I think it would be to hold
any communications of an important kind with the Germans, without
previously communicating the fact to the Russians," he wrote the
prime minister later that day.10
This letter was not the end of Balfour's attempt to contain Lloyd
George. Drummond (Asquith's former private secretary and Balfour's
present one) told Asquith, who served as a de facto leader of the
opposition in the House of Commons, of Lloyd George's interest in a
peace that would sacrifice Russia. On September 26 Asquith issued a
clear warning to Lloyd George in a speech on war aims at Leeds: "I
assume as a matter of course the evacuation of the enemy of the
occupied territories of France and Russia."11
During the early morning hours of September 25, Lloyd George
and Hankey crossed the Channel for a meeting with the French leader-
ship at Boulogne. Premier Painleve proved to be adamantly opposed
to pursuing the pourparlers, "not that the approach was not bona fide
but that it was bona fide." Painleve apparently believed that French
support for the war would evaporate if the people discovered that the
Germans were prepared to return most of Alsace-Lorraine and give up
Belgium.12
The prime minister's next stop was the BEF's general headquarters
(GHQ). At 9:30 A.M. on September 26 he met with Robertson and Haig.
Lloyd George repeated the favorable peace terms that Baron von der
Lancken had suggested to Briand. "We should not get our allies to
continue fighting if it were known among them that the above offer
had been made," he emphasized. There was therefore "a serious
danger that the offer might be made public." It was a question not of
making a peace offer to Germany but, rather of how Britain should
respond if Germany publicly made a generous peace offer that sacri-
ficed Russia. Robertson, who saw little prospect of serious American
help in the land war in the near future, stated the prime minister's
point a little differently: "Russia is practically finished for the purposes
of the war. . . .  The Italians are not fighting, and the French are not
fighting. How, then, does the war look? We cannot singlehanded [sic]
defeat the German army." Robertson himself admitted that the British
could not win if the French refused to fight. Haig insisted that Britain
could not abandon Russia. He attempted to penetrate the gloom with
his usual shining optimism. The German army was "very poor stuff,"
and the German leadership realized that it could not prevent the BEF
from capturing the Belgian coast. The general military situation on his
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front was "very favorable," he said, and would be "more favorable if
only the French would fight." If the French army continued to decline,
he offered the hope that the AEF could fill the void. The Americans
were quick learners and would "probably make good fighters and be
more valuable than the French," Haig suggested.13
When the War Cabinet resumed its discussion of the German
peace moves on September 27, Lloyd George discovered strong op-
position, especially from Balfour, Milner, and Curzon, to any peace
that would leave a strengthened Germany in a position to start and win
another war in the foreseeable future. Balfour, according to the min-
utes, "attached great importance to the deprivation to Germany of any
Colonies, unless we could obtain guarantees that she would not break
the peace, of which at present there appeared to be no prospect."
Curzon and Milner were unprepared to accept a Germany enlarged by
the acquisition of occupied Russian provinces and in a position to
make Russia its "vassal." Germany would not only be the dominant
power on the Continent but, through its control of Russia, pose a grave
threat to Britain's Asian holdings.14
President Wilson was another consideration for the British lead-
ership. George N. Barnes argued that America's opinion did not count:
No great importance needed to be attached to the Americans' attitude,
as they were "not as yet doing very much in the war outside of financial
assistance to the allies." Lloyd George's comments suggested that he
agreed with the Labour leader. The prime minister had already pre-
vented Balfour from informing Washington of the German peace
feelers; now he attempted to speak for the American people, arguing
that they would "not continue fighting merely to prevent Germany
from obtaining peace at the expense of Russia."15 The opportunistic
Welshman surely knew better. President Wilson was not prepared to
sacrifice the new Russian democratic government to the clutches of
German imperialism.
In contemplating a peace that would sacrifice Russia and reward
German aggression, Lloyd George was standing on very precarious
ground. A rupture of Anglo-American relations was only one of the
dangers. In a sense he was a prisoner of his own often-expressed view
that the war should be fought to a finish. There were posters in London
of clenched fists, symbolizing his "knock-out blow" against Germany.
The head of the Foreign Office and his strongest allies in the War
Cabinet opposed a peace that would leave the British Empire menaced
by a still powerful Germany. The Dominions also had to be consid-
ered. From Vimy Ridge to Gallipoli to Ypres to German East Africa, the
Canadians, New Zealanders, Australians, and South Africans had
made or were making vital contributions to the war effort. Their
opposition to the German overseas threat could not be ignored. Walter
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H. Long, secretary of state for the colonies, reminded Lloyd George
that he could not proceed without consulting the Dominions.16 Both
national and Commonwealth unity on the war, then, might be de-
stroyed by the issue of peace negotiations. The Morning Post, the
influential Tory paper, spoke for the right in a leading article on
October 4: "If our politicians were now to make a peace with an un-
defeated enemy, it would make our captains sick, and our dead would
turn in their serried graves."
With Painleve's opposition having effectively destroyed the
Lancken-Briand channel, Lloyd George gave Balfour permission to
reply to Madrid that Britain would be willing to receive an official
German peace proposal. Balfour, however, refused to send this mes-
sage until Lloyd George informed Britain's allies.17 The prime minister
relented, and on October 4 Balfour informed Washington for the first
time of the German peace feeler.18 When Britain's remaining allies
were included in the peace discussions two days later, a joint note was
sent to Berlin.
Berlin made no response through official channels, but von Kiihl-
mann delivered his famous "no, never" speech to the Reichstag. Ger-
many, he thundered, would "never" make any concession in regard to
Alsace-Lorraine. "As long as a German fist can hold a rifle, the integ-
rity of the German dominions, which we have received as a glorious
heritage from our fathers, can never become the object of any negotia-
tions or concessions." Meanwhile, Chancellor Georg Michaelis stated
as Germany's war objective: "We must continue to persevere until the
German Empire on the continent and overseas establishes its posi-
tion."19
Once again German intransigence for the time being prevented
any consideration of a compromise peace. If Germany had actually
announced generous terms for the west European powers, as Lloyd
George thought possible, the anti-German coalition would have been
faced with a grave crisis: public support for the war in France and Italy
would have been seriously eroded; in Britain national unity, along
with Lloyd George's ministry (especially if he had spoken in favor of
accepting the German terms), might have collapsed; and the Domin-
ions almost certainly would have broken with London.
President Wilson would also have faced a great predicament if
Germany had initiated general peace negotiations in the fall of 1917.
Wilson believed that an essential starting point for his new order in
international affairs was the removal of Germany's military-autocratic
government.20 On October 8 he publicly proclaimed that "the war
should end only when Germany was beaten and Germany's rule of
autocracy and might superceded by the ideals of democracy."21 The
prospect of a compromise peace at Russia's expense posed a disturbing
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truth: to avoid a disastrous peace, he needed the European democ-
racies more than they needed him. Only if the Allies fought on,
becoming more dependent on American resources in the process,
would he be able to influence the outcome of the war decisively.
Germany's determination to achieve a victor's peace rescued
Wilson from such a dilemma. Lloyd George, confronted with an un-
compromising Germany, had no choice but to speak once again of "an
overwhelming military defeat, which would absolutely compel the
enemy to submit." But the prime minister thought that such a victory
would not be obtainable until 1919 at the earliest, and he was deter-
mined to prevent Haig from sapping Britain's strength through am-
bitious and prolonged attacks against the German army. As Hankey
reported his words on October 15, "A continuance of Haig's attacks
might conceivably result in bringing Germany to terms in 1919. But in
that case it would be the U.S. who would deal the blow and not we
ourselves. If our Army was spent in a succession of shattering attacks
during 1918, it would, indeed, be in exactly the condition that the
French Army was in at this moment, with its numbers reduced and its
morale weakened. He was particularly anxious to avoid a situation at
the end of the war in which our Army would no longer be a first-class
one. He wished it to be in every respect as good as the American army,
and possibly a revived Russian Army, so that this country would be a
great military power in the world."22
Confronted with an intransigent Germany, the prime minister's
strategy for 1918 was to maintain pressure on the Germans in the West
with "Petain's tactics" and to detach Germany's allies or improve
Britain's negotiating position through combined military-diplomatic
campaigns in the outside theaters. With its army intact, Britain could
then play a decisive role in the climax of the war in 1919. Rather than
follow another course, Lloyd George told Hankey, he would step
down as prime minister.23
The events of the last months of 1917 created a morass of uncer-
tainty for the British leadership. The rains returned to Flanders in
October, slowing Haig's advance toward the gutted village of Pas-
schendaele, whose capture in early November brought an end to the
offensive. A few miles of enemy territory were conquered and pres-
sure maintained on the German army, but the price Britain paid for
sustaining the anti-German coalition was great. In the aftermath of
the Flanders operation, a surprise British tank offensive was launched
on November 20 at Cambrai. Initially a great success, this attack
raised hope of ultimate victory in the trenches of the western front: in
one day the British penetrated the German defenses almost as far as
a hundred days of heavy fighting had carried them in the Flanders
action. The Germans launched a counterattack, however, recapturing
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most of the trenches they had lost. When the Battle of Cambrai ended
on December 3, "the British and the Germans resembled two tired
boxers, neither of whom was capable of doing the other any serious
harm."24
Perhaps the most encouraging development in the West as the
campaign season came to an end was that the French army was
showing signs of recovering from its mutinous state: on October 23
the long-delayed French offensive to assist Haig's attack had been
launched. But the good news that the French army might once again be
an offensive force was immediately eclipsed by an unexpected Austro-
German thrust against war-weary Italy. Supported by a massive bar-
rage of artillery and poison-gas shells, the enemy smashed through the
Italian lines near the town of Caporetto on October 24. General panic
prevailed, and Italian troops fled the battlefield. If British and French
divisions had not been quickly sent to stabilize the situation, Italy
might have been driven from the war.
On the high seas, unrestricted German U-boat warfare continued
to concern the British leadership. As former First Lord of the Admiralty
Sir Edward Carson told the War Cabinet, the shipping situation might
"improve slightly from time to time," but the amount of tonnage was
"steadily going down and must disappear" if the war went on long
enough.25
The fourth year of war ended as a year of defeats for the anti-
German coalition. Only the British, assisted by the Dominions, had
done more than hold their own against the Central Powers. Maintain-
ing the strategical initiative, the BEF had played the major role in occu-
pying the Germans on the western front. The cost in human terms was
heartrending. Hankey provided the War Cabinet in mid-December
with figures alleging that combined Dominion and British casualties on
the western front in 1917 had amounted to 822,000.26
The War Office pressed the government to replace these massive
losses with dire warnings of the consequences of not keeping the BEF
up to strength. At every opportunity Robertson lobbied for drafting
more young men into the infantry, where the BEF's deficiencies were
most acute. The Army Council warned the government that "in view
of the probable release of enemy Forces on the Russian front, the war
may well be lost unless, while awaiting substantial American as-
sistance, our field armies are quickly brought up to and maintained at
full strength."27 But Lloyd George's government was no longer pre-
pared to accept the army's demands for men. "The generals are abso-
lutely callous as to the gigantic casualties and order men to certain
death like cattle to the slaughter," the prime minister once told a
newspaper editor.28 To wean GHQ from its propensity for prolonged
and distant offensives and to force more effective use of men already in
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uniform, Lloyd George's government pursued a conservative man-
power policy.29
In addition to humanitarian considerations, the civilians were
mindful of the economic and political impact of providing Haig with all
the men he requested to maintain his infantry. As Hankey advised the
Man-Power Committee in December, "The problem that confronts the
Committee . . . is to avert a military catastrophe without plunging us
into an economic catastrophe equally fatal to the cause of the Allies." 30
The War Office demanded 600,000 "Category A" men—those deemed
fit for combat—by November 1918; it got only a promise of 100,000
drafts to maintain all overseas forces in 1918. The navy, air force,
shipbuilding, food production, and even timber-felling were given a
higher priority than the field forces.31
Military operations in the Middle East in 1917, the "side shows" so
denigrated by the British high command, had given Britain unprece-
dented influence from Egypt to India. The capture of Baghdad in
March placed much of Mesopotamia under British control. Arabia had
also fallen under British influence because of the heroics of Colonel
T.E. Lawrence and his British irregulars. December brought the most
heartening success: General "Bull" Allenby's capture of Jerusalem,
which Lloyd George had wanted as a Christmas present to the British
people. Although not sufficient to drive Turkey from the war, these
successes strengthened Britain's position on the southern fringes of
Germany's unbroken line of influence from the North Sea to the now
diminished borders of the Turkish empire. Britain's forward position
in Palestine also offered security for the Suez Canal and was of crucial
strategic value for Africa's defense, should Germany triumph on the
Continent.
British gains in Mesopotamia, on the other hand, were soon nul-
lified by Russia's defection. On November 7 the Bolsheviks, com-
mitted to taking Russia out of the war, stormed the Winter Palace and
overthrew the Provisional Government. The collapse of the eastern
front that soon followed the Communist seizure of power dramatically
altered the balance between the Entente and the Central Powers.
Germany, if it massed its forces in Western Europe, would gain a
numerical superiority over the western powers, a position that it had
not enjoyed since the first months of the war. There was also the
prospect (which never became a reality) that the Central Powers might
neutralize the British blockade by extracting mineral and food re-
sources from Russia.
Britain was most threatened outside of Europe by Russia's demise.
The Turks, with their Russian Caucasian front moribund, could con-
centrate on the British in Palestine and Mesopotamia. Turkey also now
posed a very real threat to Persia, the Caucasus, and Turkestan.
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Germany, whose prewar ambitions in the East (reaching even to the
shores of the Persian Gulf with the Berlin to Baghdad railroad) had
helped plunge Europe into war, now might gain through its ascen-
dancy in Russia a northern route to India by way of the Black Sea, the
Caucasus, and the Caspian.
The continued stalemate in the West in combination with the
emerging Turko-German threat to Britain's Asian position gave Lloyd
George the support he needed from the imperial-minded War Cabinet
to wrest the strategic control of the war from the high command. His
maneuvers were as usual complicated and devious. Provoking Robert-
son's fury, he asked Lord French and Sir Henry Wilson, two generals
who were not members of the Robertson-Haig camp, to review the
course of the war and offer suggestions for future military policy.
Wilson's and French's subsequent papers included direct as well as
implied criticism of the high command's offensive strategy, if not
emphasis, on the western front. Both supported Lloyd George's plan
of a supreme war council to coordinate Allied military policy. They also
found merit in his desire to defeat Turkey but argued that it was too
late to put in train the necessary preparations for a winter campaign.
French's paper could have been written by Lloyd George himself. The
former leader of the BEF, whom Haig had replaced, concluded that "a
purely military climax" could not be attained in 1918. He favored Pe-
tain's cautious tactics until the United States had formed a great force
on European soil.32
Given a chance to respond, Robertson characteristically came to
the nub of the problem. Waiting for the Americans might be very
dangerous indeed. "If by some miracle," he wrote, "we could sud-
denly pass over the next 18 months and in 1919 resume the war under
present conditions, plus the reinforcement in France of, say, a million
well-trained American troops, there would be no question as to the
best policy. But unfortunately we cannot perform miracles, and there-
fore we have to consider whether, all things considered, the Entente
may not, despite American assistance, be much weaker, and not
stronger, in 1919 than in 1918. "3 3 The near collapse of Italy and the
triumph of Bolshevism in Russia subsequently gave force to Robert-
son's words.
The philosophical Balfour also made his contribution to this strate-
gic debate. In a memorandum circulated to the king and the War
Cabinet, he attempted to debunk Lloyd George's view that Britain's
ability to achieve its war objectives, some of which would be anathema
to President Wilson, was dependent upon conserving British man-
power. The foreign secretary argued that Britain's European allies
were doomed if Britain, no matter what the condition of its land forces,
withdrew from the coalition. Even the United States, despite its great
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Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Courtesy of
Special Collections, U.S. Army Military History Institute.
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economic power, would be reduced to military impotence in the Euro-
pean war without British participation. "What is true of us," Balfour
went on to assert, "is still more true of America. Quite apart from her
men and her ships, we have reached a stage in the war when American
assistance in money and material is absolutely necessary for its con-
tinuance. It is therefore immaterial from this point of view whether our
Armies be large or small: they cannot in either event carry on a great
Continental war without American assistance. In other words, while
America and Great Britain could fight without Italy and France, Italy
and France could not fight without both America and Great Britain,
nor could Great Britain support her French and Italian Allies without
America."34
Robertson, then, saw no alternative to the continuation of heavy
British casualties on the western front to save the alliance; and Balfour
persuasively argued that Britain, no matter what the BEF's size, was
already totally dependent upon the United States for victory on the
Continent. Lloyd George, however, resisting these arguments, be-
lieved that he still might achieve a British peace without exhausting his
country in the process. Determined to shift more of the burden of
killing Germans to the Americans, he took advantage of the Italian
disaster at Caporetto to gain his government's support for the creation
an inter-Allied supreme war council with a permanent General Staff
that would have advisory powers for Allied strategy and military
policy. The prime minister had long argued that a central weakness of
the conduct of the war against the German-dominated Central Powers
was the lack of any unified command for the Allies. A comprehensive
plan, taking in every theater and subordinating national interests to
the general Allied cause, had not been devised. Allied military and
political leaders in conference had effected only a " 'tailoring' operation
in which different plans were stitched together."35
Lloyd George's argument was legitimate, but his motives were
suspect. As later events were convincingly to demonstrate, the Welsh-
man's primary aim was to undermine the Robertson-Haig combination
and impose his own strategic views on the alliance. The Trojan Horse
he chose to infiltrate the enemy camp was Sir Henry Wilson, whom
Lloyd George planned to appoint to the inter-Allied General Staff.
General Wilson was as popular with the prime minister and the
Unionist leadership as he was disliked by the leadership of the BEF,
which considered him a political general—and indeed he has been
called perhaps "the most accomplished intriguer produced by the
British Army in recent times."36 Senior British officers, however,
wrongly suspected him of placing French interests over those of his
own nation. Articulate, easygoing, amusing, and irreverent (he once
claimed that if someone addressed a postcard to the ugliest man in
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London, it would be delivered to him), Wilson was comfortable with
politicians. Notwithstanding his opinion of them—and his private
contempt as revealed in his diary knew no bounds—he conversed
easily with the "frocks" about their strategical views, pretending to
treat their ideas with respect. But it was his malleability on questions of
strategy—in contrast to the granite-like firmness of Robertson—rather
than his personality or political manipulation that best explains his
ascendancy during this critical period of the war. Sir Henry agreed
with Robertson that the war was ultimately going to be won or lost on
the western front, but he was critical of Haig's strategy and tactics. He
took a global view of the conflict, speaking in favor of military opera-
tions away from Western Europe for political purposes or for the
containment of the Turko-German threat.
Wilson had long been on good terms with Lord Milner and his
disciple, Lieutenant Colonel Leo S. Amery. Milner was the intellectual
father of modern British imperialism with its emphasis on imperial
federalism. Largely thanks to Milner, the prime ministers and leading
ministers of the self-governing Dominions and representatives of the
non-self-governing Empire of India had been invited to London at the
beginning of 1917 to participate in meetings of the War Cabinet (called
the Imperial War Cabinet when these leaders and representatives were
present) to discuss the conduct of the war and possible peace terms.
Milner had also used his considerable influence to include many of his
disciples in Lloyd George's government; Amery, appointed to the new
War Cabinet Secretariat, was the first. Although he held other posi-
tions—including head of the political branch of the British staff on the
Supreme War Council—Amery's primary function became that of an
imperial brain truster for the Milnerites, writing memoranda on geo-
political strategy. When Milner later became head of the War Office,
Amery occupied a desk just outside the secretary of state for war's
office. The troika of Wilson, Milner and Amery formed a hard core of
support for Lloyd George in his efforts to redirect British strategy
during the winter of 1917-18.37
Lloyd George's other key allies were Smuts and Curzon. Smuts
had favored an active policy on the western front until becoming
disillusioned with Haig when the latter continued his bloody blud-
geoning in Flanders long after it was clear that his ambitious objectives
were unobtainable. Now keen on military operations against Turkey,
Smuts lobbied unsuccessfully for an attack from the sea against Syria.
Curzon, a former viceroy of India, was especially concerned about a
possible German march across the corpse of tsarist Russia. He could
now be counted upon to support a forward policy in the East and a
standstill policy in Western Europe.
Although he now enjoyed the War Cabinet's support, Lloyd
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George was still restrained by the politics of coalition warfare from
implementing his tripartite strategy: first, preserving British staying
power through a conservative manpower policy; second, diverting
British resources from the western front to outlying theaters; and
third, gradually shifting the burden of fighting the German army from
the BEF to the AEF. Lloyd George's campaign to employ America's
emerging extra-Continental military role to further British interests
started afresh with the month-long House mission to Europe in No-
vember and early December 1917.
7
The House Mission and
Anglo-American War Aims
President Wilson had rebuffed Lloyd George's efforts in September
1917 to establish a special relationship between London and Wash-
ington. Having come around to the view that concentration on the
western front served his country's interests best, he refused to ad-
vance the prime minister's strategic views in Allied councils. His
apprehension about the Welshman had, if anything, been magnified
by Wiseman's curious and disloyal actions. On several important
occasions Wiseman, who might have been expected to represent the
views of his prime minister to House and Wilson, assumed the role of
an honest broker. Wiseman's distaste for Lloyd George's machina-
tions, which served to undermine the influence of the Foreign Office,
was no doubt genuine; but his frequently hostile analysis of Lloyd
George's motives fed the suspicions of the American leadership, how-
ever much it may have increased their confidence in the British intel-
ligence agent.
What especially shook Wilson was Wiseman's assertion that full
American participation in Allied conferences might result in "shifting
the center of gravity of the war from Washington to London and
Paris."1 In discussing British efforts to get him to send a political
representative to Europe, Wilson emphasized to House that he would
trust no other person to represent his views. "No one in America," he
told the Texan, "or in Europe either, knows my mind and I am not
willing to trust them to attempt to interpret it."2
Although Wilson was prepared to coordinate American military
policy more closely with that of the Allies, he had no intention of
creating the special Anglo-American alignment in military policy that
Lloyd George wanted. To the contrary, he remained intensely sus-
picious of Lloyd George and the right-wing Tories in the War Cabinet.
Moreover, perhaps influenced by Wiseman, he never did appoint a
permanent political representative in Europe to speak for him. His
only concession, then and later, to appeals for America's political
participation in Allied councils of war was to send House, the individ-
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ual whom he believed knew his mind best, to represent him for brief
periods. As noted, Wilson declared that he had "no intention of
loosening his hold on the situation."3
Before departing for Europe on October 29 as the president's
special emissary, House discussed at length with Wilson "questions of
strategy on each of the fronts," including "the campaign in Asia Minor,
and the partition or non-partition of Turkey."4 House's diary does not
reveal the exact nature of this discussion, but the two men almost
certainly agreed that the United States should not become involved in
furthering the expansion of the British Empire in the Middle East.5 To
accompany House as the War Department's representative, and pro-
vide him with professional military advice, Wilson chose Bliss, who
had earlier expressed alarmist views about Allied intentions to dimin-
ish the AEF's role through amalgamation. Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral Benson, an Anglophobe, represented the Navy Department.
House arrived in London in the midst of a violent controversy over
the powers of the new Supreme War Council, which had been created
at Rapallo, Italy, on November 7.6 Sir Henry Wilson's relationship to
Robertson quickly became the central issue of the emerging political
crisis. The military party charged that Lloyd George, rather than
encouraging unity in military policy, had created a flawed system of
dual military advice in his attempt to make General Wilson, as the
British permanent military representative on the inter-Allied General
Staff, independent of the British General Staff. "Dual advice can only
lead to delay, friction, weakening of responsibility and lack of confi-
dence amongst the troops," Robertson told Lord Derby.7
When Lloyd George returned to London from Paris on November
13, he was met with a barrage of press criticism. "Hands Off the British
Army!" thundered the Star. Other papers warned that support for the
concept of unity of command should not be confused with support
for civilian meddling in military strategy. In Parliament there were
ominous rumblings from both Unionists and supporters of Asquith.
The beleaguered Lloyd George dined with House alone that night,
asking for American support for the new Supreme War Council.
House, who had been lobbied by Robertson the previous day, was
not about to be used in Lloyd George's attempt to divert British
resources away from the western front to Palestine or elsewhere. On
the other hand, he agreed with the prime minister that any further big
attacks in the West should be delayed until America was prepared to
"throw her strength on the Allied side or until Russia can recover
sufficiently to make a drive on the Eastern Front."8
When House cabled Wilson for his opinion of the new Supreme
War Council, the president immediately responded: "Please take the
position that we not only accede to the plan for a single war council but
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insist on it, but think it does not go far enough." 9 House then issued a
statement to the British press emphatically asserting that "unity must
be accomplished if the great resources of the United States are to be
used to the best advantage." Despite Wilson's strong stand for unity of
command, however, his support for coordinating military resources
and strategy was not always matched by his later actions. He was to
prove extremely reluctant to allow the SWC to dictate to him in military
or political questions. A consideration for Wilson in November may
have been his hope that an inter-Allied body would facilitate the clear
statement of the Entente's war objectives, for which he was then
pressing.
Lloyd George survived this Parliamentary crisis, in part because of
American support but more because of his brilliant but misleading per-
formance before the House of Commons on November 19. The prime
minister told the Commons that he sought only the "co-ordination" of
Allied plans. He flatly denied any interest in an Allied supreme com-
mander or the reduction of Robertson's authority.10
Lloyd George could afford to retreat because he had salvaged the
Supreme War Council, headed by the prime ministers of Italy, France,
and Britain. (House represented Wilson at the council's first meeting,
but Wilson still rejected permanent political representation.) From
Versailles, the headquarters of the inter-Allied General Staff, Sir Henry
Wilson as British permanent military representative could still serve
the prime minister as an alternative source for strategic advice. Presi-
dent Wilson's and Baker's choice for the American permanent military
representative was Bliss.11
The American statement in support of the SWC had emphasized
harnessing American power to the Allied cause through this inter-
Allied body. To achieve his grand strategic objectives, however, Lloyd
George was more inclined to bilateral negotiations with Washington
because of the limitations imposed by coalition warfare. The French in
particular were unlikely to support any strategy that diverted the flow
of American soldiers from their war-weary army or limited the role of
the British on the western front. In fact, French politicians were at this
time putting intense pressure on the British to extend their front
substantially by occupying trenches defended by the French army.
When Lloyd George had asked Haig and Robertson in October for
their views on the military situation and their future plans to win the
war, they had responded that the best policy, even if Russia fell out of
the war, was to continue the offensive in the West.12 In the face of
Russia's decline and Italy's defeat at Caporetto, Lloyd George was
prepared to resign rather than follow this advice. When the House
mission arrived in London, he was eager to initiate a thorough re-
evaluation of war plans for 1918 with emphasis on how American and
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British military policy might be better coordinated. A procession of
Britain's key war leaders soon passed through the library of Chester-
field House, where House was the Duke of Roxburghe's guest. These
face-to-face confrontations did more to convince President Wilson's
alter ego of the precarious military situation than did the confidential
ministerial papers he was given.
According to the minutes for November 15, it was pointed out in
the War Cabinet that "although the Departments generally had ren-
dered every assistance in their power to the [House] Mission, it was
beyond and outside their power to give information which depended
on the decisions which might be arrived at as to our future war policy,
as well as to the disposition of the United States troops, either on the
Western front or in Russia, or whether they were to be asked, owing to
the shortage of tonnage, to curtail their expeditionary forces and
augment their supply to the Allies of food, munitions, &c."13
The suggestion that the Americans might be asked to "curtail their
expeditionary forces" to alleviate the shipping crisis comes as a sur-
prise. When these words were spoken, the consequences of the Bol-
shevik revolution were not yet in clear focus; the hope lingered that
Russia might somehow be kept in the war, perhaps with American
assistance. Also, just as the Americans desperately needed ships to
transport their forces to Europe, Lloyd George and the Milnerites
needed sea transport to give flexibility to their peripheral strategy. The
men and equipment deemed necessary to defeat Turkey, for example,
could not be diverted to Palestine or an attack made on the coast of
Syria unless shipping could be found.14 If the United States delayed
military operations until it was capable of playing an independent role,
any tonnage that might be squeezed from other sources during the
winter to ship American soldiers and supplies would apparently have
little impact on the 1918 campaign. At the beginning of November the
AEF had a meager force in France of 87,000 men of all ranks. To place in
Europe an independent American army capable of taking an impor-
tant part in the fighting in the near future appeared out of the
question.
But America had a vital resource that the British army desperately
needed: fighting men. America's vast manpower was increasingly
being viewed by the War Office as the reserve of the Entente, was in
fact seen as the only means whereby the Allies could match or exceed
German strength on the western front in 1918 if the German high
command concentrated its forces there. A British General Staff memo-
randum, "American Assistance to the Allies," dated November 17,
1917, is noteworthy for its urgency and its fanciful proposals for the
utilization of American resources.15 Perhaps in an attempt to frighten
its own government and enlist support from the United States, the
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General Staff cast the military situation in the worst possible light. The
British high command, it must be recalled, was at this time still con-
templating a continuation of the offensive in 1918 rather than a defen-
sive stance. Not until December 19,1917, did Robertson assure the War
Cabinet that it was "fully realised by Sir Douglas Haig that we must act
on the defence for some time to come," and that he had "no offensive
plans in mind at present."16
According to the General Staff memorandum of November 17, the
Anglo-French reinforcements either sent to or contemplated for Italy
and the planned cannibalization of French divisions on the western
front to keep other divisions up to strength might mean a total reduc-
tion of Allied strength in the West by from twenty-four to thirty
divisions. Meanwhile the Germans might be able to transfer as many
as thirty divisions to France from the eastern front: "This may therefore
mean an alteration in the balance of strength on the Western front in
favour of the enemy by as many as 60 divisions." America's first
priority, then, must be "to compensate England and France for the
burden of supporting Italy." The British military also wanted the
United States to assist the expansion of the Allied air forces and
provide 20,000 to 30,000 workers, especially bricklayers and carpen-
ters, to build Allied aerodromes and factories.17
The General Staff's wish list further included the employment of
American resources beyond the western front, sowing the seeds of
U.S. military intervention in Russia. In addition to the "re-organization
and restoration of the transportation facilities of Russia," an idea
earlier pressed upon President Wilson by the Allies, it was suggested
that, "if shipping can be made available in the Pacific without reducing
the tonnage available for transporting American troops and stores to
France, then it is worth considering whether some of the enormous
resources in man-power of the United States might not be utilised in
sending a body of troops to Russia, where their presence might have a
steadying effect on the political situation, and provide a nucleus round
which the best elements in the country would rally." The British
military also suggested that America might form a Georgian-Armenian
army to keep alive the Russo-Turkish front and support the war in the
Balkans by "aiding the re-constitution of the Greek Army" with food
and money.18
Most of the proposals in the memorandum were obviously un-
likely to appeal to American policymakers, whose first and only pri-
ority was the western front. The War College Division, as we have
seen, had already considered and rejected sending expeditionary
forces to other theaters. Baker had also just informed the president that
"the tonnage question necessarily controls the strategy of this war so
far as our participation in it is concerned whatever conditions there
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may be on the other side." To dispatch an expeditionary force across
the Pacific in strength, for instance (and Baker argued that any U.S.
force to assist Russia must number at least 500,000 men), was out of the
question because "the length of the journey makes the whole plan
inadmissible in view of the enormous tonnage necessary first to trans-
port an adequate army, and second to keep it supplied."19
The question of shipping was a complicated one, involving con-
flicting and confusing figures, economic self-interest, and misconcep-
tions frequently based more on mutual Anglo-American distrust than
on fact. As previously noted, when the United States entered the war it
did not possess the means to transport to Europe and supply a fraction
of the men the country was capable of mobilizing. During the first
months of the war, Washington failed dismally to expand its sea
transport. The raising of an army received far more attention than
shipping.
The British merchant marine, with some 16,000,000 gross tons at
the beginning of 1917, remained by far the largest in the world. But
during 1917 and the first months of 1918, German submarines sank
British ships faster than new ships could be constructed. America's
failures in ship construction consequently placed added strain on the
British, who served as the merchant marine for the alliance. To trans-
port grain to their allies (the French and Italian harvests had failed) and
to meet their own military needs, the British planned further belt
tightening, which would "involve some industrial disaster and the ab-
solute cutting off of many articles of foodstuffs ordinarily regarded as
essential."20 Lord Curzon, who chaired the Shipping Control Board,
warned the War Cabinet that the planned reduction of imports would
"not only cause grave dislocation to certain trades, but also involve
great hardships and drastic changes in the life of the people." Curzon
predicted that the British people would accept the further war sacri-
fices "provided that some assurance can be given that our Allies are
making equal sacrifices. At present we have only too much evidence
that this is not always the case."21
Curzon did not mention the United States specifically, but he
could have done so with justification. What emerges from the papers
of Lloyd George and Wilson is that the president was much more
motivated by commercial considerations in questions of shipping than
was the prime minister. London, which saw its very survival hinging
on the outcome of the war, was more inclined than Washington to
sacrifice its commerce, both present and future, to the necessities of
war.22 Lloyd George stressed the economic damage done to British
commerce when he addressed the House mission. "The trade of this
country is largely an international trade," he told the Americans at a
special meeting of the War Cabinet. "We manufactured for the world,
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and we carried for the world, and we did a good deal of financing for
the world; all that is practically gone. We have stripped to the waist for war.
. . . We have risked it all on this great venture."23
Not surprisingly, the British looked to American industrial might
for assistance, especially since the American government had recently
requisitioned ships (nearly 900,000 tons dead weight) being built in the
United States for Britain. In December, however, they were shocked to
discover that the United States planned to reduce its industrial target
of constructing 6,000,000 tons dead weight to 2,000,000, just when the
British were requesting an increase to 9,000,000.24 "The United States
shipbuilding programme," Lloyd George gravely told his colleagues
on the Man-Power Committee, had broken down so badly that it
would be impossible to "get the American troops over in American
ships at the rate we had thought possible a short time ago."25
If anything, Lloyd George understated the seriousness of the
failure of American transport in 1917. The American General Staff had
discovered in October that it had only twenty-four ships with a gross
tonnage of 338,000 to complete the transport of the thirty divisions that
Pershing hoped to have in France by June I.26 While in London, Bliss
asked the British General Staff to furnish its estimates of the tonnage
required for four complete army corps of six divisions each by May 1.
The director-general of Movements and Railways responded that the
United States needed an additional 2,740,700 gross tons to convey
twenty-four divisions, with auxiliaries and reserves, to France by that
date. And this was considered a conservative estimate!27
As Bliss pondered these truly staggering figures, the American
General Staff discovered that "of more than fifty ships that have been
commandeered on completion by the Government, only one has been
placed available for the transportation of troops and equipment."28
Clearly, more had to be done in employing seized German ships and
requisitioned neutral shipping, not to mention diverting or construct-
ing American vessels for the transport of American troops. No matter
how great its sacrifice or its ingenuity, however, America was incapa-
ble of fully asserting its growing military power overseas without
substantial British shipping assistance. American sea transport was so
inadequate that Bliss, upon his return from Europe, bluntly informed
Baker that unless means were found to expand and hasten the trans-
portation of American soldiers to Europe, the United States would "be
responsible for continued enormous destruction of wealth and of life
and, to crown all, will have maintained an idle Army at home at a cost
of billions of dollars for mere maintenance."29
As 1917 ended, the number of American soldiers in France had
risen to 175,000, but only two combat divisions had been formed with
two more promised in early 1918.30 An additional 1,000,000 men were
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under arms in the United States. Not only had the United States no
way to get them to Europe, but their clothing, equipment, and training
were often woefully inadequate. The shortage of officers was es-
pecially acute. Some 200,000 officers were in uniform by the time of the
Armistice, but when America entered the war, there were only 18,000
regular and National Guard officers available.
Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert W. Hall, a member of the British mil-
itary mission to the United States who served as a machine gun in-
structor with the Eighty-ninth and Forty-second divisions at Camp
Funston, Kansas, found American soldiers clothed in blue overalls,
wearing inferior boots, and armed with inadequate equipment, "if it
could be said that they were equipped at all. No rifles had been issued,
wooden guns were being used, making the instruction of an infantry-
man in musketry almost impossible.. . . The machine gunners had old
and obsolete Colt guns which could never be used with ammunition
with any degree of safety."31
As the American military machine sputtered alarmingly, the
House mission returned to the United States in mid-December. Meet-
ings with British military and political leaders and the sharing of
classified information had had a considerable impact on the Amer-
icans. Repeatedly, the British had impressed upon them that the
alliance was faced with defeat unless the United States did more, and
soon. "It is pitiful to see the undercurrent of feeling that the hopes of
Europe have in the United States, pitiful because it will be so long
before we can really do anything, although the very crisis seems to be
at hand," Bliss had written his wife from London.32
The American representatives had also gained a greater apprecia-
tion of British sacrifices to keep the alliance intact. The reports of
House, Benson, and Bliss, in fact, lent support to the "special relation-
ship" between Washington and London that Lloyd George had advo-
cated in his September message to the president. In his final report,
Bliss recommended that Washington tilt its military policy in favor of
the British. The French had diminished their military role in 1917 as
the British had increased theirs. It seemed likely that the decisive
blows would be delivered by Anglo-American forces, with the French
playing a largely passive role. If this proved to be the case, Bliss
cautioned, the location of Pershing's forces near the Swiss border, far
removed from the BEF, was a grave strategical error: "We must take
note of the deep, growing and already very strong conviction on the
part of Englishmen, both military and the civil, that the war must
finally be fought out by an Anglo-Saxon combination." If the French
could be persuaded to accept a new arrangement, Bliss believed it
would be good military policy to join the American and British forces
at once.33
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Admiral Benson, although he viewed British sea power as a threat
to American interests, echoed Bliss's view that the war on land would
be won by Anglo-American alignment. "From intimate contact with
the actual war operations and from a knowledge of the European
situation which is based upon secret and what I consider reliable
information, I am convinced of the possibility of the burden of the
entire war sooner or later devolving upon the United States and Great
Britain—and this practically means the United States," he reported to
his government. Benson's motives sprang from realpolitik considera-
tions and certainly not from any Anglo-Saxon bias. The United States,
he argued, had to support the Europeans to the hilt to keep the war
from becoming almost totally an American-German conflict. "Every
day that we can keep any of the European Allies in the war, just so
much of the burden is being borne by that ally which otherwise would
have to be borne by ourselves."34
House in his report made the questionable assertion that participa-
tion in a coalition against Germany had thus far cost Britain much more
than it had gained. Acting alone, House argued, Britain could have
avoided a land war in Europe, destroyed Germany's fleet, and con-
quered its colonies. Britain would consequently have gained in pres-
tige and the "cost to her would not have been one-tenth of what she
has already expended."35
America's obligations to its overseas war partners (and equally to
its own national interests) seemed clear to the returning Americans. In
the words of Bliss, "the one all-absorbing necessity now is soldiers
with which to beat the enemy in the field, and ships to carry them." But
putting more American troops in Europe was not the same as accept-
ing amalgamation. House, who had cordially received such sugges-
tions from the British, admitted that brigading "would be the most
effective immediate help we could give the French and England, but
it would be at great cost to us." U.S. soldiers once merged would
"probably never emerge," and the United States would not receive
credit for its sacrifices.36
On December 18 Wilson held a crucial war council in the White
House with his most trusted advisers on the European war, House and
Baker. Bliss, who had just presented to Baker a paper that emphasized
ships, men, and unity of command, was also included.37 Since Amer-
ica's entry into the war, the military situation had changed dramat-
ically. The question now was not so much how to win the land war in
Europe, as how to keep Germany from adding Western Europe to its
conquest of eastern Europe. House, Benson, and Bliss had empha-
sized in their reports that the fate of the alliance hinged on America's
ability to make a military contribution commensurate with its indus-
trial and fiscal power. If the United States continued its leisurely pace
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of expanding the AEF and accepted Pershing's plan of concentrating
his forces in the French sector, withholding American soldiers from
battle, and waiting until 1919 for American arms to win the war, it
might be too late. In Bliss's chilling words, "There may be no campaign
of 1919 unless we do our best to make the campaign of 1918 the last."38
Rather than marching in a victory parade, Pershing and his forces
might be interned in German POW camps.
The only account of this meeting, House's diary, leaves the histo-
rian in the dark about what was actually said. "Bliss' advice was almost
identical with what I had already given the President," House wrote,
"and it was decided that Baker should draw up a cable to General
Pershing indicating our decision." Wilson then decided that Baker's
telegram to Pershing should also serve as his official response to British
pleas for greater American military assistance.39 It would in fact be
read to all the Allied ambassadors simultaneously in Washington.
On December 21 the prime minister read in the War Cabinet a cable
from Washington paraphrasing the telegram sent to Pershing. In his
diary, House characterized Baker's cable as a "complete answer to
their [British and French] requests."40 Nothing could be further from
the truth. On the question of amalgamation, Baker told Pershing that
the administration desired to maintain the "identity" of American
forces in Europe but that this consideration was "secondary to the
meeting of any critical situation by the most helpful use possible of the
troops at your command." Baker also suggested that Pershing consider
positioning his forces "nearer the junction of the British and French
lines."41
With House, Bliss, and Benson telling him that Germany might
win the land war in 1918 unless America did more, Wilson's reaction
was in many respects puzzling. The president of the United States in
effect abdicated his responsibility as commander-in-chief. After either
accepting or rejecting Pershing's advice, he should have given his own
response to the Allied requests for assistance. Instead he turned over
the vital question of American military cooperation (and any respon-
sibility for failure) to his field commander in Europe.
Wilson apparently wanted it both ways. He was able to appear
sympathetic to the British point of view without conceding anything.
Having made a deep impression on the House mission, the British
now had to deal with the one American leader who was least likely to
support Anglo-American military coordination if it in any way under-
mined American efforts to create an independent army that waged its
own campaign.
Wilson also implicitly rejected the British tilt in the reports of the
House mission. He introduced the possibility that American troops
might be amalgamated in French as well as British divisions; Baker's
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cable emphasized that the proposed location of the AEF at the Anglo-
French juncture was designed to assist either army. Wilson may have
been primarily motivated by a preference for a multilateral over a
bilateral military arrangement. But by introducing coalition politics
into the question, he effectively undermined British efforts to create a
special relationship between London and Washington.
In response to Baker's cable, Pershing instructed his operations
section, headed by Colonel Fox Conner, to make a confidential study
"of the best place to employ the AEF on the Western front," placing
emphasis on the possibility of American divisions training with the
BEF.42 The letter requesting this study is printed with the policy-
forming documents in the AEF's official history. Perhaps significantly,
his operations section's response is not.
That response gave political factors equal standing with strategic
considerations. Strategically, Conner argued in January 1918 as he had
in September 1917 that an American offensive in Lorraine offered the
best hope of bringing the war to a successful conclusion in 1919. To
parcel out American forces in 1918, he asserted, "and use them up
prematurely in piecemeal means eliminating the possibility of launch-
ing a great Allied offensive in 1919." As for political considerations,
Conner was quick to admit that war-weariness had grown in Britain
since the burden of fighting the main German army had shifted to the
British; American cooperation with the BEF would unquestionably
raise British morale. Conversely, French morale would just as surely
plummet. The suggestion that the AEF be placed at the joint of the
British and French forces to assist either war partner was not, in
Conner's view, a workable compromise: "It is difficult for us to avoid
friction now and to place our forces between those of our Allies would
increase our difficulties," he wrote. "We are on French soil, and must
use French facilities and it would appear that we must get along with
the French unless we should decide to turn all our forces over unre-
servedly to the British. The natural conclusion appears to be that from
a political standpoint nothing is to be gained by changing our present
plan."43
The operations section's reevaluation was really a foregone con-
clusion. Pershing and his staff had from the beginning decided that
any American force fighting alongside the British would be given a
secondary role. The dramatically altered military landscape did not
change one iota Pershing's strategy of concentrating his forces in the
Lorraine theater. The only concession that he and his operations
section were prepared to consider was the placing of American troops
behind the British front for training, if additional British shipping
could be found to transport them. But Conner emphasized that "in no
case should we consent to putting units of less strength than a division
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with the British. Otherwise we will never develop the necessary higher
commanders and staffs."44
Pershing had an ace up his sleeve in rejecting direct assistance to
the BEF: the unequivocal support of the French. Petain, determined to
pressure the British government to reinforce the BEF with soldiers of
its own, had agreed with Pershing on December 23 that "there can be
no thought given to Americans' entering the front at the junction of the
British and French armies. This entrance can be made only on the
French front."45 Pershing believed that the location of the American
theater had been "practically decided" by that December 23 agreement
with the French.46 This would not be the last time Pershing found the
French a useful ally in undermining the efforts of the British to co-opt
American military intervention for their own purposes.
Perhaps Wilson's refusal to take an unambiguous position on
collective military action can best be understood by his steadfast deter-
mination to force his political objectives upon his war partners. His
Flag Day speech in June 1917 had emphasized Germany's global threat,
but nine months of war with Germany had not yet shaken his convic-
tion that peace should be negotiated among equals. In his mind, for
example, there was no difference between British objectives in Meso-
potamia or Palestine and German designs on Courland or the Persian
Gulf. He was blind to any strategic interest the British might have in
protecting imperial lines of communication from German or Turkish
encroachment. What seemed to the British essential to the mainte-
nance of a stable and peaceful world was viewed by Wilson as selfish
colonialism and discredited power politics. Having failed to get a joint
American-Allied statement of moderate war objectives out of the Su-
preme War Council, his thoughts in mid-December were turning
increasingly to a bold American statement on war aims to effect his
radical reconstruction of the international system.47
The grave military crisis faced by his European partners presented
Wilson with opportunities as well as risks. The growing dependence of
the Allies upon American resources, now manpower as well as finan-
cial and material resources, raised America's international voice, and
he was reluctant to sacrifice any political leverage by diminishing the
identity of America's military role in the war through either amalgama-
tion or interference with Pershing's war plans. He thereby ran the risk
of losing the land war in Europe. By specifically rejecting a special
Anglo-American alignment to see the war through to victory, he also
unknowingly risked losing Britain as a war partner if Lloyd George
once again considered a separate British peace with Germany.
As 1918 began, the War College Division painted a dark picture of
America's global position should Germany triumph in Europe and
then consolidate a great Eurasian empire. Reflecting the suspicion of
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Japan that ran deep in American military and political circles, the War
College Division in its review of the strategic situation expressed the
fear that Tokyo might switch sides if Berlin controlled the world's
heartland. The result might be a Berlin-Tokyo axis "to divide the
world" between them.48 War-depleted Britain, still a great naval
power but with its manpower and economy exhausted, might remain
America's only important ally in this global struggle. A Wilsonian
peace in that event would be most unlikely. Without the British Em-
pire's assistance, America's world position would be precarious in the
extreme.
That the British might seek a satisfactory peace through negotia-
tions with Berlin and not through the military assistance of Wash-
ington was, to be sure, an unlikely possibility. Lloyd George argued
with genuine conviction that Germany must suffer military defeat to
demonstrate that militarism did not pay. As the war went from bad to
worse during the last months of 1917, however, many British leaders,
the prime minister included, began to doubt that destroying the Ger-
man army was possible without undermining Britain's status as a great
power in the process. Lloyd George had attempted to square this circle
by putting his faith in two premises: Germany would not launch an all-
out offensive against the BEF in 1918 which would force Britain to
commit its remaining military resources without reservation to the
land war in Western Europe; and, of equal importance, America could
be persuaded to begin providing manpower relief to the BEF in 1918
and assume the primary responsibility for fighting the German Army
in 1919. His failure to convert Wilson and Pershing to a special Anglo-
American alignment, consequently, was a cruel disappointment to
him.
As London experienced another war Christmas, the British lead-
ership considered a unilateral and moderate statement of war aims.
Lloyd George had resisted House's attempt to elicit a joint American-
Allied statement of war aims at the first meeting of the SWC, arguing
that such a statement would weaken the alliance and encourage the
Germans to believe in ultimate victory. Increasingly, however, it ap-
peared that general peace negotiations might ensue from the wearing
military stalemate and the widespread war-weariness on the European
home fronts.
Lord Lansdowne, who had earlier privately urged the Asquith
government to seek a compromise peace, went public with a request
for the liberalization of Allied war objectives and the beginning of
general peace negotiations. His letter, printed in the Daily Telegraph on
November 29, struck a responsive chord with some British Socialists
and elements within the non-Socialist left. "There are gradually ac-
cumulating in the country a great many wounded and crippled men
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who are not of a very cheery disposition; there are others who are mere
wasters and without patriotism; and finally, there are the various
Labour Unions etc. On the whole there is a fairly formidable body of
discontented or half-hearted people," was Robertson's uncharitable
description of this anti-war sentiment. Yet Robertson concluded that
"on the whole the majority are quite sound."49
What is really surprising is that the massive casualties suffered by
the BEF in 1916-17, the increased war sacrifices demanded from the
civilian population, and the Russian Revolution did not have a greater
impact on support for the war. Beginning in mid-April 1917 the War
Cabinet received frequent and extensive reports on the mood of the
workers.50 These reports reflect a surprising steadfastness on the part
of the working classes, despite the strain of protracted conflict. Mus-
cular patriotism rather than pacifism or defeatism motivated most
workers. As J.M. Bourne has remarked, "Perhaps Britain's greatest
asset in a war against Germany was Germany herself. The Germans
were in many ways the perfect enemy." Recent works by Bourne, John
N. Home, and Trevor Wilson support Robertson's conclusion that
support for the war within the labour movement remained strong.51
International and geopolitical considerations, more than any con-
cern about morale on the home front, in all likelihood influenced Lloyd
George to seek a liberalization of British war objectives. The Bolsheviks
signed an armistice on December 15 and issued an appeal for general
peace negotiations at the Polish fortress town of Brest-Litovsk. The
Central Powers accepted this invitation and falsely gave the impres-
sion that they were prepared to begin peace discussions on the Bolshe-
vik formula of no annexations or indemnities. Concurrently with the
Brest-Litovsk peace discussions, secret British negotiations with the
Austrians in Switzerland suggested that a moderate British statement
of war aims would encourage Vienna toward peace and might even
result in Germany's acceptance of a moderate settlement.52
On January 5, 1918, before a Trades Union Congress in Caxton
Hall, Lloyd George delivered a speech on war objectives which in
some respects could have been written by President Wilson. Prevailing
opinion is that Lloyd George's intent was to respond to the liberal
challenge posed by the America president, the revisionist demands of
the English left, and the peace offensive of the Bolsheviks (which
included the publication of Allied secret treaties that seemed to make a
mockery of the Allies' claim that they were fighting to resist German
imperialism). Much has been made of his choice of audience, a packed
gathering of trade unionists. Arno Mayer argues that the prime minis-
ter's speech before workers provides "conclusive proof" that the War
Cabinet's intent was to placate the moderate left.53 Overlooked by
Mayer and others, however, is the fact that Parliament, which the War
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Cabinet generally agreed was the proper setting for a speech of such
import, was not in session.
Lloyd George's motives were more complex than have generally
been recognized. He was greatly influenced by geopolitical and strate-
gic considerations, especially his hitherto unsuccessful efforts to use
American intervention in the war to guarantee a British peace and the
survival of the economic and military capacity that would ensure Great
Britain's status as a great power. Germany's militant position follow-
ing his tentative exploration of peace feelers in September and October
had made the prime minister doubt that the German military masters
would consider terms satisfactory to the western powers, particularly
as the war began to turn in their favor. Russia's abandonment of the
Allies and the beginning of peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, how-
ever, might present Britain with both the opportunity and pretext to
make peace at Russia's expense.
Just before the Labour party's December 28 program of opposition
to imperialist war objectives, Jan Smuts, whose advice carried more
weight with the prime minister than did that of Foreign Secretary
Balfour,54 suggested that the British must be prepared to "suddenly"
find themselves "confronted with a peace situation for which we have
made no adequate preparations. Questions of peace will rush to the
fore very rapidly at the end, and it is conceivable that the end may
come as early as next spring or even earlier." The catalyst for negotia-
tions might be a "peace with Russia which may amply compensate
Germany and Austria for all possible sacrifices in the West." Such a
peace might "convince the enemy that the war is not worth con-
tinuing, and that it would be better to concede to us most of our
legitimate war aims."55
Lloyd George certainly understood the advantages of delineating
his country's peace terms to prevent Britain's remaining European
allies or President Wilson from dominating the peace agenda at the
expense of Britain's global interests. Lloyd George also wanted to
signal Berlin that he would not reject outright a peace that sacrificed
Russian interests—especially if Germany largely confined its eastern
objectives to the non-Russian Baltic provinces—in return for generous
German concessions to the western allies.
During the War Cabinet's discussion of the draft of his war aims
speech, Lloyd George candidly asserted that it was "necessary to give
warning to the Bolsheviks that we [do] not any longer consider our-
selves bound to fight on in Russian interests, so that there [will] be no
misunderstanding on the subject in the future"; he also wished "to
give a hint to the enemy in the same direction."56 A Germany able to
dominate central Europe without a strong Russia as a counterweight
would destroy the European equilibrium. A Germany that also domi-
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nated Courland and Lithuania and was in league with an Asian power,
Turkey, would be a positive danger to Britain's world position. Lloyd
George had grave reservations about any peace that would leave
Germany unhumbled and in a stronger imperial position. Given the
increasing strain on British manpower and the economy, however, he
apparently hoped to keep his options open in the event of a rush to
peace because of general war exhaustion among Britain's European
allies. Clearly, he did not want his country's national interests to be
defined by other powers, especially the United States.
In his famous speech Lloyd George redefined British war aims,
going, in his own words, "to the extreme limit of concession."57 The
author of the "knock-out blow" did not now call for the destruction of
Germany or even the elimination of its navy. He did, however, de-
mand the restoration of Belgium, Serbia, Romania, Montenegro, and
occupied Italy and France. Beyond supporting the revival of an inde-
pendent Poland, he ignored Germany's conquest of other Russian
territories. Lloyd George thus seemed prepared to accept Britain's
military failure to demote Germany from the position of great, almost
certainly the greatest, Continental power.
His definition of war objectives was designed to thwart Germany's
overseas threat to the British Empire. Lloyd George also understood
the political requirement that Britain needed some territory as compen-
sation for its sacrifices. He told Lord Riddell, as his press proprietor
friend noted in his diary, that "we should have to secure some territory
to compensate us for what we had expended—the greater part of the
German Colonies, Palestine and Mesopotamia." The Germans could
recoup themselves with a large slice of Russia. The Russians had acted
badly and must take the consequences."58 Turkey, which served as
Germany's bridge to Asia, was to be stripped of Arabia, Armenia,
Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine through the recognition of their
"separate national conditions." There was no talk of annexing Ger-
many's colonies; instead, Germany's overseas possessions were to be
"held at the disposal of a Conference whose decision must have
primary regard to the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants of
such colonies."59 The principle of self-determination in Turkish- and
German-ruled territories was thus employed to mask British deter-
mination that any peace settlement would dismantle the Turkish Em-
pire and reduce Germany to a Continental—not global—power.60
In the unlikely event that Germany accepted these terms, Britain
would emerge from the war with its political independence and great
power status intact. Haig, who now believed that America would not
be a '"serious military factor even in 1919," probably spoke for many
British war leaders when he told Smuts, following Lloyd George's war
aims statement, that so far the British Empire had "got most out of this
The House Mission and War Aims 129
war, certainly a good deal more than even Germany"; according to
Smuts, Haig "doubted whether we would gain more by continuing the
war for another twelve months. At the end of that period we would be
much more exhausted and our industrial and financial recovery would
be more difficult, and America would get a great pull over us."61
No American was more interested in Lloyd George's January 5
statement than President Wilson. The prime minister talked of a peace
of "reason" and "justice," the "sanctity of treaties," a territorial settle-
ment based on the "right of self-determination," and the creation of an
"international organisation to limit the burden of armaments and di-
minish the probability of war." Wilson was pleased that these views re-
sembled his own and did not place him publicly in a confrontation with
London over war objectives. But he was skeptical that the imperial-
minded British war government had been truly converted to his world
view and feared that his preeminent role as peacemaker had been un-
dermined, not just by the British but by Lenin's peace offensive as
well.
House raised Wilson's sinking spirits by insisting that the presi-
dent's views on the peace settlement "would so smother the Lloyd
George speech that it would be forgotten and that he, the President,
would once more become the spokesman for the Entente, and, indeed,
the spokesman for the liberals of the world."62
On January 8 Wilson delivered his famous Fourteen Points ad-
dress to a joint session of Congress.63 In discussing territorial ques-
tions, he made it clear that he opposed any peace that would allow
Germany's domination of Eastern Europe. Accusing Berlin of seeking
the conquest and subjugation of the Russian people, Wilson made his
first territorial point the demand that all Russian territory be evacuated
by the Central Powers. Wilson's rhetorical stand on containing Ger-
many's eastern expansion appeared to move him closer to accepting
the necessity of a crushing defeat of the German army as the only
means of preventing Berlin's domination of Europe.
Lloyd George was moving in the other direction. As he told the
editor of the Manchester Guardian, "to defeat the impending great
German attack in France and Italy, or wherever else it may take place,
would in itself constitute military victory."64 Unlike Wilson's, Lloyd
George's speech was not delivered primarily with the threat posed by
Lenin and public opinion in mind. His moderate stance on British and
especially Allied war aims had the effect of bringing British political
objectives more in line with his conservative views on British man-
power and his and the Milnerites' peripheral strategy, which would
serve to strengthen Britain's defensive and bargaining position in the
event of an inconclusive end to the war.
8
Before the Storm
The War Cabinet's strategical focus prior to Hindenburg's gigantic
offensive on March 21,1918, has an unreal quality about it. As Germany
prepared for a war-winning offensive on the western front, the British
prime minister and the imperial-minded members of his government
increasingly looked eastward, alarmed by the potential Turko-German
threat to Britain's Asian position following Russia's collapse. Robert-
son's repeated warnings that Britain had no choice but to concentrate
its military effort in the West to counter the growing German threat
were greeted with considerable skepticism by the civilians. Often with
a numerical superiority of more than three to two, never less than five
to four, the British and French during the last three years had launched
massive and prolonged attacks to break through the German defenses.
These costly and ultimately unsuccessful attacks had driven the French
army to mutiny and almost exhausted the BEF. The Germans, equally,
had paid a heavy price in 1916 during their ten-month offensive at
Verdun.
Despite the alarmist tone that he had taken with the House mis-
sion in requesting American manpower, Lloyd George simply could
not accept the War Office's dire warnings. On extracts from one of
Robertson's memoranda predicting a German offensive, he wrote: "By
all means. Nothing would suit us better—but unfortunately he has
learnt his lesson."1 At the very time he pressed House to accept the
amalgamation of American with British units, he was confident that
the Allies had sufficient manpower to withstand a German attack,
even one reinforced by "all their serviceable divisions from the Eastern
front."2
Haig's testimony to the War Cabinet on January 7,1918, reinforced
Lloyd George's conviction that existing Allied forces were sufficient to
withstand any German assault in the West. "If you were a German
Commander," Haig had been asked, "would you think there was a
sufficient chance of a smashing offensive to justify incurring the losses
which would be entailed?" Haig had responded that a policy of limited
attacks "seemed to him to be the more probable course for the enemy
to adopt, because an offensive on a large scale made with the object of
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piercing the front and reaching Calais or Paris, for instance, would be
very costly." If the Germans gambled for victory and failed, Haig
accurately predicted, their position "would become critical" by Au-
gust, when the Americans were expected to have a sizable force in
Europe.3 "L.G. is convinced by the figures generally that we are all
right on the W. Front," Amery wrote Sir Henry Wilson at Versailles
following Haig's appearance before the War Cabinet, "& nothing will
budge him."4
Rather than reinforce the BEF, Lloyd George and the Milnerites
were determined to limit Britain's casualties in the continued stalemate
on the western front. On the eve of the Bolshevik revolution, Milner
had written to warn the prime minister about the danger of "tying
ourselves up more than ever in France. . . . The great point is that if,
next year at any rate, we cannot make that force strong enough to
break through, it is waste to keep it stronger than is necessary for a
lively defensive. The force we could afford to withdraw from France
should be the mobile force of the alliance[,] the strategic reserve, wh. we
have never had & without wh. we can never win."5
Russia's subsequent collapse gave added force to Milner's words.
If the war now ended in mutual exhaustion, Britain might, through
military operations away from the western front, both contain Ger-
many's global threat and improve its bargaining position in peace
negotiations. "We might find it possible if Damascus were in our
possession," Lloyd George told the War Cabinet on February 21, "to
persuade the French to be content with something less than the whole
of Alsace-Lorraine in return for compensation in Syria."6
The War Cabinet's interest in diverting British military resources
from the West to advance Britain's global strategical and political
objectives made it even more essential that Washington be persuaded
to increase its commitment to the western front, especially in or adja-
cent to the British sector. This consideration, more than the fear that
the Germans might achieve a breakthrough, prompted the British
political leadership's resumption of its campaign to win the American
military and political leadership over to amalgamation.
The War Office, although for different reasons, lent its enthusiastic
support to brigading Americans with the BEF. The civilians had been
pressing Haig for months to reduce his battalions per division from
twelve to nine, which would allow him to maintain the number,
though not the size, of his existing divisions. Robertson, unable to
change his government's manpower priorities, wanted to employ
some of the approximately 1,000,000 Yanks being trained in America
for the maintenance of BEF divisions at full strength.
The General Staff argued that the BEF could absorb one American
regiment (or three battalions) per division, some 150,000 riflemen or, if
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reinforcements were included, about 200,000 American soldiers. The
General Staff's position was that Americans serving with the BEF
would be introduced to combat six months earlier than those serving
under Pershing's command. Moreover, since the British were asking
only for soldiers not organized into divisions, Pershing would not be
prevented from forming an independent army. On the other hand, the
General Staff did not favor reducing British imports in order to acceler-
ate the arrival of American soldiers destined for Pershing's command,
which the General Staff thought incapable in its present organization
of absorbing more than an additional 250,000 men before the end of
April. The anticipated temporary loss of 450,000 tons of imports
which would be entailed in transporting 200,000 Americans to main-
tain the twelve-battalion British divisions was, however, clearly worth
the economic sacrifice. Robertson cabled Haig: "The War Cabinet are
very desirous of carrying out the first proposal [using surplus Amer-
ican battalions to reinforce British divisions], as it undoubtedly offers
the best prospect of making additional American troops available
quickly."7
The British high command apparently had more success con-
vincing the House mission than its own government of the possibility
of an Allied disaster in the West in 1918. A concerned House consulted
Pershing. The American field commander agreed that a big German
offensive was likely and expressed uncertainty that the Allies had
sufficient troops to hold on until he had created a powerful army of his
own. "The situation is liable to become grave and dangerous," he
informed House in a confidential memorandum.8
Pershing's words may have been intended to frighten the Amer-
ican administration into doubling its efforts to supply him (certainly
not the British or the French) with the men he was requesting, along
with ships to carry them. Discovering that House had discussed Amer-
ica's military role with the Allies (he learned from Petain, for example,
that the AEF was planning an offensive to clear the St. Mihiel salient in
1918), Pershing felt that his position was being undermined.9 And
indeed it was; House had left the British with the impression that he
had "cordially received" their proposal for amalgamation.10 The presi-
dent's response (via the Baker-to-Pershing cable of December 18,1917)
to Britain's renewed pleas for amalgamation left the utilization of
American manpower squarely in Pershing's hands, however.11 Both
Baker and Wilson were confident that their field commander in Europe
would protect America's national military identity and not, in the
words of Pershing, "scatter regiments for service among French and
British, especially under the guise of instruction."12
On January 9 Robertson began direct negotiations with the Amer-
ican commander. The cards held by both men were face up on the
Before the Storm 133
table. America had the men. Britain had the ships to transport them to
Europe. Robertson argued that battalions could be brought over five
times faster and placed in the line sooner than complete divisions. The
rugged and plain speaking Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS)
made it clear that Britain was not prepared to "run the risk of going
short of food" to supply Pershing with two or three additional divi-
sions (plus their many noncombat personnel such as cooks, typists,
and supply clerks) that might see no action until late 1918 or perhaps
even 1919. The Americans, Robertson darkly warned, did not have the
luxury of building toward 1919. The Germans had been able to cripple
one or another of the allies each year—Russia (in 1915), France (in 1916)
and Italy (in 1917). In 1918 it might be the British if America could not
help "in the way suggested."13
With his operations section opposed to placing any American unit
smaller than a division with the BEF for training, Pershing down-
played the German threat and continued to urge British transport for
complete American divisions. The British military authorities were
furious with what they saw as Pershing's obstinacy. "General Pershing
is looking older and rather tired, and I doubt if he has yet an intelligent
and considered view of the nature of his task, or how to set about it,"
Robertson reported to the War Cabinet.14
On January 10 Pershing appeared more flexible when discussions
of Robertson's so-called 150-battalion program resumed. But his dis-
trust of British motives remained.15 Robertson fed his suspicion that
the British wanted to use American manpower for their own purposes
when he admitted that he had no intention of allowing Pershing to
reclaim before 1919 any U.S. troops brigaded with the BEF. Still, the
British were ultimately in a superior negotiating position because of
America's inability to provide shipping for its forces. American troops
that otherwise would remain in the United States could be gotten to
Europe only with British help. Hence, Pershing agreed to send Robert-
son's proposal on to the War Department and to "add a recommenda-
tion to the effect that as this scheme was only proposed as a help to win
the war, it should be given consideration if other schemes do not
appear suitable."16
Robertson, believing that the war would reach a climax perhaps as
early as the spring and early summer, emerged disheartened from
these negotiations. Pershing's lukewarm and conditional acceptance
of brigading reinforced his view that the American's driving interest
was the creation of a great and independent army. To Robertson's
disgust, Pershing proceeded as if he "had years in which to prepare."
Given the limited progress of the AEF, Robertson concluded in his
report to the War Cabinet, "America's power to help us to win the
war—that is to help us to defeat the Germans in battle—is a very weak
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reed to lean upon at present, and will continue to be so for a very long
time to come unless she follows up her words with actions much more
practical and energetic than she has yet taken."17
The civilian leaders however, continued to be positive about
Washington's willingness to assist the British. Wilson, they convinced
themselves, really wanted to fall in with British policy. The president
was just being restrained by American public opinion and an unco-
operative Pershing. When amalgamation was discussed by the War
Cabinet on January 14, Smuts thought that the president "desired to be
fortified, in making his decision, by a recommendation from his Mili-
tary Advisers." Lord Reading, who had been chosen to replace Spring
Rice in Washington, blithely assumed that ultimately Wilson "must be
guided by the English view."18
Nothing could have been further from the truth. Wilson was both
surprised and concerned when Pershing, although he later denied it,
did in fact recommend the acceptance of Robertson's 150-battalion plan
as a temporary measure.19
Pershing's recommendation, seconded by Baker,20 could not have
come at a worse time for the Wilson administration. A serious political
crisis had erupted because of the snail-like pace of American war
preparations. When Congress reassembled in December 1917, the War
Department's alleged mismanagement soon captured its attention.
More than a million men were in uniform in the United States, but only
one U.S. division was at the European battlefront. On January 18
elements of the First Division took over a quiet section of French
trenches, the first time that Americans had held a part of the front on
their own. National security considerations kept the American public
in the dark about the small number of Yanks trained and deployed in
the trenches, but breakdowns in mobilization on the home front were
receiving extensive press coverage.
Following several weeks of hearings, the Democratic chairman of
the Senate Military Affairs Committee, George E. Chamberlain, who
had aspired to be secretary of war in 1916, issued a violent attack
against Wilson's and the War Department's management of mobiliza-
tion. In a speech in New York on January 19 to a joint meeting of the
American Defense Society and the National Security League, with
Teddy Roosevelt and other super-patriots cheering him on in the
audience, Chamberlain acidly proclaimed, "The military establish-
ment of America has fallen down." The very survival of the United
States was at stake, he went on to assert. The following morning,
newspapers across the country emphasized these dramatic charges
against the Wilson administration. Chamberlain's solution, which was
endorsed by the New York Times and many Republican newspapers,
was a proposed Senate bill that would create a three-man war cabinet
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of "distinguished citizens of demonstrated ability" to oversee prepara-
tions for war. This proposal was a direct hit at Baker's and Daniels's
leadership. Even if such a war cabinet reported directly to Wilson, its
creation would represent a deep humiliation for him as well.21 Wilson
led a vigorous counterattack against his Capitol Hill critics, and Baker,
who dared not reveal the persistent Allied pleas for American man-
power assistance, promised Congress that American troops would
arrive in France in time to prevent a German victory. The war cabinet
bill was never put to a vote.
Doughboys fighting under the Union Jack would be a telling
demonstration of the truth of the charges being made against his
administration. Pershing had been careful to demand that American
battalions be transported in British bottoms not already allocated to the
shipping of his complete divisions, but Wilson feared that his field
commander had been hoodwinked by the British.22 An impressive
display of independent American power in Europe, which would
silence his critics, was being pushed into the distant future. Wilson
had the War Department immediately cable Bliss, who had just re-
turned to Europe to take his new position on the SWC, to exercise the
"utmost care" to reach "an explicit understanding that these battalions
and their transportation are contingent upon the supply of tonnage to
us for our agreed minimum military effort."23
Wilson's position, that the British had agreed to take up the slack
in shipping required to fulfill the American program of having a
minimum of twenty-four divisions in Europe by mid-July, was without
foundation. In November the Allied generals, as previously noted,
had supported Pershing's request with little or no expectation that the
United States could fulfill it. Pershing himself had informed Robertson
on January 9 that the maximum number of divisions he expected to
have by the end of June was fifteen. The British General Staff thought
even this figure quite unobtainable. And then there was the matter of
preparing these newly arrived Yanks for trench warfare, which would
require an additional six months' training.
The Anglo-French military leadership was convinced that if dra-
matic changes did not occur in the pace and shape of America's
involvement in the European war, the AEF would have little impact in
1918 and would probably not even be an important factor in offensive
operations in 1919. A French General Staff memorandum (reviewed by
the British government) estimated that Pershing's forces by mid-1919
would still be unable to undertake and carry out "offensive action on a
large scale."24
The British were currently supplying shipping for approximately
12,000 Americans a month, less than half the strength of a complete
American division. Yet although their construction continued to fall
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short of replacing their shipping losses,25 the British now agreed to
reduce vital imports, including food, in order to allocate additional
shipping for some 150,000 Americans under Robertson's 150-battalion
plan. Hence, there was no basis for Wilson's assumption. Far from
undertaking to make up the deficit in the tonnage required to fulfill
the American program (which had been caused in large part by the
failure of American ship construction to live up to expectations), the
British, with the creation of the Allied Maritime Transport Council in
December, had anticipated an expanded American merchant marine
in 1918 to assist them in supplying the tonnage needs of Italy and
France.26
On January 25, fortified by Wilson's suspicions of the British,
Pershing told Robertson and Bliss in Paris that he had never approved
of Robertson's 150-battalion program. He returned to his demand that
six complete American divisions be transported in British bottoms.
These troops would train with the British prior to becoming part of an
American force. Robrtson protested. Pershing's plan would provide
the British with only 72 instead of 150 infantry battalions.27
Pershing's about-face placed Bliss in an awkward position. More
than any other American soldier, Bliss accepted the necessity of coor-
dinating emerging though still limited American military power with
the British, even if this meant assigning American arms an inferior,
some might say demeaning, national role. He agreed with Robertson
that he transport of American infantry for incorporation in British
divisions was the quickest and most practicable means of countering
the expected German offensive. On January 25 he did not support
Pershing against Roberton. This difference of opinion between Amer-
ica's two four-star generals in Europe created a potential crisis for the
American military role in the land war.
On January 29, in Sir Henry Wilson's private room in the offices of
the SWC, the British leadership confronted Pershing over his change
of heart. Lloyd George, Lord Milner, Wilson, Robertson, Hankey, and
Haig, who joined the discussions after they had begun, presented a
solid British phalanx against Pershing, his principal aide, Carl Boyd,
and Bliss. The atmosphere was tense, the discussion heated. When
Lloyd George tried to exploit the apparent differences between Bliss
and Pershing, the former surprised him by responding, "Pershing will
speak for us and whatever he says with regard to the disposition of the
American forces will have my approval."28 Suspecting political mo-
tives, Haig recorded in his diary that Americans "were criticising their
Government because there seemed to be no results to show for the
money which America has been spending! No troops in the field, no
aeroplanes, no guns, no nothing yet in fact!" 29
Faced with a united American command, the British on the follow-
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ing day capitulated. Pershing's six-division plan, which called for the
British transport of the personnel of six complete American divisions
by June for training with the BEF, replaced Robertson's 150-battalion
plan.
Pershing had won a victory for the political objectives of his presi-
dent. Additional British shipping had been gained without accepting
brigading, which would have diminished the American role in the
war and provoked political opposition at home. President Wilson's
unjustified interpretation of British shipping obligations to the AEF
helped carry the day. Bliss wrote Baker that, following his president's
instructions, he had pressed the British to "give us additional tonnage
to carry out our 24 division program." His failure to get such a pledge
fom London, along with Pershing's renewed and determined opposi-
tion to amalgamation, had led him to join Pershing in opposing Rob-
ertson's proposal.30
Although Lloyd George had been completely outmaneuvered, he
did not realize it until later. The prime minister, having given in to
Pershing's six-division plan, still believed that the new understanding
placed a large body of Americans on the British front. The promised six
American divisions at full strength would equal twelve British divi-
sions. Lloyd George also believed, or so he told the War Cabinet, that
the American troops arriving at the British front would be available for
combat as well as training. Moveover, there was "no limit as to num-
bers [available for cooperation with the BEF], other than the limit
imposed by the amount of shipping available and the rate at which we
[can] equip the American divisions with material."31
President Wilson's soothing words also initially encouraged Brit-
ish civilians to believe that they might soon gain relief for their de-
pleted divisions and endangered front, which was being extended by a
controversial agreement to take over more of the French line.32 Wilson,
over lunch with Wiseman on February 3, emphasized that domestic
political considerations militated against his brigading American sol-
diers with the BEF. "The placing of American troops in small bodies
under foreign leaders would be taken as a proof that the recent crit-
icism of the War Department was justified and that the American
military machine had broken down." Be assured, however, Wilson
told Wiseman, that no matter how adverse the public pressure, he
would not resist the coordination of Anglo-American arms, even brig-
ading, if the military need arose.33
Wilson sounded an ominous note, however, in warning the British
not to make transport of the six U.S. divisions conditional upon their
serving with the British.34 On February 4 he made his intentions
clearer in a letter to Baker. He accepted Pershing's six-division plan but
emphasized that only a "sudden and manifest emergency" should be
138 Trial by Friendship
allowed to "interfere with the building up of a great distinct American
force at the front, acting under its own flag and its own officers."35
It was thus wishful thinking by the War Cabinet that the six-
division plan promised real assistance to the BEF and the creation,
even on a temporary basis, of a front line manned by Anglo-Amer-
icans. Wilson said as much once he had gotten the British to accelerate
the shipment of complete American divisions rather than battalions to
Europe. On February 15 he told Lord Reading, as the latter reported to
London, that American opinion was "unanimous that it would be a
grave error to send American troops under any bargain or understand-
ing with British Government that these should be used to supplement
British army instead of for purpose of forming an American army."36
Wilson's opposition to the BEF's partial absorption of American
forces abroad is certainly understandable. Nationalistic and political
considerations alone provide a strong defense of his actions. His con-
tinued rejection of close military cooperation with the British, how-
ever, has been seen by some historians as a reflection of his preference
for multilateral cooperation as opposed to any special Anglo-American
military and political alignment.37 At first glance, Wilson's wartime
actions do suggest strong support for international cooperation in mili-
tary matters. He vigorously backed the creation of the SWC, strongly
supported the creation of an inter-Allied General Reserve, and looked
with favor upon the creation of a supreme Allied commander-in-
chief.38
Wilson's support of collective security, however, was more am-
bivalent than those facts would indicate. Lloyd Ambrosius has demon-
strated that he was torn between universalism and unilateralism in his
approach to the League of Nations.39 The same appears true in his
reaction to cooperative military efforts. His support for unity of com-
mand came easy because he initially saw in it no conflict with Amer-
ican national objectives. Since his field commander in Europe com-
manded only a phantom force, compared with the other Allied armies,
he did not have to subordinate America's military role to a supreme
Allied military authority. Wilson also deflected Anglo-French sugges-
tions that the Americans serve as the Allied reserve, favoring instead
the formation of an inter-Allied General Reserve, which would not
require the armyless Pershing (as it would the French and British
commanders-in-chief) to lose control of his reserve divisions.
At this point the Americans apparently had little to lose and much
to gain from unity of command. The creation of the SWC served to
enhance the American leadership's "western front" posture in the
discussions of future Allied military policy while undermining the
concept of a special Anglo-American relationship. Bliss, although
American arms had played no part yet in the land war, was given a
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strong voice at the SWC. His participation in Allied military decisions,
however, involved potential responsibility and commitments and
were bound to have political undertones. Wilson, attempting to main-
tain America's political independence, artificially separated military
and political decisions. He seems to have believed that Allied unity of
command, whatever its form, should pertain only to decisions directly
related to the American policy of fighting the war in Western Europe.
When he came to realize that military operations such as those pro-
posed in the former tsarist empire, although connected by their advo-
cates to the defeat or containment of Germany, had possible political
ramifications inimical to American goals, he sought to withhold Amer-
ican cooperation.
Wilson's views on his country's military role continued to be
shaped decisively by his ultimate political aims. He proved as ready as
any European statesman to put national objectives over those of Amer-
ica's partners in the war. America's military and political policy often
spoke the language of unilateralism rather than multilateralism. In this
Wilson apparently saw no inconsistency. Unlike Lloyd George and his
imperial-minded colleagues in the War Cabinet, his motives in interna-
tional affairs, at least in his own mind, were to further the interests of
humankind, not the interests of a particular country. The British
political leaders were no less convinced that their peripheral strategy
during the winter of 1917-18 was directed toward the future peace and
stability of the world. Unless German expansion in Eurasia could be
contained, the national security of the United States as well as Britain
would remain imperiled.
It is usually assumed that Lloyd George's and the War Cabinet's
"eastern" or indirect strategy was essentially political in nature with
little strategical value, as opposed to the "western" strategy of the
British high command, which sought the defeat of the Imperial Ger-
man army. This assumption proves misleading, especially when the
precarious military situation of the Allies is viewed in broad perspec-
tive. As 1918 began, the British—with one major European ally out of
the war and the other two in serious decline—were on the defensive. It
was no longer a question of either turning Germany's flank (the
"easterner" solution) or the destroying of the German army (the British
high command's formula for victory). Germany, which now controlled
all of Eastern Europe, Belgium, and a considerable part of northern
France, was on the verge of dominating Europe and advancing across
Asia, perhaps even threatening India. Allied victory, it was thought,
depended upon the still unproven ability of the United States to
substitute its military power in the land war in Europe for Britain's
fading or lost European allies. Under these circumstances the British
had reason to be concerned about their capacity to contain the emerg-
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ing German-Turkish threat in the East, which was directed more
against the national and strategical interest of the British Empire than
that any other Allied state. Thwarting German and Turkish imperi-
alistic ambitions rather than expanding the British Empire was at the
heart of the War Cabinet's geopolitical strategy. There was an element
of desperation in its attempts to implement its peripheral policy,
especially in the chaotic situation that existed in the lands of the former
tsarist empire.
Following the Bolshevik coup d'etat on November 7, 1917, the
British government had been advised by, soldiers on the spot that
token military intervention might result in the establishment of a pro-
Ally, anti-Bolshevik regime that would keep Russia in the war. Lieu-
tenant General Sir Charles Barter, the head of the British military
mission at Russian military headquarters, telegraphed the War Office
that the "mere announcement of the landing of foreign troops . . .
would bring about the total collapse of the Bolshevists."40
The fundamental problems for British advocates of military inter-
vention in Russia were where Allied soldiers could be located for an
expeditionary force, and what armed force could be constituted in
Russia that would favor the continuation of the war. Lieutenant Gen-
eral Sir George Macdonogh, with an eye toward the Romanian army,
which still remained in the war despite Russia's collapse, believed that
he had found the answer to both questions. The usually level-headed
chief of intelligence on the General Staff submitted a memorandum to
Robertson on November 20 that crossed the line into cuckoo land.
Macdonogh suggested that General A.M. Kaledin, an anti-Bolshevik
Don Cossack leader who expressed loyalty to the Allies, could rescue
southern Russia from the clutches of Germany.41 If an Allied force of
"say two American divisions" were able to lend support to Kaledin,
Macdonogh wrote, it would be possible to create an army of pro-Ally
elements in the East consisting of "500,000 Poles, 400,000 Cossacks,
80,000 Czechs and Slovaks, 300,000 Rumanians, 15,000 Serbians,
105,000 Armenians and 25,000 Georgians, etcetera." In another flight
of fantasy, Macdonogh suggested that 575,000 Knights of St. George,
storm battalions, volunteers, and loyal elements from the Russian
army could also be collected, making an army of an even 2,000,000
men.42
On December 3, with the Bolsheviks engaged in armistice negotia-
tions with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk, the War Cabinet took a
concrete step toward involvement in Russia by deciding to extend
financial aid to Kaledin.43 But money alone was thought unlikely to
serve as the impetus for a pro-Allied force in southern Russia. Allied
soldiers and supplies were even more essential. On December 7 Rob-
ertson advocated landing a "police force" composed of Japanese and
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perhaps Americans at Vladivostok, Russia's Asiatic port of entry and
the terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway. An important considera-
tion for Robertson was that it might eventually be possible to control
this vital railway and open communications with Kaledin's forces.44
With momentum building in Paris and London for military as well
as financial intervention in Russia to rescue the Allied cause, the
British sought to coordinate their policy with that of the French at an
Anglo-French conference at the Quai d'Orsay on December 23. The
British hoped to maintain their blockade of the Central Powers by
denying the enemy access to the food and mineral resources of south-
ern Russia. Important strategical considerations were also at stake.
Lord Milner told the French that if Germany and Turkey were given
free rein in southern Russia, there would exist no "barrier against the
development of a Turanian movement that will extend from Con-
stantinople to China and will provide Germany with a weapon of even
greater danger to the peace of the world than the control of the
Baghdad railway."45
As the British and French at Paris drafted a convention that di-
vided southern Russia into spheres of Allied operations—the British
in southeast Russia; the French in Bessarabia, the Crimea, and the
Ukraine—the S WC addressed the problem of linking up with national
groups who wanted to resist Germany's Drang nach Osten. In their Joint
Note No. 5, dated December 24, 1917, the permanent military repre-
sentative advocated the establishment of direct communications with
Kaledin either along the Trans-Siberian Railway or through military
operations against Turkey.46
Increasingly, the Milnerites related southern Russia and the war
with Turkey, which had become a British affair, to the collapse of the
Russo-Turkish front. Amery, now head of the political branch of the
British staff on the Supreme War Council, emphasized the "intimate
connection of the South Russian problem with the Turkish problem" in
a letter to the prime minister on December 29, 1917. "The control of
South Russia is in fact for the Germans the only condition on which
they can put Turkey on its legs again, check our advance, and carry out
their scheme for linking up the Turks of Asia Minor with the Turkish
populations of the Eastern Caucasus, North-Western Persia, and Tur-
kestan in a Pan-Turanian combination which would be a most serious
threat to our whole position in the East." Turkey's defeat, Amery
argued, could "turn the tables upon the Germans in that part of the
world" by establishing direct contact with southern Russia through the
Dardanelles.47
Although skeptical about British involvement in the confused Rus-
sian situation, Lloyd George welcomed any argument that strength-
ened his case for concentrating on Turkey in 1918. He intended to
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outflank Robertson and the General Staff by working through Sir
Henry Wilson and Amery at Versailles; they now took the approach
with the other permanent military representatives, that British military
operations against Turkey were intimately connected with the south
Russia situation.48
Lloyd George also briefly considered placing his ally Smuts, who
would report directly to the War Cabinet instead of to the War Office,
in charge of all naval and military operations against Turkey.49 "With
Wilson at Versailles & the East delegated to Smuts," Amery gleefully
wrote Lloyd George, "I don't think the old gang can give too much
trouble—if they do you can deal with them."50
Britain's war partners presented almost as great an obstacle to
British concentration on Turkey as did Robertson's opposition. After
considerable British politicking, the military representatives at Ver-
sailles in their Joint Note No. 12, titled "1918 Campaign," approved of a
campaign to remove Turkey from the war. The Allied political leaders
at a meeting of the SWC, although not without some unpleasant
Anglo-French wrangling and opposition from Robertson, then ratified
the decision. This success for Lloyd George and the Milnerites was
tempered by conditions insisted upon by the French. Britain was
expected to maintain its forces on the western front and not divert any
of its military resources there to the war against Turkey.
The United States played the bystander during this debate over the
advisability of attempting to knock Turkey out of the war in 1918. Since
the United States was not at war with Turkey, no direct American
involvement in this conflict was requested or expected. Hence Bliss
took only a passive part in the discussions and did not affix his
signature to Joint Note No. 12.
Standing aside from the Russian situation, however, was not so
easy for the Americans. When the British military authorities had first
discussed possible Allied military intervention, they included the use
of American as well as Japanese soldiers in their calculations.51 Al-
though President Wilson was hostile to Bolshevism and had initially
considered providing secret support to the Cossacks in Southern Rus-
sia, he decided on a policy of nonintervention in the emerging civil war
in Russia, a position strongly supported by Baker and the General
Staff, who opposed diverting any American military resources from
the western front.52 The British War Office consequently turned its
attention increasingly toward enlisting Japanese rather than American
manpower to further British policy in Russia.
The military authorities exercised their influence primarily
through the Russia Committee, an interdepartmental group composed
of representatives of the Foreign, War, and Treasury offices. This body
had been reluctantly created by the Foreign Office at the beginning of
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1918 to develop a common policy for organizing resistance to Germany
in Russia. George Russell Clerk, a senior Foreign Office official, issued
a warning that the government later ignored to its detriment: "The
scanty information which reaches us as to the progress of events from
Vladivostock to Jassy is so confused and so constantly shifting that it
is almost hopeless to attempt anything like a constructive scheme for
establishing our position in South-Eastern Russia, giving Romania the
essential support due to her, and denying the wealth of the Ukraine,
the Don, the Caucasus, and Siberia to Germany."53
In mid-January the Russia Committee ignored this sound advice
and produced a proposal involving Japanese intervention, which was
already popular with British and French officers in the Supreme War
Council at Versailles. To prevent German domination of Russia, it was
suggested that a largely Japanese force be deployed some 3,600 miles
from Vladivostok along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Cheliabinsk.
From this town, just to the east of the Urals, a branch line ran to the
edge of Cossack country.54
On January 24 the War Cabinet discussed this far-fetched pro-
posal. Representing the military were General Macdonogh and Brig-
adier General A.W.F. Knox, the British military attache who had just
returned from his post in Russia. These military authorities, along with
Milner and Balfour, spoke in favor of the plan. Opposition came from
Deputy Foreign Secretary Robert Cecil, Curzon, and Lloyd George.
"The proposal now made," Cecil proclaimed, "would probably result
in the domination of the Japanese over the whole of Siberia, and would
have far-reaching results upon the world's history, as it would make
the Japanese a prodigious Power in Asia, including the virtual domina-
tion of China." 55 Curzon expressed concern about giving the Japanese
a military role that would impinge upon the "racial ascendancy and
international prestige" of Europeans.56 Lloyd George argued that Bol-
shevism might prove to be a more effective barrier against German
expansionism than Japanese intervention. "Any attempt of the Ger-
mans to interfere in Russia," he stressed, "would be like an attempt to
burgle a plague-house." Although of a mixed mind, the War Cabinet
still decided to urge its war partners to support the Japanese takeover
of the Trans-Siberian Railway from Vladivostok to Cheliabinsk as a
mandatory of the Allies.57
By mid-February Balfour began to experience serious second
thoughts about the advisability of Japanese intervention. There
seemed little likelihood that strong Russian native resistance could be
initiated against Germany. Only the French gave their enthusiastic
support to armed intervention. The Italians dragged their feet, and
President Wilson raised weighty objections, arguing that since the
Japanese would not advance as far as West Siberia, they would pose
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little threat to the Germans; the only effect of their intervention would
be to turn the Russians against the Allies.
Wilson's opposition made Balfour pause. The American presi-
dent, he informed the War Cabinet, would "yield only under the
strongest pressure from the Allies, and I feel very reluctant to take any
share in exercising this pressure unless we are certain that the Japanese
will carry out their allotted role." Balfour was "extremely doubtful"
that they would.58 Another consideration was that Kaledin had com-
mitted suicide. By late February the only anti-Bolshevik force in all of
European Russia was the Volunteer Army, a small band of three to
four thousand men, which had succeeded Kaledin's broken move-
ment. It was no longer "a question of bringing help to the Cossacks by
means of Japanese intervention," Balfour told the War Cabinet on
February 20, because it had become clear that the Cossacks were no
longer "an efficient fighting force."59
Despite Balfour's strong reservations, the proponents of Japanese
intervention—especially the Milnerites, who were desperate to pro-
tect the now exposed British position in Asia—pressed on. On Febru-
ary 21 Sir Henry Wilson, who had just replaced Robertson as CIGS,
noted in his diary: "Russia is falling to pieces and I suppose Roumania
will follow and then we may lose the Caucasus and must watch
Persia." 60 To Milner, the most influential civilian advocate of Japanese
intervention in Siberia, it was nonsense to argue as Balfour did that
Japanese intervention might drive the Bolsheviks into the waiting arms
of Germany. He had written off northern Russia and believed that the
Bolsheviks were puppets of Berlin. "In the future Russia [will] have a
German-controlled Government at Petrograd, either under the Bolshe-
viks or a pro-German Czar," he told the War Cabinet. Concerned
about the prospect that the Germans might one day dominate Siberia
if no country stepped in to stop them, he desired rather than feared
Japanese domination of Siberia as a counterweight to German influ-
ence. Although Lloyd George was absent, the War Cabinet on Febru-
ary 25 decided to try once again to gain President Wilson's support for
Japanese intervention.61 British advocates of the plan, however, dared
not mention their true fears to Wilson: the possible future German
threat to India. "It would be most unfortunate if the idea prevailed here
that we are encouraging Japanese occupation of Siberia in order to
protect our own interests in India," Wiseman cautioned from Wash-
ington.62
Despite the War Cabinet's February 25 decision, which was subject
to the prime minister's concurrence, the government remained badly
divided on the question of Japanese intervention. Smuts, whom Lloyd
George had sent to the Palestine theater to ensure that the General
Staff did not sabotage British offensive plans there, raised powerful
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objections to Japanese intervention in Siberia when he returned to
London. "I profoundly distrust Japan," he wrote the prime minister,
"whose attitude leads me to think that she either has or is contemplating
an understanding with Germany; and in that case her position in Si-
beria at our invitation would be the worst possible business for us."63
Lloyd George, probably believing that President Wilson would
continue to resist, made no move to reverse the War Cabinet's deci-
sion. Imagine his surprise when on March 4 Balfour made the dramatic
announcement to the War Cabinet that "the United States [has] agreed
to Japanese intervention in Siberia."64 Wilson's apparent volte-face
could not have come at a better time for the British leaders concerned
with the Empire's vulnerable Asian position. On the previous day the
Bolsheviks had signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. A German peace
treaty with Romania, which would place the Germans above the Black
Sea, seemed certain to follow.
Panic prevailed among the Empire-minded statesmen. "I am seri-
ously concerned about the Eastern front," Milner wrote Sir Henry
Wilson. "Russia has gone & we must set up a barrier somewhere to
stop the Bolshevik flood, carrying German influence with it, or paving
the way first, from sweeping right over Asia. . . .  We have to draw a
line from the Persian Gulf to the Trans-Siberian—nearer west or fur-
ther east as we best can." 65 On March 8 Curzon expressed concern in
the War Cabinet about a Romanian peace: "Germany would be su-
preme on the Black Sea, and also in Turkish territory in this part of the
world, with possibilities of penetration into Persia and through Tur-
kestan towards India." Prompted by Balfour, the concerned civilians
requested a study from the General Staff on Berlin's prospects of
sending troops across the Black Sea from Odessa to Batum and then by
rail to Baku on the Caspian.66
Just as the need for Allied intervention in Russia had never seemed
greater from an imperial perspective, Wilson again disappointed the
British. Lord Reading cabled from Washington: "United States Gov-
ernment have never been favourable to policy of intervention. The
most they said was that they had no objection to His Majesty's Govern-
ment making request to Japanese Government." 67
Wilson's renewed opposition, and the inability of London to exact
a commitment from Tokyo to advance beyond eastern Siberia, for the
moment frustrated the interventionists, who realized that Britain
could not afford to alienate the American president. "There was a
possibility of a rift on a matter of cardinal policy between ourselves and
the United States of America, to secure which was one of the aims of
German policy," it was noted in the War Cabinet minutes. "Japan in
any case would not go far West, as she had ceased to feel confident that
her Allies were on the winning side."68
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If not for the important imperial strategical considerations being
stressed by the Milnerites and the military authorities, the War Cabinet
would probably have abandoned the rash and impractical plan of
drawing a line with Japanese soldiers to limit German influence in the
East. Sir Henry Wilson's domination of the General Staff strengthened
the interventionists. The choice of the Milnerites, he believed that the
drive for world dominance might eventually place Germany on Rus-
sia's Pacific coast. The British response, he argued, "must be to estab-
lish an effective barrier to German progress eastwards."69 As CIGS,
Wilson gave free rein to the military professionals who were consid-
ered experts on the Russian situation: Knox, Major General F.C. Poole,
who had served as chief of the British artillery mission with the
Russian army, and Captain Alex Proctor, another experienced Russian
hand. If the attempt to gain Japanese intervention failed, Knox argued
in appreciations for the War Cabinet, Britain must be prepared to
accept "the definite passing of all European Russia, Caucasia, North-
ern Persia, Western Siberia and Turkestan into Germany's political and
economic sphere of influence."70
These officers joined General Wilson in developing plans to check
Germany in Russia and to protect British imperial interests. The cor-
nerstone of their plans continued to be a Japanese advance along the
Trans-Siberian Railway to the Urals. A Japanese presence on the
eastern border of European Russia supposedly would place Siberia
under the control of the Allies and provide shelter for anti-Bolshevik
elements. To the south, the War Office also wanted the Nipponese to
cross the Urals and advance to Samara on the Volga, thereby protect-
ing railway communications to the Afghan frontier from the north-
west. A benefit of encouraging the Japanese, the military argued, was
that they would be drawn into full membership in the league against
Germany; otherwise, the military feared that Japan might make an
alliance with Germany to exploit Asiatic Russia. While Siberia and
Samara were being occupied by Japanese forces, the western Allies
would secure control of the northern ports of Archangel and Mur-
mansk, from which they could exercise influence in northern Russia
and possibly link up with the Japanese at Volgoda, the junction of the
Trans-Siberian Railway. In the Caspian area, the government was
advised by General Wilson to conduct "an energetic policy on [the]
Persian frontier, so as to open the road to the Caucasus."71
The Japanese were contemplating intervention, but only to fulfill
their own imperialistic designs; they were as unlikely to prop up the
British position in Asia as were the Americans. President Wilson
recognized this, along with the unrealistic nature of attempting to erect
a new eastern front with Japanese or any other Allied soldiers. The
British, however, clung to the hope that Wilson could, if carefully
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handled, be persuaded to support their plans in Russia. As Wiseman
had reported, "President Wilson may be led but certainly not driven." 7Z
This British preoccupation with events in the East, on the eve of
the titantic German effort to impose a peace on the Allies by victory in
Western Europe, makes strange reading. As the field-gray German
divisions deployed for their massive assault on the British front, the
War Cabinet's attention was fixed on such troubling omens as the
German occupation of Kiev on March 16 and a report that Austrian
prisoners had shown up in northeastern Persia.
On March 20, the day before the Germans attacked, the prime
minister received a "very anxious" letter from Milner. "Persia, wh. we
are to discuss to-morrow, is only an incident. The question is really very
much larger than that. We have a new campaign, wh. really extends
from the Mediterranean shore of Palestine to the frontier of India. . . .
Whether or not Japan takes on Northern Asia—I doubt her doing it—
we alone have got to keep Southern Asia, and we are lucky if our line
only extends from the Mediterranean to the Caspian & does not have
to double back from the Caspian to the Himalayas. Note that, ac-
cording to one report, some Austrian prisoners have already turned
up near Meshed in North-Eastern Persia! That shows what comes of the
collapse of the Power, wh. used to cover our whole Asian flank. . . .
How right was the instinct, wh. led you all along to attach so much
importance to the Eastern campaigns & not to listen to our only
strategists, who could see nothing but the Western front. If it were not
for the position we have won in Mesopotamia & Palestine & the great
strength we have developed on that side, the outlook would be black
indeed."73
Just before dawn broke on March 21, some 6,000 German big guns
unleashed their torrent of steel and poison gas against the British line
west of St. Quentin. As the British and Germans locked in a fierce
battle that would not be equaled until May 10, 1940, when Hitler
invaded France, Belgium, and Holland, the War Cabinet continued to
focus on Germany's eastern threat. With Sir Henry suggesting that
there was the "possibility" that the German attack might constitute
only a "big raid or demonstration," the civilians at their regular midday
meeting discussed Siberia and Persia. If the Germans were to gain
control of Siberia, General Wilson ominously warned, "their influence
would extend south into Turkestan, and our whole position in India
would be imperilled." It was part of the same problem as the danger to
Persia. It was a question of "pulling Siberia out the wreck, in order to
save India." Balfour suggested violating the neutrality of Persia by
sending a small force of some 1,300 men with armored cars into that
vital area.74
The War Cabinet decided to establish the Eastern or Vigilance
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Committee, "ready to warn the War Cabinet and furnish advice on the
Eastern area of operations." Curzon was asked to chair this committee,
which included Balfour, Smuts, and Sir Henry Wilson.75
Prior to the colossal German drive against the BEF, the British had
failed to gain President Wilson's support for their plans to maintain
their position in France with American manpower. Nor was the War
Cabinet successful in gaining American involvement in Russia to shore
up Britain's deteriorating position in Asia, which had been made
vulnerable by the collapse of the eastern front from the Baltic to the
Black and Caspian seas. President Wilson had seemed ready to offer a
helping hand during negotiations over the utilization of American
soldiers on the British front (which might give the British a freer hand
on the periphery) and Japanese intervention in Siberia, but in the end
he had withheld American cooperation. More dependent than ever on
American good will and power, the British feared to press him hard,
especially if their pressure seemed designed to protect Britain's over-
seas possessions.
Saving the alliance from defeat in Western Europe, however, was
another matter. The great German threat provided the British with a
powerful argument for using American manpower on the British front
and in Russia. During the next few months, with Berlin coming dan-
gerously close to winning a German peace on the battlefield, the
Americans no less than the British confronted their deepest military
crisis of the war.
9
The Western Front
Imperiled
General Erich Ludendorff, the German army's de facto commander,
rejected a defensive policy designed to achieve a negotiated peace.
Instead, he gambled on victory in Western Europe in 1918 through
battles of annihilation against the Anglo-French forces. His all-or-
nothing strategy depended upon delivering a knock-out blow before
the Americans arrived in sufficient strength to change the balance of
forces decisively in favor of the Entente. The BEF was his initial target.
On March 21, called by Hankey "one of the decisive moments of
the world's history,"1 the main German blow fell on General Sir
Hubert Gough's Fifth Army, which had been weakened by continuous
fighting in the Flanders quagmire. British defenses were beached in
two places, and attempts to plug the gaps failed. The Fifth Army
started to disintegrate. On the first day of the battle, Haig requested
three French divisions as reinforcements. On the following day he
issued a panic-stricken plea for twenty. Yet the French initially re-
sponded by withholding their forces from the great battle. By Satur-
day, March 23, the shape of the military catastrophe was becoming
clear to the civilians in London.
Lloyd George, who had spent the night at his home in Walton
Heath, rushed back to London. "The news is very bad. I fear it means
disaster," he told his newspaper friend Lord Riddell.2 Canceling a
meeting of the War Cabinet, he took charge in the War Office, seeking
to locate and send every available rifleman to France. At 4:00 P.M. the
other members of the War Cabinet joined him to review the military
situation. The deputy director of military operations on the General
Staff, Walter Kirke, who had just arrived by plane from Haig's head-
quarters, presented a report that mirrored the approaching gloom of a
March evening in London. The British had been thrown back twelve
miles, lost some 40,000 men, and abandoned not less than 600 guns.
After hearing Kirke's report, General Wilson spoke bluntly: The British
army was now under attack by "a large proportion of the German
Army" and was "menaced with a possible attack by the whole."3
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Lloyd George's plan of conserving British manpower by gradually
shifting the burden of the fighting to the United States lay in ruins. As
Robertson had forecast, Germany now confronted the British with a
life-or-death struggle on the western front. There no longer seemed
any way of preserving Britain's staying power with a prudent man-
power policy that protected industry and maintained morale on the
home front.
In time, British forces could be transferred from other theaters—
Italy, Palestine, perhaps even Mesopotamia—but Haig needed rein-
forcements immediately. All available men in uniform in Britain were
rushed across the Channel. There were 88,000 members of the BEF on
leave. An additional 50,000 trained boys, over eighteen and a half but
under nineteen years of age, could be sent into combat earlier than
previous practice had permitted. More soldiers could be found by
diverting drafts for other theaters and advancing the orders of drafts to
go overseas. In all, the War Cabinet discovered 170,000 men who could
be sent to Haig within the next three weeks.4
But the vast majority of these reinforcements were not new men to
add to Haig's existing or anticipated numbers. They were already
either a part of Haig's establishment (those on leave) or boys who
would soon have been sent to join the BEF anyway.
On March 25 the War Cabinet held one of its most painful meetings
of the war. Extraordinary suggestions were advanced to find addi-
tional soldiers. The eyesight test for recruits could be modified. Con-
scientious objectors could be used as non-combatant workers behind
the front. Men released from the Territorials "on compassionate
grounds" might be recalled, along with men who had been discharged
because of wounds. Coal miners, munitions workers, and even minis-
ters of religion were considered as possible recruits.5 Many of these
measures were impractical, politically dangerous, or potentially ruin-
ous to the economy. "We might almost as well recruit Germans," H.E.
Duke, the chief secretary for Ireland, exclaimed when the proposal
was made to impose conscription on rebellious Ireland.6
These manpower discussions provide convincing evidence that no
"secret army" existed in Britain. The French had long believed—and
never missed an opportunity to tell the Americans—that the British
were hoarding vast numbers of soldiers at home. It is true that Lloyd
George's government, believing that the war would go into 1919 and
perhaps beyond, had denied Haig the number of draftees he de-
manded. But Lloyd George and his civilian colleagues were not re-
sponsible for withholding men already in uniform from the BEF.
As London agonized over manpower, Ludendorff, concentrating
seventy-one divisions against twenty-six British divisions, piled on the
pressure. The Fifth Army melted away. It could "no longer be re-
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garded as a fighting unit," Sir Henry Wilson told the War Cabinet on
March 27. He even doubted whether any of the corps in this army
could be considered fighting units.7 The Fifth Army's destruction
constituted the BEF's worst defeat of the war, a setback even more
alarming than its panicky retreat in 1914 after the Battle of Mons.
The British military and political leadership, however, believed
that the situation on the Continent could be saved. Lord French, the
commander-in-chief of the Home Forces, told the War Cabinet that it
was too soon to consider abandoning the French army and retreating
to the Channel ports, a desperate act that would almost certainly
destroy the Anglo-French alignment and signify defeat in Europe.8
While Lord French spoke with guarded optimism in London, an im-
portant step was taken at Doullens to strengthen the cohesiveness of
the anti-German coalition. On March 26 Ferdinand Foch was granted
"coordinating" power over the Anglo-French armies on the western
front.
Although the Doullens agreement made no mention of Pershing's
forces, the American field commander visited Foch's headquarters on
March 28 and assured him of his support: "Infantry, artillery, aviation,
all that we have are yours; use them as you wish. More will come, in
numbers equal to requirements."9 Within the week the AEF was
officially placed under Foch's command through an inter-Allied reso-
lution at Beauvais that extended Foch's control to strategy on the
western front. Pershing wanted it that way. "I think this resolution
should include the American Army," he asserted at the Beauvais
Conference on April 3. Intending to create an independent army at his
first opportunity, Pershing proclaimed: "The arrangement is to be in
force, as I understand it, from now on, and the American Army will
soon be ready to function as such and should be included as an entity
like the British and French armies."10
Pershing supported his words with an offer to put all four of his
available divisions into the line as a corps. Such a deployment, of
course, would constitute a giant step toward creating an independent
American army. It would also mean turning over a section of the
French front to inexperienced soldiers. For this reason Petain rejected
the offer. Although Pershing's best division, the "Big Red One," was
moved from Lorraine to Picardy, no American combat units were
committed to stopping the first German offensive. Two American
engineer companies working on railways behind the British front,
however, found themselves in the path of the German advance and
suffered seventy-nine casualties.
Pershing's dramatic "all that we have" pledge to Foch actually had
little practical value. The Americans had no planes or artillery of their
own to commit to battle, only men. Lloyd George hoped that the
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tightening of the anti-German alignment at Doullens and Beauvais, in
combination with the dire military situation, would force Washington
to accept brigading with British and French divisions. Milner, fresh
from the Doullens Conference, wrote him in no uncertain terms that
even if the German drive stalled, other attacks would follow: "If they
do not break us now, they will break us later, unless we can keep on
sending substantial reinforcements." All too aware of Pershing's iron
determination to create an independent army, Milner believed that "it
must be a year at least before the Americans can make their weight
felt."11
Lloyd George thought that more British soldiers must be found for
Haig, but he rejected Milner's pessimistic view of American assistance
in 1918. He was much encouraged by two recent events. First, Bliss on
March 27 had gone against Pershing's wishes and joined the other
permanent military representatives at Versailles in approving Joint
Note No. 18, which asked Wilson to ship only infantry and machine
gun units during the present emergency.12 Second, news from Amer-
ica suggested that the United States, shocked by the force of the
German assault, now recognized that the Entente—especially Brit-
ain—was "standing between her and German militarism," according
to Lord Reading. Americans "realized as it were in a flash their own
military shortcomings and the time they have lost since they entered
the war. This has already produced an outburst in the Press and
Congress which naturally enough takes the form of an attack on the
Administration."13 Believing that Wilson was in a vulnerable political
position, Lloyd George planned to press him hard on the issue of
brigading. If he got his way, Pershing would be forced to suspend
building his army, and most of the American troops arriving in Europe
during the next three or four months would serve with the French and
especially British armies.14 To outflank Pershing, Lloyd George
thought that he had the backing of Baker, who was on an inspection
tour of the western front, and the Allied military advisers (which
included Bliss) at Versailles.15
Wilson was surprised and perplexed by the powerful German
offensive and the collapse of the western front at the juncture of the
British and French armies. As late as February he had clung to the hope
that the peace factions in the Central Powers would triumph over the
war elements and make possible general peace negotiations based on
his liberal war aims. Including the Central Powers in the making of a
new world order might serve to moderate Allied war objectives. War-
weary Austria-Hungary appeared especially vulnerable to his liberal
diplomacy. He had been furious with the Entente leaders when they
had resoundingly rejected peace discussions with an unhumbled Ber-
lin and Vienna during a meeting of the SWC in early February. "There
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is infinite stupidity in action of this sort. It stiffens every element of
hatred and belligerency in the Central Powers and plays directly into
the hands of their military parties," he had written his secretary of
state. "These people have a genius for making blunders of the most
serious kind and neutralizing each thing that we do. Do you think that
anything can be done to hold them off making fools of themselves
again and again?"16
In British eyes, Wilson—who in Curzon's words, "aspires to be-
come the great figure in the peace negotiations"—was the loose can-
non.17 London had been exploring peace feelers from Vienna. As
opposed to Wilson, who sought general peace pourparlers, the War
Cabinet sought a separate peace with Austria-Hungary in order to
isolate Germany. On March 1 the British leadership spoke bluntly
about its differences with Wilson. The prime minister expressed ap-
prehension that the president, having failed as a war leader to mobi-
lize his country effectively, "might want to end the war, and might
agree to conditions that we could not accept." Speaking for the
Dominions, Smuts warned against "entrusting our interests to the
United States."18 These discussions made it clear that the British were
adamantly opposed to allowing Wilson to define their interests in
Europe or elsewhere. In Hankey's words, it was "preposterous" to let
Wilson dominate peace discussion with Vienna because "we have all
at stake; Wilson very little."19
The massive German attack in March ended all talk of a negotiated
peace. The future of Europe and perhaps even of the world order was
being decided in the trenches of France and Flanders. The British told
President Wilson that they were "engaged in what may well prove to
be [the] decisive battle of [the] war."20 That Wilson grasped the dan-
ger posed to American interests (although it must be noted that he
stressed economic rather than strategic considerations) is suggested by
a comment he made to Edward Hurley, the new tsar of American
shipping: "Unless we send over every man possible to support the
Allies in their present desperate condition, a situation may develop
which would require us to pay for the entire cost of the war to the
Central Powers."21
Domestic criticism of his war leadership and the prospect of a
German victory forced Wilson to devote greater attention to military
affairs in Europe and to broaden his circle of advisers on military
questions. With the Cabinet's time being devoted more and more to
jokes, storytelling, and insignificant matters, the president in March
created an informal war cabinet or war council which met separately
on Wednesday mornings. Chaired by Wilson, this inner committee
had a fluctuating membership. Frequent participants were Baker,
Daniels, and Secretary of the Treasury William Gibbs McAdoo. Heads
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of the primary war agencies were also included in these discussions,
which focused primarily on mobilizing the economy for war but also
included questions of military cooperation with the Allies.22
Confronted with critical inter-Allied matters such as amalgama-
tion, shipping, and military intervention in Russia, Wilson also reg-
ularly looked to soldiers for help. He had always worked hand in glove
with Baker, with whom he met almost daily; he now included Bliss and
Peyton C. March, Pershing's former chief of artillery, who had become
chief of staff on March 4, 1918, among his intimate advisers. March's
elevation to the leadership level brought needed stability to that body
and enhanced its influence on national policy. Since April 6, 1917,
Scott, Bliss, and Major General John Biddle had been involved in an
astonishing merry-go-round: during the first eleven months of Amer-
ican belligerency, these three men had been rotated as chief of staff no
less than seven times. It is small wonder that the General Staff re-
mained in the background during the formative phase of America's
extra-Continental commitment. Wilson respected March's straight-
forward and almost always sensible advice. The president also valued
the frequent and comprehensive assessments of inter-Allied politics
and military matters which Bliss forwarded from Versailles. Viewing
Bliss as "remarkable" and a "real thinking man,"23 Wilson frequently
issued instructions based on specific and minor details contained in
these reports.24
The president's now intimate involvement in such questions as
shipping did not mean that he was prepared to march in step with
British plans to save the military situation. When Lloyd George urged
him to abandon Pershing's six-division plan in favor of transporting
infantry battalions to serve with Allied military formations, he tem-
porized and looked for advice from Bliss and Pershing, who were close
to the sound of the cannons. But no matter what their counsel, he was
most reluctant to accept amalgamation, which would delay the crea-
tion of an American army, undermine America's political influence,
and give ammunition to those who were attacking his war leader-
ship.25
As the British intensified their pressure, his irritation mounted.
On March 27, Lord Reading, appearing at the Lotos Club in New York,
delivered a message to the American people from the prime minister.
Lloyd George's words echoed those spoken earlier to the American
military attache by authorities in the British War Office: "For God's
sake, get your men over!" 26 Wilson reacted with fury, believing that he
was being blamed for the destruction of the Fifth Army. It was intolera-
ble that Lloyd George should speak directly to the American public,
expressing sentiments that seemed to pass judgment on their presi-
dent. Momentarily he thought of having Reading recalled. On March
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28 he acidly told the British ambassador, as Reading reported to Lloyd
George, that there "was no need to press these matters upon him as he
was only anxious to do all he could."27
London's response was to escalate its demands. The British gov-
ernment planned to draft an additional 400,000 or 500,000 men, but
these new recruits could not be trained for at least four months. Hence,
Lloyd George asked Wilson for 120,000 men a month for the next four
months to be brigaded with British divisions.28 It was suggested with-
in the War Cabinet that a special meeting of the SWC be called to
pressure Wilson "should there be any reluctance on the part of the
American Government to comply with the proposal put forward."29
The carrot as well as the stick was used to persuade Wilson.
Wiseman cautioned London: "Expediency demands that we should
help the President in order that he will help us."30 When House
suggested to Reading that London could bolster the president in his
political difficulties by praising American contributions to the Allied
cause, Lloyd George immediately issued a public statement on April 1,
1918, which asserted that Wilson had done "everything possible to
assist the Allies" and had "left nothing undone which could contribute
thereto."31
Wilson welcomed these generous words of praise and believed
that he had neutralized the unpredictable and volatile Lloyd George,
who he had feared might attempt to make him the scapegoat for recent
German successes. But he was uncomfortable with the heavy respon-
sibility for the success or failure of the Allied cause that the urgent
British requests for help placed upon him. Clinging to his prebelliger-
ent role of the honest broker, he had hitherto maintained his distance
from his war partners. The powerful German attack—which followed
on the heels of Berlin's annexationist Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with
Russia—was now forcing his hand. To save the alliance, he was under
intense pressure to make military and perhaps even political decisions
that threatened to impinge upon American independence. A nagging
thought was that London's assessment of the conflict was more nearly
right than his own. An objective reading of the facts indicated that the
British view of a predatory Germany was correct.
On April 1 Wiseman recorded a revealing statement from the
president: "If then the Allies became exhausted, what should we do?
He supposed we should have to make a compromise-peace, but we
could not deceive ourselves—it would be a German peace, and mean
in effect a German victory. The Germans would no doubt be prepared
to deal generously with France and Belgium, and other questions,
providing she was allowed practically a free-hand in Russia. . . . He
could not help being aware (he said) of the position of America. She
was now supplying a large part of the material support of the war, and
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she was also the potential military factor. It meant, he said, that the
decision as to whether the war should continue would rest in his
hands. It was, he said, a terrible responsibility, and a question which
he certainly would not regard from solely an American point of view:
he must consider it also from the point of view of the Allies and indeed
the whole world."32
On April 6, the first anniversary of the American entry into the
war, Wilson gave public expression to his fears of German world
domination. Before a large, enthusiastic audience he delivered his
strongest attack yet on German expansionism. "Their purpose is un-
doubtedly to make all the Slavic peoples, all the free and ambitious
nations of the Baltic peninsula, all the lands that Turkey has dominated
and misruled, subject to their will and ambition and build upon that
dominion an empire of force upon which they fancy that they can then
erect an empire of gain and commercial supremacy,—an empire as
hostile to the Americas as to the Europe which it will overawe,—an
empire which will ultimately master Persia, India, and the peoples of
the Far East."33
Wilson's emphasis on Germany's eastern ambitions encouraged
London to believe that he might now cooperate with British efforts to
contain German influence in northern Russia and elsewhere in the
East. On April 12 the War Cabinet asked the General Staff and Foreign
Office to draft a strategic appreciation for Wilson that treated Europe
and Asia as a single front. With some trepidation, the War Cabinet
decided that this communication should express in direct language the
British concern about Germany's threat to their imperial position.34
Still, it was the hope of Wilson's cooperation on the question of
amalgamation rather than American assistance in containing Germany
in the East that remained uppermost on the minds of the British in
April. American combat deaths after one year in the war equaled 163;
British casualties from March 21 to April 7, 1918, excluding the sick,
were 115,868.35 Not surprisingly, the British believed that the United
States should do more—no, had to do more. Haig had written Lord
Derby on April 7 that "in the absence of reinforcements, which I
understand do not exist," the situation would "become critical unless
American troops fit for immediate incorporation in my Divisions arrive
in France in the meantime."36
As bleak as Haig's position appeared, it was about to become even
more tenuous. Ludendorff, having seen his first drive stall in late
March, shifted his attention to the north of the British front to the
Ypres salient. On April 9-10 twenty-seven German divisions tore a gap
in the British line in Flanders and advanced along a twenty-four-mile
front. This German success disturbed the British leadership even more
than the earlier German breakthrough at the Anglo-French juncture.
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Vital rail communications and perhaps even the Channel ports were
endangered.37 Every line of the assessment of the situation prepared
by the head of intelligence on the British General Staff spoke the
language of panic. "Germany is endeavoring to destroy the British
Army and decide the war by concentrating all her available reserves
against the British front," Macdonogh wrote. Unless France and the
United States sent massive reinforcements and most of the British
troops were withdrawn from the periphery, Britain was faced with
"decisive defeat."38
There was an unjustified though understandable tendency to as-
sign much of the blame for this rout in progress to the American
leadership, especially Wilson. On several previous occasions the presi-
dent had seemed ready to accept amalgamation, the only realistic
method of providing immediate American relief, but he had always
stopped short. Lloyd George feared that Wilson would disappoint
again. "We have so often had large promises in past which have
invariably been falsified in result that I am sincerely apprehensive that
this last undertaking may not be carried out in actual practice," he
cabled Reading.39
The British this time went to the limit in pressuring Wilson, stress-
ing that the Entente's survival depended upon immediate American
reinforcements. Reading was a frequent and increasingly unwelcome
visitor at the White House. His Lotos Club speech had put him on thin
ice with the president. Now Lloyd George ordered him "to step out-
side his ambassadorial functions and to satisfy himself that every
possible step is being taken to fulfil the President's pledge."40 The
"pledge" that Lloyd George believed Reading had extracted from the
president on March 30 was a commitment to send to France, for
brigading, 120,000 infantry a month for the next four months. Wilson
had indeed accepted the "principle" of brigading, but he had no
intention of making this commitment open ended.41 The number of
troops actually brigaded was to be left to the American military lead-
ership in Europe. Although London sought to use President Wilson's
attempts to reassure Lord Reading as a stick with which to beat the
AEF's leadership into line, its pressure tactics were futile, for Per-
shing's operations section believed that acceptance of the British posi-
tion would destroy "any hope of forming even a single army corps this
year, if indeed it does not end all hope of seeing an American army in
this war."42
As the initial German offensive of March 21 ground to a halt,
Wilson began to retreat even from his qualified commitment to brigad-
ing. He had March cable Bliss that he had made no specific agreement
with the British; in response to the SWC resolution he had only agreed
to "send troops over as fast as we could make them ready and find
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transportation for them. That was all."43 In Wilson's view, then,
neither Pershing's theatrical promise of "all that we have" nor Amer-
ican cooperation with Joint Note No. 18 constituted an American
commitment to parceling out the newly arrived American units to the
Allied forces. Indeed, that was very much Pershing's position as well,
as the British were all too aware.
At the Beauvais Conference on April 3, where Foch's authority
was extended to the "strategic direction of military operations" of the
Allied forces, including the Americans, Pershing had resisted any form
of amalgamation in preference for building an American army. "The
man's an ass. I think—he doesn't mean business—what Bliss calls the
God-damned American programme is going to f up the whole
show," was the way Major General Sir Charles Sackville-West, the
Britain's permanent military representative at Versailles, expressed
the British military's rage over Pershing's intransigence.44
America's continued hedging on amalgamation, especially when
the new German offensive on April 9-10 renewed the prospect that
the BEF faced annihilation unless doughboys served as its reserve,
provoked identical fury (though not expressed in such earthy terms) in
London. The War Cabinet rejected the suggestion that the House of
Commons be asked to pass a resolution of thanks for President Wil-
son's cooperation, and Lloyd George fired off another cable to Reading
which pointedly noted that building an independent American army
must be subordinated to meeting the present military crisis.45
To his shock, Reading found that Wilson, who believed the British
had lost their nerve and resented their pressure tactics, was unwilling
to see him at first. He did eventually meet with the British ambassador,
but he was extremely reticent and refused to make any commitments
until he had conferred with Baker, who was en route home from
Europe. Such a defensive and cool reception convinced Reading that
his government had pushed the president too far. "I beg of you not to
regard this report as indicating a change of view of President," he
reported to London.46 The dynamic and irrepressible Lloyd George
was unconvinced. He furnished more ammunition to Reading to use
in the forthcoming discussions with Wilson and Baker. His message
was direct: "We can do no more than we have done. It rests with
America to win or lose the decisive battle of the war."47
Differing perspectives had plunged Anglo-American relations to
their worst depths since December 1916. The British demanded that
America forgo an independent military role for the near future. If it did
not and the war were lost, the responsibility would rest with Wash-
ington. Wilson was naturally loath to accept the British position. His
irritation knew no bounds. He exploded, "[I] fear I will come out of the
war hating [the] English."48
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On April 19 Wilson canceled a Cabinet meeting to confer with
Baker, who had just returned from Europe. The outcome of their
discussions has been rightly characterized as a "masterpiece of studied
ambiguity."49 The American response was handed to Reading on the
evening of April 19 and received in London on April 21.50 Although
this much qualified document appeared to support amalgamation, its
real intent, as Baker wrote Pershing on April 29, was to retain Amer-
ican freedom of action and to avoid a "definite and obligatory promise
as will permit representatives of the British Government to feel that
they have a right to watch what we do and sit in judgment on our
action."51 This sentiment, surely as much Wilson's as Baker's, was
intended to be the last word on the subject. House informed the War
Cabinet through Reading that the American position "should be ac-
cepted, not only without raising any objection, but also without hav-
ing any in mind."52
At this point the tense Anglo-American discussions of amalgama-
tion took another twist. Pershing had been conducting his own nego-
tiations in London with Sir Henry Wilson and Milner, who had just
replaced Derby as secretary of state for war. The resulting London
Agreement of April 24 represented a return to Pershing's six-division
plan, the major differences being that only the infantry and machine
gun units of six divisions were to be shipped and that these doughboys
could be used for combat as well as for training in the British sector. A
decisive moment for the British in these negotiations occurred when
Pershing implied on April 22 that the war would be won with "an
American army fighting side by side with the British" on the Flanders
front.53
There were now two understandings, the London Agreement of
April 24 and the so-called Baker-Reading understanding of April 21.
Pershing naturally preferred his arrangement with Milner, which gave
him more freedom of action, limited the American commitment to ship
combat elements to one month instead of four, and generally im-
pinged less on the creation of an independent American fighting force.
In opposition to his civilian superiors in Washington, Pershing stood
by the London Agreement at a Supreme War Council meeting on May
1 at Abbeville.
Believing that the French had a virtual monopoly on American
troops, Clemenceau was enraged when he learned that the London
Agreement apparently gave the British control of the American infan-
try being shipped in May. Neither his government nor the new Allied
supreme commander had been consulted. Foch's command was not "a
mere decoration," he thundered at the Abbeville meeting. If the British
got 120,000 Yanks in May, the French must get their 120,000 in June.
As the British and French squabbled over the division of American
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manpower, Pershing erupted. Surely his comrades-in-arms were not
saying that "the American Army is to be entirely at the disposal of the
French and British commands." From that point on, the discussions
rapidly went downhill. When Foch asked Pershing if he were prepared
to see the French forced behind the Loire, the grim-faced American
responded: "Yes, I am willing to take the risk. Moreover, the time may
come when the American Army will have to stand the brunt of this
war, and it is not wise to fritter away our resources in this manner."
The meeting concluded when Pershing pounded the table with his fist,
declaring, "Gentlemen, I have thought this program over very deliber-
ately and will not be coerced."54
On the following day, with the Allies threatening to go over his
head directly to Wilson, Pershing retreated but not by much. He
agreed to accept the extension of the London Agreement into June but
no further. The resulting Abbeville Agreement provided for British
shipping of a minimum of 130,000 American infantry and machine gun
units in May to serve with Haig, and 150,000 in June for service with
either the British or French. In return for this commitment, Pershing
got the SWC's formal approval for the creation of an independent
American arm.55
A puzzling aspect of this whole episode is that Lloyd George ini-
tially kept the War Cabinet in the dark about the London Agreement.
The ministers were thunderstruck when they learned that the Baker-
Reading understanding of April 21 had been abandoned. By their
calculations the London Agreement provided the infantry-starved BEF
with only 72,000 combat troops for its immediate use. Moreover, by
emphasizing American divisions rather than battalions to serve with
the British, Pershing had undermined British efforts to revive their
forces with American manpower. Two weeks earlier, for example, the
War Cabinet had discussed using American manpower to restore
shattered British divisions and perhaps then exchanging these divi-
sions for British divisions in Italy. Now, the ministers pondered, how
could Lloyd George, who had practiced brinkmanship in pressing
Wilson to accept amalgamation, accept such a half-loaf? On the other
side of the Atlantic, Reading was equally "mystified and disturbed." 56
When he returned from Abbeville, the prime minister gave his
explanation, which was, in a word, Pershing. Lloyd George probably
believed that renewed pressure on Washington to overcome its field
commander's intransigence would do more harm than good. Per-
shing's so-called divisional program still seemed to provide the British
front with tens of thousands of doughboys and, just as important, the
prospect of joint Anglo-American operations. Pershing had told Lloyd
George that he would supply 170,000 (instead of 120,000) infantry and
machine gunners in June if the British found the necessary shipping.57
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Meanwhile, in Washington, Wilson and Baker assessed the results
of Abbeville. Baker, encouraged by Pershing to believe that the Ab-
beville solution represented a true meeting of the minds of the Allies
rather than capitulation to his intransigence, expressed delight in an
agreement "which relieves us from any possible embarrassment due to
a misunderstanding of our execution of the resolution [Joint Note No.
18] of the Permanent Military Representatives at Versailles." Wilson,
too, thought the "agreement entirely satisfactory." The president was
especially relieved that this SWC decision would, or so he believed,
"dispose of further indefinite discussions of the particular views of any
single government." 58 He meant Lloyd George's unilateral appeals for
British utilization of American soldiers.
The prime minister returned from Abbeville to find his war lead-
ership under serious assault in the press and by a combination of
Asquith's supporters and right-wingers led by Sir Edward Carson. The
catalyst for this political crisis was the publication of a sensational letter
by Major General Frederick B. Maurice, the director of military opera-
tions on the General Staff. Central to Maurice's accusations was the
damaging charge that Lloyd George, having failed to maintain the
BEF's effectives, had misinformed Parliament about the strength of
Haig's forces prior to March 21, wrongly claiming that the BEF was
stronger in January 1918 than it had been a year earlier.59
Maurice's letter threatened to destroy Lloyd George's coalition
ministry. The climax came when the Welshman defended himself
brilliantly, though not always truthfully, in the House of Commons.60
"I have never seen such a complete collapse as Asquith's yesterday,"
one M.P. commented. "You couldn't find him with a magnifying
glass."61 Lloyd George's parliamentary triumph secured his political
position for the rest of the war, but his rhetorical genius did not solve
the BEF's shortage of infantry. Even Clemenceau had come to realize
that the British were telling the truth about their manpower diffi-
culties. There was no large secret reserve being held back in Britain.62
On May 9, the day that the prime minister defended his conduct of
the war in Parliament, Milner informed the War Cabinet that the BEF
had suffered 310,000 casualties (including 130,000 missing in action)
since March 21.63 French casualties during this period were estimated
at 90,000. Sir Henry Wilson believed that the first two German attacks
on the British front would soon be followed by a third, with disastrous
consequences. With nine divisions already knocked out, the CIGS
predicted that Haig's effective divisions might be reduced to about half
of what they had been on the eve of the German attack on March 21. M
The dramatically increased flow of Americans across the Atlantic of-
fered Haig his only realistic hope of immediate relief—that is, if Per-
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shing gave his genuine cooperation to the training and service of
Yanks with the BEF.
Lloyd George exploited his politial triumph to increase his control
over strategy and military questions. He had replaced Robertson with
the more malleable Wilson as CIGS. Lord Derby, the soldiers' friend,
had also been cast aside; Milner replaced him as head of the War
Office. The prime minister now consolidated his position by creating
the so-called "X" Committee, composed of himself, Milner, Sir Henry
Wilson, Hankey, and (after the first two meetings) the imperialist
braintruster Leo Amery. Officially, Hankey and Amery were secre-
taries, but they both enjoyed influence far beyond their position. Lloyd
George hoped to use this imperial-minded committee (which met just
before the regularly scheduled meeting of the War Cabinet) to chart
future grand strategy. When weather permitted, these five men often
conducted business while walking abreast on the flagged terrace just
outside the Cabinet's meeting room.
American reinforcements dominated the "X" Committee's first
meetings. Major General Robert Hutchison, director of organization in
the War Office, whom Lloyd George had sent to America in April to
assist the War Department in accelerating the transport of American
troops to their embarkation ports, gave a disheartening report on
American shortcomings in providing clothing and equipment for draf-
tees. He deemed American war mobilization in general and Peyton C.
March (the new head of the General Staff) in particular "inadequate" to
the task.65
No doubt there was some truth in Hutchison's critical analysis of
America's war machinery. His evaluation of General March, however,
could not have been further from the mark. Tall and erect, March was a
soldier who meant business, as reflected by his steely eyes and direct,
decisive ways. His forceful personality had at once energized the
General Staff. "He took the War Department like a dog takes a cat by
the neck, and he shook it," was one staff officer's analogy. "I am going
to get the men to France if they have to swim," March once exclaimed.
Under his leadership, the War Department transported 1,788,488 men
to France during the last eight months of the war.66
The flow of American troops after March 21 rapidly exceeded all
expectations. In convoys of fast transports, three men to a bunk,
sleeping in shifts, doughboys poured across the Atlantic. Lord Read-
ing raised spirits in London when he reported that as many as 250,000
troops of all kinds might be ferried across the Atlantic in May. The
British, who provided the additional shipping, were initially the prime
beneficiaries of the dramatic increase in the American presence in
Western Europe. At the beginning of May there had been only 1,341
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combatant troops (along with 3,417 Engineer Corps, 426 Signal Corps,
and 763 Tank Corpsmen) training with the British.67 All the stripped-
down U.S. divisions, composed only of their combat elements, were
with one exception placed behind the British front.68 No less than ten
U.S. divisions, without their transport and artillery, composed
roughly of 12,000 infantry and 3,000 machine gunners per division
when at full strength, were in the process of being formed, fed,
equipped, and trained by the British. One of these huge four-infantry-
regiment American divisions, designed by the War Department in part
to overcome the shortage of trained command and staff officers, was
the equivalent of two British divisions.
Believing that only trained U.S. soldiers were arriving in Europe,
Lloyd George wanted these Americans in the line as quickly as possi-
ble. Yet Haig informed him that by June 1 (by which time the Germans
might have resumed their offensive), there would be only three Amer-
ican battalions in the line, and then only for "instruction." Lloyd
George was incredulous. How was this possible? Was Haig responsi-
ble? Pershing? To whom should be protest?69
The answer was no one. In its eagerness to assist the Allies, the
Wilson war administration sent recruits to France before they had
received their prescribed five months' training. In the Seventy-seventh
Division, for example, 10,000 men were on their way to France five
weeks after being drafted; another 4,000 were on the high seas within a
week after donning a uniform.70 Both British and American military
authorities recognized that it would be tantamount to murder to intro-
duce these raw troops to combat.
General Sir H.S. Rawlinson, commander of the British Fourth
Army, was greatly impressed with the quality of the individual Amer-
ican soldiers and the enthusiasm of their officers, but he thought that
none of the American divisions training behind his line were ready for
the trenches: "At present they are helpless, they cannot feed them-
selves, they cannot move, and the art of getting into and out of billets is
strange to them. They are about what our Territorials were before the
war but much better material." As for their tactics, "Rawly" reported to
Sir Henry Wilson, "Pershing's 'Schedule of Training' is shocking.
Nothing in it!!"71
Rawlinson's critical assessment of the AEF's doctrine and staff
work had merit, yet it is by no means certain that the doughboys would
have fought better under British tutelage. Major Lloyd Griscom—who
had just left the Seventy-seventh, the first American division assigned
to the British front, to take up a new assignment as Pershing's personal
representative to Lord Milner in the British War Office—reported to
House: "It took only two weeks to develop the fact that our men do not
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like being with the British or in fact with anybody else but their own
people."72
Pershing clearly indicated to the British that American divisions
were being placed with the BEF for service if necessary. But did he
really mean this? The square-jawed and stubborn Missourian was
showing himself "very obstinate regarding their employment," Raw-
linson reported to Sir Henry Wilson on May 19.73 On this day, without
the knowledge of the British, Pershing reached an agreement with
Petain to transfer his divisions then with the BEF to an American front
in the Lorraine theater as soon as their training was complete and the
present military emergency terminated.74
London's best leverage over Pershing was its control of the lines of
supply for the British front.75 As Hutchison told the "X" Committee,
Pershing could not "feed more troops than those provided in his
original programme," so the American troops attached to British units
could not be fed unless they remained with the British. Realizing this
weak link in collecting all American divisions under his command,
Pershing joined forces with the French to lobby for pooling supplies.76
He was "abetting the French in their aims by his scheme for a pooling
of all resources," General Wilson told Milner and Lloyd George. Be-
cause the number of troops he could supply through the southern
French ports was limited, he wanted "to get a part use of the Northern
ports for the American Army, in order that he might hereby avoid
putting American troops in the British Army and increase the strength
of the American Army."77 Since the supply of all of the armies in
France depended upon shipping, the British held the whip hand.
There was not going to be any pooling of supplies, despite pressure
from the French and Americans in that direction.
Germany's massive assaults had forced the Allies to create unity of
command in March and April to prevent military collapse, but Foch's
powers should not be exaggerated. His position as Allied commander-
in-chief or, more accurately, persuader-in-chief did not truly represent
the machinery for effective military coordination. Foch's position, for
example, cannot be compared with General Dwight Eisenhower's
during World War II. No Allied Joint Chiefs of Staff or Supreme
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) existed in 1918.
Foch (as suggested by the British) could have utilized the permanent
military representatives at Versailles as an Allied general staff, but
instead he chose to rely on his own staff. His essentially personal
command often failed to inspire confidence in the British military and
political authorities. Even Sir Henry Wilson, a friend of Foch and
widely thought to be the most pro-French general in the British army,
talked with Milner on May 9 about "the French absorbing us, our
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Army, our Bases, our Merchant Marine, our Food, Italy, Salonica,
etc."78
Lloyd George initially resisted sinister interpretations of French
designs. The prime minister's priority was "to win the battle." Nothing
should be done to handicap General Foch in that respect. An impor-
tant British consideration in supporting unity of command at Doullens
had been to encourage the French to commit their forces to battle.
Believing that the next German offensive would destroy a "large part"
of the BEF, the prime minister wanted the French to take on the Ger-
man army during the summer until the burden might be shifted to the
Americans in the fall. As he told Milner and Wilson, he hoped that
the French would "take a very big share in the battle"; he did not want
the British army to be "so reduced that next year we should find
ourselves the third Military Power on the Western front."79
German pressure on the British front in March and April had not
forged the closer Anglo-American military ties that Lloyd George had
hoped for. President Wilson and the American General Staff under
March's forceful leadership did respond handsomely to desperate
British appeals for help by dramatically increasing the flow of Amer-
ican troops across the Atlantic, but the tug-of-war between Lloyd
George and the American political and military leadership about the
employment of these Yanks provoked mutual recriminations. The
underlying cause of these disagreements remained the differing strate-
gic and political perspectives. Pershing, supported by his civilian
superiors, wanted to build an army capable of playing the leading role
in defeating Germany in 1919. The result would be an American victory
not only on the battlefield but perhaps at the peace table as well.
Lloyd George and the Milnerites saw no hope of victory over the
German army in 1918 and perhaps not even in 1919. Their immediate
objective was to stave off defeat on the western front through Amer-
ican reinforcements. Their next priority was to take the military initia-
tive against the enemy on the periphery in order to ensure a successful
political outcome to the war if the main German force could not be
crushed in Western Europe. Without significant American assistance
they feared that they would not have the means to secure both their
position on the Continent and their imperial possessions in the East
against the Turko-German menace. They were further concerned that
the BEF, unless substantially reinforced by American troops—through
either brigading or joint military operations in Flanders with an Amer-
ican army—would be reduced by the end of the year to a second-rate
force with a consequent loss of influence in any peace negotiations.
These fears continued to dominate London's relations with Wash-
ington as renewed German assaults in late May and June confronted
the anti-German coalition with the specter of defeat.
10
A New Strategic Landscape
During Germany's two powerful offensives against the BEF in March
and April, the bludgeoned British front had bent but not collapsed. But
it was a near thing, and there was anxiety in London over the alliance's
ability to withstand further German attacks. During the lull between
the second and third German offensives, the British leadership ad-
dressed future military prospects. The catalyst for this discussion was
a paper by Leo Amery titled "Future Military Policy." If the Central
Powers defeated Italy and France, Amery asserted, Britain and the
United States would have to "concentrate our whole military effort on
the East, confining our operations in Europe to action by sea and air."
Even if Ludendorff's campaign ultimately failed, eastern operations
still offered the Allies their only realistic opportunity to "take the
strategical initiative" before 1920, when a great American army would
be assembled in Western Europe. Amery proposed a two-pronged
strategy for the next eighteen months: an attack on Turkey in Palestine
and Mesopotamia, and "the salvage of Great Russia from Vladivostok
and Archangel."1
Sir Henry Wilson looked to 1919 rather than 1920 when he talked
with the prime minister on May 27 about future military policy. The
next few months were to be anxious ones, Wilson contended, but by
the end of September the West might be relatively secure. The Allies
could then build their forces toward a "tremendous and crushing
blow." But this would take many months, and Sir Henry expressed
opposition to engaging in "operations of the Passchendaele type"
during the interim. He professed to favor a forward policy in one of the
outlying theaters during the time-consuming military buildup in the
West.2
The increased flow of American troops across the Atlantic encour-
aged Lloyd George to believe that any "tremendous and crushing
blow" against the German army would largely be delivered by Yanks
rather than Tommies. During the meeting of the War Cabinet that
immediately followed his conversation with General Wilson, he placed
the "greatest importance" on America's "having an army available and
ready for operations in 1919." When the CIGS was asked how much
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U.S. manpower Foch believed necessary for victory in 1919, Wilson
shocked those present with his answer: one hundred American divi-
sions. When augmented by proportionate corps and army troops, re-
placements and supply units, one hundred American divisions could
equal as many as 5,000,000 men, an enormous army that would dwarf
the combined Allied forces on the western front. How was this possi-
ble, a puzzled Lloyd George wanted to know. Present arrangements,
the prime minister noted, called for forty-two American divisions to be
in France by June 1919, of which twenty-eight would be combatant
divisions and fourteen replacement divisions.3
On May 27, the same day that Lloyd George and Wilson discussed
future military policy, Ludendorff wrenched the British back to the
present with his third offensive, this time against the French along the
Chemin des Dames. His purpose was to lure British reserves south-
ward to rescue the French. He then planned to finish off the British
army in either June or July.
On the first day of the battle, German shock troops swept forward
thirteen miles. After three days their advance covered thirty miles. On
the fourth day, May 30, German forces reached the Marne River. With
the Germans within fifty miles of Paris, Sir Henry Wilson noted in his
diary: "I find it difficult to realize that there is a possibility, perhaps a
probability, of the French Army being beaten. What could this mean?
The destruction of our Army in France? In Italy? In Salonica? What of
Palestine and Mesopotamia, India, Siberia & the Sea? What of Arch-
angel & America?"4
The Supreme War Council reassembled at Versailles on June 1-2.
Paris was in a state of great agitation. As the noise of the big guns to the
east drew closer, hundreds of thousands of Parisians fled. Bliss requi-
sitioned trucks and prepared to abandon his offices at Versailles if
necessary. "Our plans are all made in case we should have to leave and
in that event we will probably go to Tours," he wrote his wife. "A few
days more will probably decide."5
Tempers were on edge, especially within the French delegation,
which emotionally criticized the British as well as the Americans: the
former (who had suffered some 350,000 casualties since March 21)
because they would not promise to maintain fifty-nine divisions on the
western front, and the latter because they would not feed their men
into French divisions. On this latter point there was unanimity be-
tween Paris and London. Pershing was the organizer of defeat because
of his stubborn determination to put an independent American force
into the field, no matter what the consequences to Allied military
fortunes.
President Wilson, vulnerable to the charge that he had given
Pershing too much latitude on the question of amalgamation,6 had
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recently instructed Baker to order Pershing to adopt a more "sympa-
thetic" attitude toward the Allies. He also had just informed Wiseman
that "if PERSHING really stood in the way, he would be ordered to
stand out of the way."7 Yet Pershing proved as immovable as ever
when it came to wholesale amalgamation and introducing Americans
to trench warfare before he deemed them ready for combat. The
following exchanges at Versailles most certainly did not reflect a "sym-
pathetic" attitude:
Foch to Pershing: "You are willing to risk our being driven back to
the Loire?"
Pershing: "Yes, I am willing to take the risk."
Lloyd George to Pershing: "Well, we will refer this to your Presi-
dent."
Pershing: "Refer it to the President and be damned. I know what
the President will do. He will simply refer it back to me for recommen-
dation and I will make to him the same recommendation as I have
made here today." 8
Pershing correctly gauged the support he enjoyed from Wilson, Baker,
and March.9 Their acceptance of any Allied military policy infringing
upon the distinctiveness of the American role was given with extreme
reluctance and lasted only as long as the latest military crisis. In his
defense, Pershing did recognize the gravity of the military situation
and was prepared to help, but only on terms that would not destroy his
program of forming complete divisions and creating an independent
American army during the last half of 1918. He conditionally offered
Foch the loan of U.S. divisions and enthusiastically supported the
SWC's appeal to Washington to have one hundred U.S. divisions in
Europe by 1919. No less than the Allies, he demanded "men, men, and
still more men" from Washington.
The most recent German offensive had provided American troops
an opportunity to demonstrate their combat effectiveness, a matter
very much on the minds of both the Germans and the Allies. On May
28, the second day of the German offensive, a regiment of the First
Division launched a previously planned and meticulously organized
local attack against Cantigny. Several days after this village was cap-
tured, the Third Division engaged the advancing Germans on the
Marne at Chateau-Thierry. West of Chateau-Thierry the Second Divi-
sion attempted to block the road to the French capital. On June 6 a ma-
rine brigade made its famous and costly advance into Belleau Wood,
with Gunnery Sergeant Dan Daly exhorting his troops in the immortal
words: "Come on, you sons-o'-bitches. Do you want to live forever?"
A year and two months after declaring war, at Cantigny, Chateau-
Thierry, and Belleau Wood, Americans were entering combat. Thou-
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sands more were moving toward the front. "They are coming fast," the
New York Times reported on June 6. "In passenger trains, in freight cars,
or hiking along dusty roads, they arrive from the seaports and pour
into camps behind the battlefront." The military impact of these lim-
ited American engagements should not be exaggerated. The psycho-
logical consequences, however, were profound.
No American was more elated by the good showing of the dough-
boys than Pershing. He believed that his program of hoarding Amer-
ican military resources for a gigantic American offensive effort in
Lorraine in 1919 had been vindicated. "The allies are done for," he
wrote House, "and the only thing that will hold them (especially
France) in the war will be the assurance that we have force enough to
assume the initiative. To this end we must bend every possible energy,
so that we may not only assume the offensive, but to do so with
sufficient force to end the war next year at the latest."10
Not surprisingly, British perspective differed from Pershing's.
More dependent upon America's emerging military power than ever,
they continued to link the British Empire's survival with the integra-
tion of the American military role their own. Uncertain of France's
staying power and fearing that Foch might use his position as gener-
alissimo to protect Paris at the expense of the British front (with its
Channel ports), the British leadership began to panic.
Foch's recent actions gave the British real cause for anxiety. At
the SWC meeting just concluded he had suggested that some of the
American divisions behind the British front be moved south to inactive
sectors in Alsace to relieve French divisions for action. Sir Henry
Wilson had been miffed at the time, believing that Foch wanted "to
pinch all our American Battns & send them to Alsace."11 Pershing,
who had already made arrangements with Petain for the formation of
an American army in this sector, accepted with alacrity Foch's subse-
quent proposal to transfer five American divisions training with the
BEF. Haig was angered. Just as his American divisions were becoming
"fit for battle," they were being taken from him.12
Foch had previously claimed four French divisions that were part
of Haig's reserve. Now he ordered three British divisions moved from
the north to a position astride the Somme, west of Amiens, to serve as a
reserve for either the French or the British front. Foch's handling of
American divisions and British reserves served to shift the Allied
center of gravity southward, away from the beleaguered British front.
Paris, not the Channel ports, seemed to be Foch's priority. A worried
Haig released his British divisions but not without issuing a formal
protest.
Foch's leadership was discussed in alarmist terms on June 5 at a
meeting of the "X" Committee. Sir Henry Wilson insisted that the
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British, who were being denuded of their reserves, must go against
Foch's wishes and shorten their front at its northern end toward the
sea. The CIGS was "absolutely convinced" that they were not in a
position to hold the present line against the attack of Prince Rupprecht,
who still had forty-eight reserve divisions. Ominously, the British,
fearing that the French were about to crack, began making secret plans
to withdraw their army from France in that event.13
Anxiety over Pershing's leadership explains the most extraordi-
nary proposal yet made by a member of the British war leadership for
Anglo-American military integration. "I fear very much that with the
present Higher Command," Smuts wrote Lloyd George on June 8,
"the American Army will not be used to the best advantage; and
victory for us depends on squeezing the last ounce of proper use out of
the American Army." Pershing, Smuts argued, was "overwhelmed by
the initial difficulties of a job too big for him" and unlikely to cooperate
loyally with any Allied strategy. The South African's astonishing solu-
tion was to propose himself as the "fighting" commander of American
forces. Pershing's duties would be confined to "all organisations in the
rear."14 A more unattractive request of President Wilson would be
impossible to imagine—the handing over of American forces in Eu-
rope to one of the most prominent spokesman for British imperial
interests. Not surprisingly, the prime minister kept this proposal to
himself.
Lloyd George, more than any other member of the government,
was exercised about the shift of American troops from the British to the
French front. It would be August before British draftees could be
trained and sent; Haig needed his Americans at least until then. Lloyd
George believed that one of his greatest achievements had been to
persuade the Americans to place ten of their divisions with the BEF.
Now Foch, supported by Pershing, was rapidly undoing what he had
accomplished.15 The volatile Welshman concluded that the French
were involved in machinations to force the British to find replacements
from their own manpower resources to maintain the British front.
Pershing was Foch's willing instrument because the French seemed
more inclined than the British to allow him to create an independent
army.
On June 7 Milner and Sir Henry Wilson confronted the French in
Paris at a meeting characterized by plain speaking on both sides. The
French continued to demand that the British maintain their divisions at
fifty-nine. The British complained about Foch's placement of Allied
reserves, especially his ordering the five American divisions away
from the British zone. Foch, understanding that his future authority
was at stake, was conciliatory in that he proclaimed no intention of
withdrawing any more American divisions from the BEF.16 He empha-
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sized, in response to a query by Sir Henry Wilson, that his primary
objective as generalissimo remained keeping the British and French
forces joined. He also assured the British that he assigned equal weight
to the defense of Paris and the Channel ports.17
Rather than strengthening the alliance, this meeting served as a
warning that more trouble lay ahead. Lloyd George, believing that the
American troops arriving in June would replace the divisions just
moved by Foch, was greatly agitated to discover in mid-June that
Pershing had no intention of sending any of his newly arrived divi-
sions to the British sector to substitute for those ordered southward.18
Faced with Pershing's granitelike determination, BEF headquar-
ters finally accepted as inevitable the creation in the near future of an
independent American force with its own front. The British military
authorities thus shifted their focus from lobbying for amalgamation to
persuading Pershing to cooperate with the BEF rather than the French
army, which they feared was on the verge of being routed. On June 14
Colonel Griscom, Pershing's liaison officer with the British War Office,
dined at GHQ with Haig. "He said," Griscom informed Pershing, "the
sooner we had American Corps and Armies operating the better he
would be pleased and he had told General Foch that it was folly to send
two of our good divisions to the Vosges to relieve second-rate French
Divisions. He said he would do anything he could to help get an
American Army together, and that geographically he thought the
place for our concentration now was in or opposite Belgium in view of
the immediate crisis."19
With Foch as generalissimo, however, the French retained the
upper hand in putting American forces into the line. Two of the
American divisions withdrawn from the British sector, the Fourth and
the Twenty-eighth, were stopped on their move southward to the
Vosges front and established on the west side of the Marne salient not
far from Chateau-Thierry. They joined the Second, Third, Twenty-
sixth, and Forty-second divisions, which were already in the area,
giving Pershing the nucleus for an independent army and strengthen-
ing the defense of Paris at the same time.
When Lloyd George discovered what had happened, he erupted,
suggesting that Foch had, "intentionally or unintentionally, 'done' us
in the matter."20 Pershing also incurred his anger. A protest was
cabled to the American War Department. When Baker attempted to
discover the circumstances of the transfer of the American divisions
from the BEF, Pershing replied that he was only following Foch's
instructions and that the British had no legitimate claim to these
divisions. The president, brought into this discussion on June 19,
exploded: "If the English continue to maneuver around and about, this
way and that, to have their own way, I shall speak very plainly."21
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On June 9 Ludendorff had resumed his offensive, his fourth of
1918, attacking a twenty-mile section of the French front between
Montdidier and Noyon. This fresh onslaught was quickly checked by
French counterattacks, however, and the Germans now paused. Time
was running out for Ludendorff. His initial successes against the
French had led him to concentrate on them instead of launching his
strike against the British in Flanders as he had originally planned. With
his forces exposed in vulnerable salients that had been punched into
the Allied front, his casualties, which could not be replaced, continued
to mount.
German numerical superiority, although being fast reduced by the
arrival of the Americans, still seemed to give the strategical initiative to
the enemy. Ludendorff's fourth attack had achieved little, but there
was no doubt in London that he would try again, and concern about
France's staying power continued as strong as ever. On June 19 the
prime minister tried to suppress the reporting of parliamentary
speeches that advocated a British withdrawal from France.22
Preying on British minds was the fear that France's collapse would
put Germany in control of the Continent and in a position to expand
against the British Empire in Asia and Africa. Sir Henry Wilson asked
Lloyd George if "he meant to go on with the war if the French fell out."
The prime minister's prompt response: "Yes if America will stick to
it."23 At a time when Anglo-American military cooperation never
seemed more vital, the British leadership was confronted with a deteri-
orating relationship with Washington and the AEF's leadership.
Uncertainty about American intentions continued to plague the
formulation of imperial military policy. The CIGS urged Lloyd George
to get in touch with President Wilson to learn what he was prepared to
do if the French lost Paris and the general situation became critical. It
was "essential" to know if the United States was "prepared to go on in
all circumstance."24
As July began, the "X" Committee learned that the infantry and
machine gun units of seventeen American divisions were now in
France. Seven of these divisions were in the line, complete with their
artillery. But British civilians remained in the dark about American
plans to employ these unbloodied soldiers. Lloyd George emphasized
his ignorance of how General Pershing was using the large forces
being brought over from the United States in British shipping.25
America's role in the war was also uppermost on the minds of the
imperial leaders, who reassembled in London in June to join the War
Cabinet in taking stock of the military and diplomatic situation. The
Empire statesmen included Robert Borden for Canada, William
Hughes for Australia, W.F. Massey for New Zealand, and Sir S. Sinha
and the Maharaja of Patiala for India; Smuts, already a member of the
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War Cabinet, represented South Africa. The mood differed sharply
from that of their first meeting in March 1917. There was no talk this
time about the British Empire's being the premier power in the world.
Rather, Britain's ever increasing dependence on the United States,
both in checking Germany's drive toward global domination and in
achieving a decent peace, was an important theme running through
the discussions.
On the eve of the first meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet, Milner
urged the prime minister to tell the Empire statesmen "what they
really are up against." Milner wrote: "We must be prepared for France
& Italy both being beaten to their knees. In that case the Germans-
Austro-Turks-Bulgar bloc will be master of all Europe & Northern &
Central Asia up to the point, at wh. Japan steps in to bar the way, if she
does step in. . . . In any case it is clear that, unless the only remaining
free peoples of the world, America, this country & the Dominions, are
knit together in the closest conceivable alliance & prepared for the
maximum of sacrifice, the Central bloc, under the hegemony of Ger-
many, will control not only Europe & most of Asia but the whole
world. . . .  The fight will now be for Southern Asia & above all for
Africa (the Palestine bridge-head is of immense importance)." To
Milner, the war was now a "new war." The United States held the key
to the British Empire's salvation. "One thing more—intimately con-
nected with the above. Of course all this depends on what America
may do. Is not the time approaching, when we should try to find out,
what she will do in case of a collapse of the Continental campaign
against Germany? . . .  Unless he [Wilson] can be shaken out of his
aloofness & drops 'co-belligerency' or whatever half way house he loves
to shelter himself in, for out & out alliance... . I don't see how the new
combination can have sufficient cohesion & inner strength."26
Milner's disciple Amery also emphasized that the war had entered
a new and ominous phase. "You asked me the other day to say what I
thought of the situation," Amery had written the prime minister on
June 8, "and I ventured to sum it up by saying that as soon as this 'little
side show' in the West is over, whether the line gets stabilised or
disappears altogether, we shall have to take the war for the mastery of
Asia in hand seriously, and that in that quarter we can call a New
World into being to redress the balance of the Old—if the Old should
go wrong, which I am not yet prepared to admit."27
With charges and countercharges still reverberating between the
civilians and the military party over responsibility for the BEF's set-
backs, Lloyd George's opening statement to the Imperial War Cabinet
was calculated to defend his war leadership. Russia's collapse was
partly responsible for creating the precarious military situation, but
the slow buildup in Europe of American forces ready to enter combat
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was termed Britain's "worst disappointment." The Americans had
"promised us 450,000 men in the field by the spring" but had fallen far
short. "If we had had reasonable ground for believing that the Amer-
icans would have failed us altogether, we would have risked our
industries and would have cut down our rations to one-half, and done
all sorts of things in order to put the very last man into the field, but as
the battle was going to be a battle of endurance we did not feel justified
in doing that when we were expecting American aid to that extent."
Lloyd George conveniently omitted mention of the War Office's re-
peated warnings that serious American military assistance could not
be counted on until the last half of 1918 at the earliest, and perhaps not
even until 1919.
The prime minister also vigorously defended military operations
away from the western front, especially British successes in Palestine
and Mesopotamia. Germany had "thought of the Baghdad Railway as
a means of getting to the East; they thought of the railway through
Palestine as a means of getting to Egypt, and through Egypt to Africa.
There we have cut them off, and these two successes which occurred
during last year, although, for the time being, they have not loomed as
large as the gigantic events which have taken place in the West, may
turn out to be even more eventful than those great battles." Control of
the world's shipping lanes and these strategic overland lines of com-
munication might, in the nightmarish event of a German triumph on
the Continent, allow the rim powers—the British Empire, America,
and Japan—to continue the struggle as Britain had done a century
earlier against Napoleon.
Significantly, Allied misfortunes made Lloyd George reject any
thought of peace negotiations with an unrepentant Berlin. The pros-
pect of a confident and expansionist Germany dominating the Con-
tinent, with a free hand to challenge Britain in Africa and Asia, was too
horrible to contemplate. Any German effort to buy a German peace in
the East with concessions to Britain's allies in the West must be re-
buffed. "They would be selling out at the top of the market," he told
the Imperial War Cabinet, leaving Germany "strong," "triumphant,"
and in a position to menace the British Empire. "Unless Germany is
beaten now, there [will] be another war."28
During the following weeks the Imperial War Cabinet sought to
formulate a military and political strategy that would harmonize the
Empire's declining manpower resources with a favorable peace won
on the battlefield. Wilson's world view and liberal war aims con-
stituted an obvious barrier to Anglo-American cooperation in bringing
the war to a successful conclusion from the British perspective. Lon-
don and Washington had hitherto successfully avoided an open con-
frontation over Britain's secret treaties with its allies and the British
176 Trial by Friendship
Empire's determination to eliminate the Turko-German threat. Wil-
son's and Lloyd George's January war aims statements had had much
in common, but the British knew enough about Wilson to fear any
peace settlement that he dominated.
On August 13 Lloyd George read to the Imperial War Cabinet the
remarks Wilson was alleged to have made in April to foreign jour-
nalists about the position he planned to take at any peace conference:
"Gentlemen of the Conference, we come here asking for nothing
ourselves, and we are here to see you get nothing." Lord Reading
immediately interjected that Wilson might not have used those exact
words, but the president had "refused to let the Ambassadors have it
[a copy of his statement]. . . . it was not a prepared thing." Lloyd
George remained unconvinced. He had it on good authority that these
had been Wilson's exact words. In any event, he stressed, "I think it is
very much like what President Wilson would say."29
Balfour, Lloyd George, and many of the Empire statesmen were
opposed at this stage of the war to extending the already vast holdings
of the British Empire unless vital economic and strategic interests were
involved. Their primary motive in advocating any expansion of British
rule in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific was the future security of the British
Empire. The oil fields of Mesopotamia and the phosphate-rich German
Pacific island of Nauru, in fact, were the only territories sought chiefly
for economic gain.30
When Lloyd George suggested that Wilson's opposition to the
annexation of territory might be lessened by sharing captured territory
with the United States, the reaction was strong skepticism. British
statesmen who had firsthand experience with Wilson doubted that the
president could be persuaded to go along with any form of territorial
aggrandizement. Lloyd George was engaging in wishful thinking to
argue that Wilson, for altruistic motives, might accept American ad-
ministration of Palestine, thereby providing the Suez Canal with a
shield from any future threat from the north. Equally unrealistic was
Borden's view that Wilson's radical departure from American isola-
tionism formed the basis for a new Anglo-Saxon world order. "The
more we can induce the United States to undertake its just respon-
sibilities in world affairs, the better it will be for the world and the
better also for the British Empire," he suggested. "I put the future
welfare and peace of the world first, but I think this purpose is equally
essential for the security of our huge and scattered empire which we
believe to be perhaps the greatest influence for the welfare of humanity
and the advancement of civilisation that has yet been established. . . .
The more we can get the United States to realise her great respon-
sibilities for the peace and welfare of the world the better it will be for
us and for all mankind."31
A New Strategic Landscape 177
No conflict over war strategy demonstrated the differing Anglo-
American geopolitical objectives and the difficulty of any integration of
their military resources more than British efforts to promote U.S.
military intervention in Russia to thwart long-range German designs in
European Russia and protect the British position in Asia from German
and Turkish encroachments. Much ink has been expended on the
origins of Allied intervention in Russia to prove, on the one hand, that
this controversial enterprise was motivated largely by ideological con-
siderations and, on the other hand, that military factors rather than
fear of Bolshevism were the root cause. A detailed discussion of the
argument is obviously beyond the scope of this book. Suffice it to say
that the voluminous British government records now available to the
historian strongly suggest that the advocates of intervention who were
in a position to determine British policy during the first half of 1918
were motivated far more by fear of German and Turkish expansionism
than by any threat, real or imagined, posed by Bolshevism. The de-
signs of President Wilson, who almost single-handedly determined
America's Russian policy, are less clear. Carl J. Richards identifies no
less than six theories concerning his motives.32 But Wilson, too,
seemed much less influenced by fear of Bolshevism than by other
factors.33
Ludendorff's campaign in the West, in combination with what the
British interpreted as a forward German policy in the East,34 eventu-
ally gave the upper hand to British advocates of action over caution in
dealing with Russia. Suspicion of Japanese aggrandizement was over-
come by the apparent need to forge closer relations with Tokyo in the
event of defeat in Western Europe. Lloyd George, who shared Presi-
dent Wilson's belief that armed intervention, especially by Japan,
would fail to revive the eastern front and would succeed only in
driving the Russians into the waiting arms of Berlin, was put on the
defensive by the Milnerites' concern over the security of the British
Empire. When Sir Henry Wilson, standing before a large map in front
of the Imperial War Cabinet on June 18, took stock of the war, his
pointer beat an ominous tattoo of German menace in Asia. "It seems to
me we have to get a position on this side (the east) as well as on the
west. If that is so, we have got to get everybody to help, and we must
get the Japanese. I can see no other way out of it. No military decision,
as far as I can see, that we can get here now will settle the east. It is for
that reason that I think that between the days when all anxiety is past,
this autumn, and the time when we throw down the glove here for a
final clinch, we ought to exploit the outside theatres as much as we
can, so that at the Peace Conference we, the British anyhow, will not be
so badly off."35
German pressure on the western front, however, prevented the
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British from diverting sizable military resources to the East. Meanwhile
the president's opposition on political and military grounds thwarted
both Japanese and American involvement in Russia. In yet another
effort to win Wilson's support, Balfour cabled Reading that America's
"western front" strategy could not by itself achieve a Wilsonian peace.
"No military decision in the Allies' favour can ever be expected as the
result of operations on the Western front alone; nor will such a meas-
ure of equality as may be looked for in that theatre in any way secure
objects for which the allies are fighting, unless combined with the
maximum military effort that can be made in the East."36
At the beginning of June, Wilson had bent a little in his opposition
to armed intervention in Russia, accepting with a marked lack of
enthusiasm the Allied military argument that American troops were
necessary to keep the north Russian port of Murmansk out of German
hands. General March opposed this and all other American military
involvement in Russia, but the president overruled the General Staff
(for only the second time, the first being his decision to send the AEF to
Europe immediately). The suggested military commitment appeared
limited (although Sir Henry Wilson actually expected the United States
to assume the "chief burden" of maintaining the Allied position in
North Russia);37 Japanese imperialism was not an issue; and the strate-
gical objective seemed clearly linked to the war with Germany. An
additional consideration for Wilson, especially with Generalissimo
Foch supporting the venture, was that he was weary of being por-
trayed as an obstructionist in the implementation of Allied strategy.
Hence, a small contingent of American troops (mostly from Michigan
and Wisconsin) who were destined for the trenches of the western
front was eventually placed under British control for intervention in
northern Russia.38
Persuading Wilson to employ Yanks in Siberia proved much more
difficult. Unconvinced by military arguments that dared not speak
directly to London's primary concern, the use of American and Jap-
anese manpower as a shield for the British Empire, the president
continued to stymie Allied intervention in Asiatic Russia. British diplo-
mats fared little better with the president than did the soldiers. "There
remains only the Czechoslovak complication to use as a lever," la-
mented John D. Gregory, a member of the Russia section of the
Foreign Office.39
Some 50,000 Czechs (mostly Austro-Hungarian deserters and pris-
oners of war who had formed the Czechoslovak Legion to fight with
the Allies on behalf of Czechoslovakian independence) were about to
become central characters in the saga of Allied intervention in Siberia.
Spread along the Trans-Siberian Railway, this body of troops was in
the process of being transported to ports for shipment to the western
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front. British advocates of intervention, however, with their country
dominant in shipping, sought to use the Legion's control of this vital
rail artery to form the nucleus of a pro-Allied force in Asiatic Russia.
Wilson's military advisers in Washington, March and Baker, were
both strong "western fronters"; if they got their way, the United States
would pursue a hands-off policy in Asiatic Russia.40 When the presi-
dent asked him about the efficacy of armed intervention, the chief of
staff on June 24 dictated a memorandum emphasizing the impractica-
ble nature of Allied proposals to revive the eastern front by means of
the Trans-Siberian Railway. "To make a substantial diversion of Ger-
man forces," he informed the president, "would require the oc-
cupation of the Trans-Siberian Railroad to Russia proper, and the
maintenance of a force in Russian territory entirely beyond the possi-
bility of the present resources of the United States to maintain."41 Or
any other great power, he might have added. What is not usually
appreciated is that many British statesmen agreed with March on this
point. It was frankly admitted within the War Cabinet that no military
authority had yet devised a believable plan for erecting an active front
in the East that would threaten the Central Powers and force them to
divert troops from the western front.42
Emphasis on the reconstitution of Russia, or the revival of the
eastern front as it had once been, misses the point. The British Empire
now confronted, in Milner's words, a "new war," which might mean
defeat in Europe, a prolongation of the war into 1920 or later, and
increasing German concentration in the East. The Empire statesmen
were intent on filling the vast vacuum created by Russia's collapse. In
Curzon's panicky utterance, the whole of Russia was "laid out pros-
trate and impotent at the foot of an advancing Germany."43 Without
the military means themselves, Empire statesmen sought to block
Germany's eastern expansionism with a polyglot force of Czechs,
Japanese, Americans, and native elements. If the war went wrong in
Europe, it appeared absolutely essential to have Japan and the United
States committed to Asiatic Russia.44
With Wilson's approval considered essential to any military action
in Siberia, the Imperial War Cabinet had suggested on June 20 that a
direct British request be made to the White House. Foreign Office
officials, however, knew that unilateral British action would fall on
deaf ears. "What would really appeal to him is a message from the
Supreme War Council backed by Foch," Drummond wrote Hankey.45
On June 27 the Imperial War Cabinet decided to pressure Wilson
through the Supreme War Council.
On July 2, the SWC sent Wilson an urgent appeal for armed
intervention in Siberia. A new and insincere argument, calculated to
appeal to the president's idealism, was that intervention was neces-
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sary to rescue the Czechoslovak Legion, which was reportedly in a
life-and-death struggle along with the Bolsheviks, and Austrian and
German prisoners of war.
This Allied request finally forced Wilson's hand. On July 6 he met
with Baker, Lansing, Daniels, March, and Benson at the White House.
Although the president agreed with his military advisers' criticism of
the military justifications for this intervention, he nevertheless over-
ruled them on the employment of American troops beyond the west-
ern front. When March vigorously shook his head and expressed his
fears of the consequences of armed intervention in Asiatic Russia,
Wilson retorted, "Well, we will have to take that chance."46 He de-
cided to send 7,000 soldiers to join with an equal number of Japanese
troops to assist the Czechs.47
Wilson's motives for this decision remain murky. It has been
suggested that he sought not to rescue the Czechs but to use them to
block further German inroads in Russia.48 The president may have
believed that national sentiment would not be aroused if a Slavic
contingent, the Czechoslovak Legion, constituted the core of anti-
German resistance in Siberia, around which loyal native forces might
rally. Political questions aside, Wilson probably saw little risk in his
conception of armed American intervention. Determined to keep the
American presence limited and under his tight control, he almost
certainly saw no conflict with America's commitment to the western
front.
The president's reaction to the appeal by the SWC was generally
consistent with his previous responses to British efforts to coordinate
the American military effort with their own. He did not hesitate to
reject an Anglo-American military alignment, but finding it difficult to
refuse outright a proposal for collective military involvement in Siberia
if it came ostensibly from Foch and the SWC, he was prepared to give
the appearance if not the substance of American cooperation. Wilson
quickly emphasized that any American participation was to be on his
terms. On July 17 he delivered to the Allied ambassadors his famous
aide-memoire, in which he disclaimed any intention of intervening in
Russia's internal affairs. The heavy-handed implication was that
America needed to protect Russia from both the Central Powers and
the Allies. Wilson, echoing his generals, also took a strong "western
front" position, arguing that only in Western Europe could the United
States conduct large-scale military operations. "The American Govern-
ment, therefore," he noted, "very respectfully requests its Associates
to accept its deliberate judgment that it should not dissipate its force by
attempting important operations elsewhere."49
The British were furious. Wilson's position of moral superiority
annoyed them, and his desire to limit American and Japanese involve-
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ment to 7,000 men apiece, if adhered to, would effectively destroy
British efforts to create a barrier to German expansionism. In short, the
British viewed Wilson's actions as another example of American uni-
lateralism—which indeed they were, for his response had little in
common with Allied interventionist plans. The prime minister sar-
castically compared Wilson's "half-fledged" acceptance of the SWC's
appeal to Prime Minister William Gladstone's failure to send relief to
"Chinese" Gordon at Khartoum.50
The ray of hope for the British was that American and Japanese
intervention, once launched, would inevitably grow. Believing that
the war would not end until 1919 or later, their most prudent policy
seemed to be one of patience. Pressing Wilson, who at this time was
bitter about what he thought were British-inspired articles in the
American press favorable to intervention, was certain to be coun-
terproductive.51
Rather than integrate their military resources with those of the
British to bolster Britain's position in Europe and Asia during the grave
military crisis of June and early July, American policy-makers clearly
wanted American arms to make a big, essentially independent splash
in Western Europe. On July 7 Baker wrote Pershing a confidential and
personal note stressing two points: "(1) I want the Germans beaten,
hard and thoroughly—a military victory. (2) I want you to have the
honor of doing it."52
Before Baker's letter arrived, Pershing was already moving in this
direction. On July 10 he talked with Foch about forming an American
army with its own theater of operation. In short, he wanted indepen-
dent objectives as well as an independent force. To give him the
necessary military muscle, he pressed the War Department hard to
achieve the impossible: one hundred American divisions in France by
July 1919, which would more than quadruple the size of his existing
forces.53
The British hoped that Pershing would employ some of his in-
creasing military strength alongside the BEF, putting the five remain-
ing American divisions into a corps that would take its place in the line,
if not in Flanders, perhaps at the joint of the British and French
forces.54 An incident on July 4, however, destroyed any chance that
Pershing would ever allow a sizable American force to fall under
British influence or control. Companies C and E, 131st Infantry, and A
and G, 132nd Infantry, of the American Thirty-third Division (National
Guard,) participated in an attack by the Fourth Australian Division on
the village of Le Hamel.
The Battle of Le Hamel, although a minor engagement, was a
brilliant success. Following an opening artillery bombardment, which
some Americans described as better than "any previous Fourth of July
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demonstration they had ever heard," a well-coordinated thrust cap-
tured 41 German officers, 1,431 other ranks, several big guns, 171
machine-guns, and 26 trench mortars. The Australians lost 51 officers
and 724 other ranks; the Americans, 6 officers and 128 other ranks. In
ninety-three minutes the attack achieved its objectives. The untested
Americans fought well, impressing the Aussies: "United States troops
are now classified as Diggers," an Australian company commander
reported to his superior. On the following day, Lloyd George and
Milner visited soldiers from the Thirty-third Division. After saluting
the American flag as he reviewed American troops marching by, the
prime minister stood on an automobile and spoke of the common
struggle against Germany. Across the globe there was talk of the new
Anglo-American alliance; American flags flew in Toronto, Sidney, and
Wellington in recognition of America's Independence Day.55
Behind the scenes it was a different story. Rawlinson had inten-
tionally chosen the Fourth of July for the first American offensive
action in the British zone. Despite its clear success, Pershing seethed.
In his view the United States was still struggling for its independence
from the British. Earlier he had vetoed American participation in this
Australian attack, and Haig had passed on his instructions to Rawlin-
son, with whom the Thirty-third was training. Rawlinson then duti-
fully informed Lieutenant General John Monash, an unconventional
Jewish officer who was a genius at meticulous preparation for infantry
assaults. Receiving these orders at 4:00 P.M. on July 3, Monash was
aghast: if he withdrew the American companies, the resulting gaps in
his orchestrated attack would force cancellation. He protested and was
given permission to proceed. Rawlinson was at the same time greatly
relieved that the attack had been a great success with small American
losses ("If things had gone wrong I suppose I should have been sent
home in disgrace!!") and furious with Pershing. "Pershing is a tire-
some ignorant and very obstinate man as we shall find later on when
he begins to try conclusions with the Boche 'on his own,'" he wrote the
assistant private secretary of George V.56
Pershing's apprehension over British ulterior motives would have
been even greater if he had been privy to the discussions taking place
in the "X" Committee. On July 1 Lloyd George discussed 1919 military
operations with Major General P. de B. Radcliffe, the director of
military operations, and Major General Charles H. Harington, the
deputy CIGS. These generals explained that the Americans, who were
expected to have their own front in 1919, would play a key role along
with the British in offensive operations. Predictably, the prime minis-
ter sat uneasily in his chair when big attacks on the western front
involving heavy British losses were discussed. He suggested that if the
Americans were to concentrate "a great Army on the Western front
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next year, it might be possible for our Army to follow out its traditional
role of operating on the outskirts of the war area."57
In his attempt to implement a strategy so favorable to the political
interests of the British Empire, Lloyd George ran afoul of unity of
command. Central to his conflict with Robertson had been his deter-
mination to limit British casualties on the western front. In an effort to
undermine Robertson's stranglehold on strategy, he had been the
motive force in creating the SWC, which he planned to use as an
alternative to his own General Staff's advice. Foch's position as gener-
alissimo had evolved out of this first hesitant step toward unifying
Allied military policy. But Foch, no less than Robertson, opposed any
reduction of the British commitment to France.
The War Cabinet refused to march in step with Foch for two
reasons. First, the ministers did not believe it either economically or
politically feasible to make the draconian demands on depleted British
manpower resources that would be required to replace Haig's losses.
Second, Lloyd George hoped to gain strategical flexibility for the
British Empire, freeing some of Haig's divisions for theaters where
their use would directly further imperial interests; the United States
would replace Britain as the linchpin of the anti-German coalition in
Europe. Foch, however, checkmated him by placing almost all the AEF
divisions behind or in French defenses, at the same time insisting that
Britain was not providing its fair share of infantry to the western front.
A meeting of the Supreme War Council, July 2-4, gave Lloyd
George the opportunity to confront the French. First he took on Andre
Tardieu, the high commissioner for Franco-American affairs, for med-
dling with the British transport of Americans across the Atlantic.58
Next he attacked the French for unilaterally changing the orders of the
Allied army in the Balkans, which was commanded by a French gen-
eral, from a defensive to an offensive position. Trouble would arise
"the moment General Foch came to be considered merely as the
servant of the French Government," he blustered. For the present, the
SWC "trusted him absolutely," but if it was thought that he was
"taking instructions from one Government more than from another,
this feeling of complete confidence would disappear."59
One suspects that Lloyd George confronted the French to put
them on the defensive. To prevent Foch from unilaterally deciding
Allied strategy in 1919, he moved that the permanent military repre-
sentatives, who had largely been made superfluous by Foch's en-
hanced position, study future military operations.60 If Lloyd George
and Milner got their way, they intended to transfer some of Haig's
divisions to Palestine once the western front was secure.61 British
plans to reduce their commitment to the western front, of course,
could not be revealed to either the French or Americans.
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When Foch threatened resignation over any effort to diminish his
authority, Lloyd George firmly stood his ground. According to Gen-
eral Wilson's diary, he told both Foch and Clemenceau that "there was
a d sight too much of these Generals threatening to resign & that if
they were private soldiers they would be put up agst. a wall & shot."62
Lloyd George's resolution stood, with some change in the wording.
This contentious meeting set the stage for a showdown over ship-
ping between London and Washington. The tottering of the European
side of the anti-German alignment confronted Lloyd George and the
Milnerites with the inescapable conclusion that the British Empire's
salvation rested in the hands of Wilson, who had become the world's
most powerful political figure. The president's uncooperative Russian
policy, along with Lloyd George's maneuverings to shift the primary
British military contribution to the periphery for political reasons,
widened the gulf between London and Washington, not to mention
Paris. Unable to persuade the president to cooperate with British
military and political policy in Europe or in Asia, Lloyd George con-
fronted the American political and military leadership with his only
remaining bargaining chip: shipping.
11
Disunity of Command
It has often been remarked that America in World War I had almost no
strategic role to play in the land war because the principal theater of the
war, the western front, had already been well established by the
course of military events prior to April 1917. This argument assumes
that Anglo-French strategic policy constituted a monolith, which was
far from being the case, especially during the last phase of the war. The
political leadership of Great Britain and the Dominions, more con-
cerned than their primary war partners about the Turko-German
threat to Asia, sought strategic flexibility to meet this menace. The War
Cabinet's imperial focus, which threatened to diminish the British
commitment to the western front, placed it on a collision course with
France, especially with a Frenchman as Allied supreme commander.
With Paris and London at sixes and sevens over Foch's growing
control of Allied military policy in Western Europe, the Americans
held the balance of power.
The wide divide between the American "western front" view and
the British imperial strategy is abundantly demonstrated by the differ-
ing perspectives of Bridges and Bliss. General Tom Bridges, who had
returned to Washington in July, vigorously lobbied Baker to increase
America's military role in Siberia, arguing that it was essential to an Al-
lied victory. After an especially frustrating encounter with the Amer-
ican secretary of war, Bridges, never one to mince words, charged that
advocates of the single-minded "western" approach "must take the
responsibility of prolonging the years of war, millions of American
casualties, the expenditure of billions of treasure, and in fact the heavy
additions to the sum of human misery that we shall hereby incur, as
well as a great risk of an inconclusive peace."1 President Wilson in
particular was incensed by this tough talk, and the Foreign Office was
subsequently warned not to send Bridges to Washington again.2
In opposition to Bridges, Bliss argued that Britain's emphasis on
the outer theaters was a political rather than a war-winning strategy.
On August 14 he cabled Baker and March that the war could be ended
in 1919, but only if the Allies were prevented from shifting the burden
of the fighting in Western Europe to the United States, while they
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squandered their military resources elsewhere to guarantee them-
selves a favorable peace. "If sufficiently favorable military situations
are not created on certain secondary theaters by beginning of Autumn
next year," he warned Baker, "the Governments of our Allies may be
willing to continue through 1920 and at the cost of United States troops
and money a war which may possibly be ended with complete success
for us by operations on the western front in 1919. " 3
Following the fourth German offensive of 1918, June 9-13, there
was yet another pause, the last such lull in military operations. With
hope of a knock-out blow waning, Ludendorff's gamble for total
victory took on an even more desperate note. If his next move failed,
he knew that his declining numbers would not allow yet another
throw of the dice. Ludendorff planned to threaten Paris with an attack
around Rheims on July 15 (thereby encouraging Foch to weaken fur-
ther the British position in Flanders) and then shift his reserves north
to drive the BEF into the sea.
Foch, as early as June 28, had learned of the German plan to attack
the French front and made his preparations accordingly, provoking
anxiety in London. Anticipating a great German push at any moment
against their forces, the British civilians feared another March 21 disas-
ter. German preparations across no-man's-land suggested (correctly)
that Ludendorff ultimately planned to seek a German victory against
the British rather than the French. Although Lloyd George's govern-
ment had survived the destruction of the Fifth Army, it would be down
and out if confronted with another military debacle of that magnitude.
On July 8 General Wilson told the War Cabinet that "the Germans
could now put in a bigger attack than they did on the 21st March."
Although British defenses were stronger, the BEF's position "was
weaker in the respect that we [are] not in a position to give ground, as
was possible on that occasion." 4 Foch's placement of Allied reserves in
a position to counter any German move against Paris especially con-
cerned the civilians. On July 11 the War Cabinet instructed Lloyd
George to remind Clemenceau that Foch was "an Allied and not merely
a French Commander-in-Chief, and that he must treat the Allied
interests as a whole, making his dispositions on this basis and not
mainly from the point of view of French interests."5
The prime minister saw sinister motives in the actions of Clemen-
ceau and Foch. As frequently as a cloudy day in England, the French
had pressed him to maintain the strength as well as the number of
Haig's divisions. He was convinced that Foch's deployment of Amer-
ican troops was designed to force the British to provide their last man
to the killing grounds of Western Europe. The infantry and machine
gun units of thirty American divisions would be in France by the end of
the month, yet the BEF apparently would have only five American
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divisions on its front. Lloyd George told the "X" Committee on July 12
that the French had "secured the bulk of the American divisions for
themselves." Clemenceau had "more than hinted" that he was "get-
ting hold of the American divisions in order to compel us to re-fill our
own," which was "an unjustifiable attempt to put pressure upon us." 6
The following day, Lloyd George took on the French in preemptive
fashion. Speaking on behalf of the Imperial War Cabinet, he wrote
Clemenceau (copy to Foch) that the generalissimo's deployment of
divisions to meet the German threat must not give Empire statesmen
the impression that "their armies have been let down by the united
command." At the very least, Foch must reinforce the reserves behind
the British sector "by a much larger proportion of the American troops
brought to France during the last two or three months." The British
Empire, in fact, had a "special claim" to many of these troops. At "great
sacrifice" the British had brought some 582,000 doughboys across the
Atlantic since March 1, yet only 100,000 were now training behind
British lines. Lloyd George concluded his letter with a threat and a
demand. If Foch's allocation of American manpower resulted in the
BEF's being "overwhelmed by superior numbers," it would "undoubt-
edly be fatal" to unity of command; therefore Clemenceau should
apply pressure on Foch and Pershing to deploy more American divi-
sions in the British sector.7
On Sunday, July 14, a crisis atmosphere existed within the ruling
political circle in Britain. Discovering the exact hour of the German
attack, Foch ordered Haig, who still believed that his forces were
Germany's primary target, to send four divisions from the British
reserves south of the Somme to an area south-east of Chalons.8 Pre-
viously he had moved the last six French divisions of the Detachment
de l'Armee du Nord, the French army group in Flanders, south to
Beauvais, where they could reinforce either the French or British front.
At the very time Lloyd George was demanding that the British sector
be reinforced, Foch was thus moving its reserves southward.
The prime minister convened an emergency council of war in
Sussex at Danny Park, Hurstpierpoint, where he was Lord Riddell's
guest. He dispatched Hankey to Canterbury to fetch Milner. "Yester-
day you saw the letter I wrote to Clemenceau," the prime minister
wrote the secretary of state for war. "I fear that it may not suffice with
that queer tempered old gentleman. When so much depends upon
his decision—his immediate decision—we must take no chances."9
The Welshman wanted to send Smuts and Canadian Prime Minister
Borden, who "I am told will have special influence with Pershing," to
France to back up his earlier appeal to Clemenceau.10 Meanwhile,
Smuts arrived at Danny Park from Oxford, Robert Borden from Lon-
don, and Sir Henry Wilson from Henley.11
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Believing that British forces were about to be "overwhelmed,"
Lloyd George lost his nerve, threatening to destroy the unity of com-
mand which he in large measure was responsible for creating. He was
prepared to veto Foch's transfer of the four British divisions unless
Haig could guarantee that Germany would not attack his forces. Nei-
ther Haig nor any other general could give such rash assurance. Milner
and Wilson, however, urged against any precipitous action on Bri-
tain's part until German intentions were clearer. They persuaded the
prime minister to rely on Haig's judgment; Wilson telephoned BEF
headquarters, instructing the field marshal to appeal to his govern-
ment Foch's handling of Allied reserves (which he had the right to do
under the Beauvais Agreement)12 if he thought that his front was in
danger or believed that "political reasons" were behind the movement
of reserves from the British sector. Smuts followed this telephone mes-
sage with a visit to GHQ to ascertain whether the British commander-
in-chief "was satisfied with the evidence on which General Foch was
acting."13
Significantly, Lloyd George's obsession with acquiring American
troops to replace those moved to the French front was in no way
modified when the Germans attacked the French front on July 15.
Smuts, who left for France just as this fifth German offensive began,
was instructed to enlist Haig's support in pressuring Foch to allocate
more doughboys to the BEF. To Lloyd George, much more was at stake
than the battle in progress. Without substantial American support in
the British sector, he feared that the British would never have the
strategical flexibility to protect British interests outside of Europe and
establish the territorial basis for a favorable political settlement. Con-
sequently, he continued to press Clemenceau on the "undiminished
importance to the training of additional American divisions behind our
lines."14
Germany's assault on July 15 was quickly repulsed, with heavy
losses to the attackers. On July 17, recognizing his defeat in the Second
Battle of the Marne, a disappointed Ludendorff called off his attack.
On the following day Foch launched a counteroffensive, the Aisne-
Marne Offensive, to eliminate the Marne salient. America began to flex
its new military muscle. Eight American divisions (equal in infantry to
some sixteen Allied divisions) were involved in the Franco-American
advance. American divisions also fought for the first time in larger
military units. When the offensive formally concluded in early August,
the former front of the French Sixth Army in the Marne sector was
manned by the American First and Third Corps. Ludendorff's gamble
had failed. His five offensives had cost him 800,000 casualties. Numer-
ical superiority (given the Allies by the arrival of U.S. forces) and the
strategical initiative passed from his hands to Foch.
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Foch's steadfast direction of the Second Battle of the Marne and
the counteroffensive that followed earned him a marshal's baton.
Lloyd George, however, continued to believe that Clemenceau was
taking unfair advantage of the British through his manipulation of the
generalissimo. Nothing could alter this view: not Foch, who prom-
ised to protect the British front;15 not Milner and Wilson, who argued
that there was "no proof that General Foch had let the British Army
down";16 and not Haig and Chief of the General Staff Sir Herbert
Lawrence, who expressed the view that "the presence of the Amer-
icans" had had "a remarkable effect in stimulating the French moral."
Haig went so far as to tell Smuts that he "doubted if the French army
would have had any offensive spirit left" without American sup-
port.17
The prime minister's anxiety was to a large degree a result of
Britain's worsening manpower situation, which Lloyd George linked
to "the part that this country would take on the Western front and the
part that America would take next year, a matter closely connected
with questions of our future war policy, which [is] now under consid-
eration by the Military Representatives at Versailles, by the General
Staff, and by a Committee of Prime Ministers set up by the Imperial
War Cabinet."18 The Committee of Prime Ministers, which Lloyd
George had just initiated, included the political leaders of Canada,
New Zealand, Australia, and Newfoundland, and Smuts, who repre-
sented General Louis Botha, the prime minister of South Africa. Mil-
ner, as secretary of state for war, was given a seat on this committee;
and Sir Henry Wilson, as the government's chief adviser on strategy,
was usually in attendance. This subcommittee of the Imperial War
Cabinet quickly came to overshadow its parent organization. Chaired
by Lloyd George, it was dominated by military and political leaders
who believed that the war in Asia was as important, if not more so,
than the war in Europe.
To his chagrin, however, Lloyd George discovered that the delib-
erations of the Committee of Prime Ministers had been rendered
largely irrelevant by the powers of the generalissimo. Having broken
the stranglehold of the "westerners" on British strategy with the
dismissal of General Robertson in February, Lloyd George found that
the means to that end, unity of command, presented a formidable
obstacle to implementing his peripheral strategy. Shielded by Foch's
position, the "western" generals had greater ability than ever to plan
and conduct military operations, free from Whitehall's interference.
The determination of Pershing and his staff to launch a great
American offensive in Lorraine in the direction of Metz also under-
mined Lloyd George's plans. The creation of an independent Amer-
ican army was the first step toward that goal. On July 10, in a
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conference with Pershing at Bombon, Foch had proclaimed: "The day
when there are one million Americans in France, America cuts a figure
in the war. America has a right to an American army; the American
army must be."19 Gaining acceptance for the AEF's Lorraine strategy
was more difficult, for Foch wanted the Americans to participate in
1919 in Allied attacks from the Argonne Forest to Arras, which would
shift American emphasis away from Metz. Fox Conner spoke for the
leaders of the AEF when he wrote: "A campaign limited to the front
planned by General Foch carries with it no reasonable prospect of final
victory during 1919. This final victory can only be had by reaching the
vitals of Germany and by destroying her armed forces. Since her vitals
are in Lorraine the simplest method is to take the most direct road to
that region."20
On July 24 Pershing and the other Allied commanders-in-chief on
the western front, Haig and Petain, met with Foch. It was probably
Pershing's most enjoyable meeting yet with the other commanders.
With some 1,200,000 Yanks in Europe and his forces engaged on a large
scale with the enemy, he believed that he had earned a position of
equality with the Allied generals. Three days earlier he had reached an
agreement with Petain to establish American armies on two sections of
the French front, one active and the other a quiet sector for battle-
weary and untrained American divisions. With the expectation of an
American offensive there later in the year, the southern side of the St.
Mihiel salient was chosen as this "rest" sector. Pershing then dined
with Haig and gained his support for the formation of an independent
American army. Significantly, as he slyly admitted in his memoirs, he
omitted any mention of "the probable early recall of our units from his
front."21
The results of Pershing's lobbying, which reached fruition at the
July 24 meeting, could not have been more satisfactory from the
American point of view. Pershing joined the Allied generals in embrac-
ing a policy of maintaining offensive pressure on Germany, with the
AEF being given responsibility for a future campaign at St. Mihiel.
Pershing immediately issued orders, to go into effect on August 10,
creating the American First Army in the Marne sector. Earlier, with the
bulk of his forces attached to the French army, Pershing had received
his orders through Petain. As head of the First Army, he now stood
equal with the French and British commanders-in-chief.
As Pershing anticipated the prospect of achieving an American
victory in 1919, Lloyd George plotted to get his fair share of Yanks in the
British sector. Britain's dominant shipping position represented the
only leverage left to the prewar's premier global power. Responding to
an American request for assistance in fulfilling its hundred-division
program by July 1919, the British agreed to provide additional trans-
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port. The British share (with some Italian assistance) was 180,000 men a
month; 120,000 would be transported by the Americans and French.22
Thereupon, on July 24, Washington informed London that although
additional British transport was still required, the fulfillment of the
hundred-division program was impossible.23
With Washington retreating from that program, Lloyd George saw
an opportunity to hedge on his promise to provide shipping for some
180,000 troops a month. He sent Hankey to visit Sir Joseph Maclay "to
'rig' him in regard to an American application for tonnage to help in
their military programme in France." The minister of shipping was
instructed to manipulate British sea transport figures "to force Foch to
put some of the American divisions to train behind our line and to take
over part of our line in winter."24
On the same day that Lloyd George prepared the ground for
pressuring the Americans and French through Britain's dominant
shipping position, Foch cabled Sir Henry Wilson his decision imme-
diately to create two American armies, situating them both on the
French front. Foch also ominously suggested that Pershing might "ask
for the divisions now in the British zone to go to the American zone
when fully trained, if they are left holding back lines, but that if it is
proposed to use them in active operations General Pershing will prob-
ably not ask for them."25
Lloyd George was thunderstruck at this news. Despite his pres-
sure tactics, the BEF, rather than having additional American divisions
allocated to it, was in danger of losing all its American troops. Greatly
agitated over this "French plot," he launched into a tirade during a
meeting of the "X" Committee on July 26. He accused the French of a
"political game" that General Foch was playing "at M. Clemenceau's
instigation." As reported in the "X" Committee's minutes, he went on
to say that "the whole object of it was, by depriving us of the support of
the American troops, to force us to keep up our present total of 59
divisions regardless of the effect upon our industries and national life
generally. It was intolerable that the French should attempt to put the
screw upon us in that way and he was determined that if this con-
tinued he would ask the authority of the Cabinet to refuse the French
any ships for the conveyance of American troops to France. . . . He
was determined to call a halt to this process of putting the screw on us.
He would have to give the reasons quite plainly to M. Clemenceau
though not to the United States."26 Lloyd George followed up his
angry words with decisive action, gaining the War Cabinet's approval
to use British shipping "as a lever to secure a fair redistribution of
Allied forces in the line on the introduction therein of the American
divisions."27
On August 2 the prime minister sent a bombshell message to Paris
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which emphasized that Washington, although unable to fulfill its one
hundred-division program, still required further British shipping to
achieve its reduced eighty-division program. "Owing to the serious
character of this intimation I immediately made a preliminary examina-
tion of the question with the Minister of Shipping, Sir Joseph Maclay. I
regret to say that we shall be unable to render further assistance in
cargo tonnage, and will probably have to reduce our troop transport
tonnage."28
Logistics took center stage in the Anglo-French tug-of-war over
Allied war policy. The British controlled sea transport, but the French
were in the process of centralizing in Paris all land transportation
authority under M. Albert Claveille, the chairman of the Inter-Allied
Transportation Committee. Lloyd George, warned by First Lord of the
Admiralty Sir Eric Geddes, a leading authority on rail transportation,
that Foch's consolidation plan would allow him "to control the detailed
strategy of the Allied Armies' Commanders [more] than any number
of Conventions," attempted to counter the French move by centering
all shipping decisions in London.29
With this Anglo-French power struggle as a backdrop, the British
civilians took stock of the improved military situation that followed the
checking of the Germans on the Marne.30 Their conclusions on the
future direction of British military policy were in sharp contrast with
the growing optimism of GHQ BEF. From 1916 on, approximately two-
thirds of the British and imperial divisions had been committed to the
western front.31 If imperial troops such as Indian soldiers (who played
the major role in Britain's war with Turkey) are omitted from the
calculation, the percentage of the British contribution to the Continen-
tal war is even greater. Haunted by Britain's massive losses since the
Battle of the Somme in 1916, the politicians' perspective was shaped by
the country's manpower resources. They needed to realise that they
were "passing from the time of enlisting 75,000 men a month to
20,000," Milner stressed within the War Cabinet, which meant moving
from "an army of big to one of moderate dimensions."32 In 1916 the
nation had provided 1,200,000 recruits; in 1917, 800,000; in 1918, an
estimated 700,000; and in 1919, a projected 300,000 (of these, 90,000
would go to the air force and 40,000 to the navy, leaving only 170,000
for the army.) Lloyd George clearly spoke for his government when
he talked of limiting British "strategy to our income."33
The catalyst for these important discussions by the Empire states-
men was the memorandum, "British Military Policy 1918-1919," dated
July 25, which had been prepared by the CIGS on the prime minister's
instructions. No soldier had expressed a greater interest in military
theaters "over the salt water," as he expressed it, or tailored his
strategic advice to fit more closely the geopolitical goals of the Milner-
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ites than Sir Henry Wilson. These views, in fact, had been largely
responsible for his becoming the government's primary strategic ad-
viser. This latest strategic appreciation, however, seemed to indicate
that he had been a closet "westerner" all along. Stressing General
Robertson's familiar though no less valid argument of the German
advantage of interior lines of communication, Sir Henry came down
hard on Lloyd George's and the Milnerites' formula for achieving a
satisfactory peace. Rather than British concentration on the periphery,
he favored limited military operations in the West as a prelude for a
decisive victory over the German army in 1919.34 General Wilson's
change of heart was, in all likelihood, due to the improved Allied
position and his probable knowledge that the higher commanders on
the western front had in great secrecy adopted an offensive strategy for
the last half of 1918, with the now rested BEF initially assigned the
leading role. This information, if known to him, he dared not share
with his civilian superiors.
"Wully redivivus," was the shocked prime minister's bitter remark
(alluding by nickname to Sir William Robertson) when he read Wil-
son's memorandum.35 With enemy troops pouring out of the Marne
salient under Franco-American pressure, Lloyd George recognized
that the immediate danger of a German victory was over. Britain's
position outside of Western Europe also looked better. There were
reports of German soldiers being withdrawn from Palestine, and the
swirling chaos of the borderlands of the old tsarist empire was proving
to be quicksand for the Germans. "Russia merely absorbed some 30
German divisions," the Welshman reported to the Committee of Prime
Ministers, but the Germans "were in despair there and did not know
quite what to do." 36
Notwithstanding these encouraging developments, Lloyd George,
Smuts, and Milner vigorously attacked General Wilson's proposal to
concentrate the British Empire's remaining military resources on the
western front. The following sentiments appear in the minutes of the
Committee of Prime Ministers meeting on July 31.
Milner: "In his view the Western front was a candle that burned all
the moths that entered it."
Smuts: "He did not question that the Western front was the de-
cisive front, but from the beginning of the War it had always proved
the fatal front."
Lloyd George: "The enemy had only done it [attacked on the
western front] twice since the very first onslaught, namely, at Verdun
and in the present year. If the enemy had gone eastward or made an
attack on Italy in the present year we should now be in a most difficult
position."37
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To Milner, Lloyd George, and Smuts, Britain's exhaustion meant
that the western front must be a secondary theater until Pershing had
the weight of numbers and trained troops to overwhelm the German
army. It was "out of the question," Milner stressed, that the British
could ever again "play the great role on the Western front." In Lloyd
George's view, the nature of Britain's military effort during the last
phase of the war would determine "the position of the British Empire
when ultimate victory" was achieved. He gave a graphic prognosis of
what would happen if Sir Henry's advice were followed: "We might
batter the enemy, and possibly they might have to sue for peace. What
would be the conditions when that occurred? America would have an
Army equivalent to 120 divisions, France perhaps 40, and the British
Empire perhaps 23. When Australia said she wanted the Pacific Is-
lands, or Palestine, President Wilson would look down his nose and
say: That he had entered the War with quite different ideas in view, he
would say he had his 120 divisions ready to continue the War, and he
would ask what assistance we could give." Before deciding "to put our
Army on the table next year and get it smashed to pieces" said Lloyd
George, "this consideration ought to be very carefully weighed."38
Although Hughes, the Australian prime minister, strongly dis-
sented, the Committee of Prime Ministers favored deploying a good
part of Britain's remaining military strength away from the West, both
as a guarantee of a settlement in the interests of the British Empire and
as a protection against Germany if it stood on the defensive in the West
and concentrated on the East in 1919.39 If Lloyd George had his way,
Hankey recorded in his diary, the British commitment to the western
front would be halved by 1919, with the surplus divisions employed in
Italy, in Salonika, or against Turkey. "This of course will get us into
great difficulties with our allies," Hankey admitted.40
While his political superiors were discussing diminishing his force
for use in other theaters, Haig, in consultation with Foch, moved
forward his preparations for a surprise attack against the Germans at
Amiens. The government received its first indication that something
was afoot on August 1, when Borden, the Canadian prime minister,
informed the civilians that he had been "told in confidence and great
secrecy" that the Canadian Army Corps was being deployed for an
offensive.41
The ministers were shocked, especially when the CIGS denied any
knowledge of a forthcoming operation. The last time he had seen Foch,
Sir Henry insisted, the generalissimo had talked of a German attack
rather than any Allied offensive. The worried statesmen then dis-
cussed their ability to control Haig, who was under the strategic
control of Foch. As Smuts had exclaimed the previous day, if Foch
planned a great offensive, "the British Government should have a very
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serious talk with him." It was agreed that the government could not
stand by helplessly if Foch countenanced large-scale attacks.42
Instructed by the ministers to discover Foch's intentions, General
Wilson reported on August 6 that "it was difficult to say exactly what
General Foch's forthcoming operations would be." The Frenchman
said he planned to keep the pressure on the retreating Germans, but so
far as Wilson knew, "General Foch did not intend to undertake any
considerable operations."43
Two days later, at 4:20 A.M., 2,000 big guns opened fire in the
Amiens salient. Rawlinson's Fourth Army jumped off, assisted by
French troops on its right. The forces of the British Empire swept
forward in a dense mist, with the Canadian Corps on the right, the
Australian Corps in the center and the British on the left. Supported by
massed tanks and air cover, the BEF took 16,000 prisoners and 200 guns
within two hours. By noon the advance had surged forward nine
miles. It was the BEF's best day of the war, the German army's worst.
Haig's triumph at Amiens did not go unrecognized in London. Sir
Henry Wilson delivered glowing reports on the BEF's progress. Milner
tried to put British losses in correct perspective, telling the Committee
of Prime Ministers that after four days' fighting Haig reported only
20,000 casualties out of some 150,000 men engaged against the Ger-
mans. The British had actually captured almost as many Germans as
they had suffered casualties.44
Always the optimist, Haig thought his success suggested that the
war could be ended in 1918 if the Allies continued their offensive
pressure into the fall. He told Winston Churchill, then minister of
munitions that "[we] ought to do our utmost to get a decision this
autumn. We are engaged in a 'wearing out battle,' and are outlasting
and beating the enemy."45 Lloyd George was unconvinced. Fearing
that the BEF would wear out along with the German army he told
Hankey that he did "not take a very sanguine view of our military
prospects, in spite of recent success."46 Haig's resumption of the
offensive had not only seized the strategical initiative fom Ludendorff;
it also threatened to dictate war policy to the civilians for the remainder
of the war. If Haig continued his offensive, the BEF's losses were
bound to be huge—and irreplaceable. With Haig's casualties for Au-
gust exceeding 100,000, the prime minister believed that his fears were
coming true.47 The inevitable result, even with ultimate victory, which
he did not think possible in 1918, would be that the British Empire
would see its political influence shrink along with its army.48
The prospect of massive casualties weighed heavily on the minds
of the Empire statesmen as they discussed future war plans in mid-
August. Their preliminary policy draft was overwhelmingly Lloyd
Georgian in tone. It emphasized military operations away from the
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western front and opposed Sir Henry Wilson's advocacy of limited
attacks in the West in 1918 as prelude to a decisive victory in 1919: "If we
are to enter upon a great offensive next year we should conserve our
Army for that purpose, give it rest, and bring it to the highest possible
pitch of training, in order that it may combine with the American Army
which is now being built up in whatsoever operations it is decided to
utilise." It also noted that "the husbanding of our man-power has
become a consideration on which the whole future of our Empire
depends."49
When this preliminary draft was discussed by the prime ministers
on August 16, Hughes, the blunt-speaking Australian, said what was
on everyone's mind. If the draft were adopted, "the position would be
very delicate as regards our Allies. It would be difficult to tell France
and our other Allies that we now preferred to look after ourselves and
to draw the line as to the number of troops we would place at stake." 50
It was equally true that Britain, by withholding her military resources if
military events took a decisive turn in the favor of the Allies, might
prolong the war. Lloyd George had to admit that if the Allies were on
the verge of defeating the German army, the British could not hold
back. But at this time, he obviously did not believe that Haig's steady
advance on the Somme in August portended victory in 1918, and
perhaps not even in 1919.51 The formidable Hindenburg Line, with its
ten-mile deep defensive system, remained to be conquered.52
The checkmating of Germany on the Marne might in fact endanger
the Empire if Ludendorff adopted a defensive posture in the West and
concentrated on expansion in the East. "Nobody concerned in this war
except ourselves has any interest in Asia," is the way Smuts expressed
this fear. The South African leader also warned against fighting the
war "to the absolute end, because I think that, although that end will
be fatal to the enemy, it may possibly be fatal to us too." In that case,
the United States and Japan would be the great winners.53
By linking the indirect strategy favored by Lloyd George and the
Milnerites to a compromise peace that would leave German power
intact in Europe, Smuts was being logical. The prime minister and
many other British leaders, although determined to prevent the British
army and economy from being reduced to second-rate status, paradox-
ically clung to the hope of military victory. Only American manpower
could prevent their war policy from being impaled on the horns of this
tormenting dilemma. In desperation, Lloyd George sought to revive
amalgamation, which to Pershing was akin to lighting a match in a
room full of gas. Washington, which had emphasized the shipping of
men rather than their supplies, was amassing a vast force in Europe yet
did not have the required cargo transport to supply this force. If the
Americans could not maintain the eighty divisions, Lloyd George told
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the Imperial War Cabinet, "it would be better to fit them into our
organisation."54 He had in mind an American army of from fifty to
sixty divisions with the surplus assigned to Anglo-French forces and
becoming a part of their existing logistical systems.55
The War Office and GHQ BEF, quite sensibly, had long since
abandoned any thought of feeding American troops into British divi-
sions. Radcliffe, the General Staff's director of military operations,
argued that "it would be a most shortsighted and mistaken policy to
put any obstacle in the way of General Pershing [in creating his own
army]."56 When brought into the Imperial War Cabinet's discussions,
he bluntly told the civilians that "it would be wrong to give the
Americans the impression that we were trying to tie them to our apron
strings." Yanks cooperating with the BEF offered the British their best
hope of receiving direct American assistance. The War Office, in fact,
was at this time discussing with Griscom the possibility of Britain's
assuming responsibility for supplying, from Dunkirk, an American
army in the British sector. Any American force so dependent upon
British supply lines would, of course, be under Haig's strategic con-
trol.57
This was the field marshal's hope and expectation. He agreed with
Foch's conception of a broad Allied offensive stretching from Verdun
on the Meuse River to the North Sea.58 Instead of a series of limited
blows by each army against separate German salients (Foch's con-
ception), however, Haig wanted to go for the jugular. "The eccentric
was to be made concentric," Brigadier General John Charteris has
explained.59 Haig wanted the French and the American First Army to
treat the front from Verdun almost to the North Sea as one great
salient, attacking it on its flanks or shoulders.
Haig's ambitious strategic goal for the BEF was to rupture the
lateral German rail communications, through either their capture or
their neutralization under artillery fire. Without these vital rail com-
munications, the German army would be unable to maintain its posi-
tion in France and Belgium.
The Scotsman was willing to risk an attack against the hitherto
impregnable Hindenburg Line because he believed that his forces
represented the best chance the Allies had for victory over the German
army in the near future. He gave no thought to a war prolonged until
1920; on one of Sir Henry Wilson's memoranda that talked of future
military operations, he commented, "What rubbish! Who will last till
1920—only America?!"60
Although Haig accepted that the Empire must bear the brunt of the
fighting, he knew his government could not replace his losses. An
integral part of his offensive strategy was the utilization of at least one
American corps on his front. He was thus unable to conceal his
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exasperation when Pershing informed him on August 12 that as soon
as the Amiens offensive, in which only one American regiment had
participated, was over, he was probably going to withdraw his five
divisions still training with the BEF. Curiously, Haig initially kept this
unhappy information to himself. On August 22 Lord Milner learned
informally from General Rawlinson that Pershing had begun to move
American divisions out of the British zone. He was furious, telling
Griscom that their removal was "premature and the manner of re-
moval without consultation showed want of consideration" for both
him and the prime minister. Sir Henry Wilson was, if anything, even
more upset, "so angry that he can hardly speak civilly to me," Griscom
reported to Pershing.61
The prime minister was having no better success in using shipping
as a weapon in his negotiations with the French. On August 18 he
received an uncompromising letter from Clemenceau which expressed
concern over actions "tending to show that British Empire has arrived
at end of sacrifices which it could make in common cause." Did not
Lloyd George realize, Clemenceau stressed, that a satisfactory political
settlement depended upon the British Empire's doing its fair share?
Otherwise the American military effort would give Wilson the upper
hand in the peace settlement.62
Having joined the battle, Lloyd George was not inclined to retreat.
He ordered the War, Shipping, and Foreign offices to make no new
pledges on American troop and cargo transport. He also emphasized
that existing arrangements to ship American troops lasted only
through December 1918.63 Since early August, the American govern-
ment had known of Lloyd George's threat to reduce the flow of
American troops and supplies across the Atlantic. The French had
given Pershing a copy of Lloyd George's August 2 letter to Clemen-
ceau. Believing his 1919 war-winning Lorraine strategy imperiled, the
American field commander immediately cabled Baker requesting "an
early and complete understanding with the British Government on
this subject." Informed by Baker that Lloyd George's shocking letter
was possibly not a final decision, but rather a negotiating ploy with the
French, President Wilson agreed with Pershing that shipping arrange-
ments with the British must be resolved, and soon. "This is serious,"
he wrote Baker, "and how characteristic after urging the 100 division
programme! We must now insist that the decision be definite and final
as to what they can do. Would that we were dealing with responsible
persons!"64
Lloyd George's threat to reduce shipping, if serious, would
gravely undermine American military prospects for 1919, in part be-
cause of continued setbacks in American merchant ship construction.
Not until the last months of 1918, when some hundred hulls were being
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completed every day, did American shipbuilding hit its stride.65 The
British estimated that it would be March 1919 at the earliest before
America would have the shipping to supply eighty divisions in Eu-
rope.66
The American leadership, with Wilson's war cabinet reviewing the
Allied advance on maps at the War Department, sensed victory in mid-
August. Bliss reported from Versailles: "Everything now points to
favorable conditions for launching a conclusive campaign on the west-
ern front next year, and if enemy's resistance is crushed on this front it
will cease everywhere." Believing that victory would come through
American "troops, supplies and money," Bliss urged Washington to
put pressure on the British through Foch. "If Marshall Foch will state
that the 80 division program gives reasonable assurance of a final
campaign next year I feel sure that United States can demand and
secure the necessary tonnage." 67 Unless the British promised to make
up for American transport deficiency, the future American military
role would be plunged into uncertainty.
"There must be a show-down on this subject," Baker wrote the
president, who accepted the suggestion that his secretary of war go
to Europe to make possible the implementation of the eighty-division
program.68 On August 31, Baker left for France on a troopship.
As Baker departed the United States, Lord Reading served as
Lloyd George's emissary to the French. Having finally abandoned any
hope of amalgamation, the prime minister focused on getting the
Americans to take over part of the British front, and his heavy-handed
approach to Foch and Clemenceau seemed to be having some effect.69
Pershing had removed only three of the remaining five American divi-
sions training behind British lines, and Foch agreed to place the two
divisions left under Haig's command on the "active Battle front."70
When Lloyd George received this encouraging news, he took the
extraordinary step of having the CIGS instruct Haig to make prudent
use of these American forces. As he told Milner and Sir Henry Wilson,
"If the Americans got badly smashed up it would be as bad as in the
case of the Canadians [during Passchendaele], since in that case Gen-
eral Pershing would never send any more men to the British line."71
Lloyd George was convinced that in 1919 the American army would
"take a large slice of the front now occupied by our troops." 72 But until
he had a firm commitment on this, he was, as he informed Reading,
prepared to withhold "further assistance in the matter of shipping"
beyond December.73
Reading had taken with him to Paris a letter from the prime
minister that made a strong defense of Britain's contributions to the
Allied war effort. "I venture to believe that history will record that no
nation engaged in this war has made a more complete or unreserved
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use of their resources in man-power and material for the Allied cause
than the people of Great Britain," Lloyd George asserted. He stressed
that the "reserves of the Allied army are in America."74 The French,
however, continued to argue that Britain had to maintain its existing
divisions in France, if not in ration strength, at least in total number.75
Pershing was only dimly aware of this controversy that separated
the British and French political leadership during Reading's visit to
France from August 31 to September 8. He had a more important
matter on his mind, the launching of his long-planned offensive to
reduce the St. Mihiel salient. He shifted First Army headquarters to
Ligny-en-Barrois— about twenty-five miles southeast of St. Mihiel—
and began to mass his scattered divisions, collecting three corps of
fourteen divisions, or some 550,000 troops, for the first ail-American
offensive of the war.
On August 30, however, the generalissimo in person showed up at
Ligny with an abrupt change of plans. As Sir Henry Wilson explained
to Milner and Lloyd George in London, Foch planned to "employ part
of the American forces with the British and part with the French,
leaving only one Army under General Pershing's command."76 This
scheme, of course, would divide Pershing's forces and undermine his
plan to win the war in 1919 with a great attack in Lorraine, especially if
the initial phase of this American offensive, the reduction of the St.
Mihiel salient in 1918, was abandoned. In the Haig-Foch plan, Amer-
ican forces would combine with the French on the right shoulder of
this bulge, driving northwest between the Meuse and Aisne rivers
toward M6zieres and Sedan, with the British on the left shoulder in the
area of Cambrai.77 To Allied generals, who had high praise for Amer-
ican troops but disdain for American staff work, this plan offered the
best prospect for victory. As General Wilson told Lloyd George and
Milner, if General Pershing insisted on attacking with only American
troops, he would either "meet the Germans in large numbers in
strongly fortified positions, and suffer heavy casualties," or his ad-
vance would collapse "at a relatively early stage, owing to inadequate
staff work."78
Pershing was stunned. "But Marshal Foch," he said with feeling,
"here on the very day that you turn over a sector to the American
Army, and almost on the eve of an offensive, you ask me to reduce the
operation so that you can take away several of my divisions and assign
some to the French Second Army and use others to form an American
army to operate on the Aisne in conjunction with the French Fourth
Army, leaving me with little to do except hold what will become a quiet
sector after the St. Mihiel offensive." When Foch asked him soldier-to-
soldier if he wished to "take part in the battle," Pershing shot back,
"Most assuredly, but as an American Army and in no other way." At
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one point, Pershing became so angry that he thought of striking the
generalissimo.79
On September 2 Pershing, Petain, and Foch effected a compro-
mise. Pershing was allowed to launch his St. Mihiel offensive, but as
soon as it was concluded, he had to extend his front to the Argonne
Forest, a distance of approximately sixty miles. With most of the
American forces in Europe under his command, he would then partici-
pate in the converging Allied attacks with an offensive scheduled for
late September in the Meuse-Argonne sector.80
Pershing's understanding with Foch has been criticized on several
grounds. It was asking too much of Pershing's green corps and army
staffs to launch a great attack, immediately disengage, and then in
some two weeks assemble a powerful strike force many miles to the
north for a second big offensive. Moreover, Pershing chose a theater,
the area between the Argonne Forest and the Meuse River, which had
limited road communications and was deemed by Colonel Hugh
Drum, the First Army's chief of staff, the "most ideal defensive terrain I
have ever seen or read about."81 But Pershing took these considerable
risks because his objectives were as much political as they were mili-
tary. He was determined to keep most of the doughboys under Amer-
ican command in American-dominated operations, rather than utilize
them in joint operations where the AEF's accomplishments would be
blurred. As he told Marshal Foch on August 30, "Give me a sector
anywhere you decide, and I will take it over at once."82 Nor had he
abandoned his conception of a war-winning American offensive in the
direction of Metz, to which the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient
would be a prelude.
On September 12 Pershing finally got his chance to fight in his own
sector with his infantry-rich army. He had struck a hard bargain with
Foch over the support the French would provide the American First
Army: Foch agreed to assign some 110,000 French troops to his com-
mand. Allied material support for the AEF was even more impressive.
Breakdowns in American industrial mobilization and the decision to
ship infantry and machine gun units without their artillery meant that
Pershing was dependent upon the Allies for his modern weapons. The
First Army's 3,010 artillery pieces, airplanes, and 267 tanks came from
the Allied arsenal.
The timing of the AEF's attack could not have been more oppor-
tune. The Yanks fell on the Germans just as they were in the midst of a
planned withdrawal. In some thirty hours the battle was over except
for local operations that flickered on until September 16. Two hundred
square miles of French territory were liberated, 450 guns and 16,000
prisoners captured.
On September 13, Pershing and Secretary of War Baker met near
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the village of St. Mihiel to celebrate a great American triumph, both
political and military, which has been characterized as "the stroll at St.
Mihiel" or as "the sector where the Americans relieved the Germans."
Victory had indeed come with deceptive ease against a greatly out-
numbered and retreating foe. Nonetheless, an independent American
force under its own commanders, with its own tactics and its own
strategic objectives, had met and defeated elements from what was
still the world's greatest fighting force. The AEF, fighting 3,000 miles
from home, had made dramatic progress since its regiment-sized
attack against the village of Cantigny in May.
Pershing later argued that a great opportunity was lost when the
AEF stopped its advance at St. Mihiel to cooperate with Foch's and
Haig's concentric attacks, which shifted American resources north-
ward. "Without doubt, an immediate continuation of the advance
would have carried us well beyond the Hindenburg Line and possibly
into Metz" he wrote in his memoirs.83 Pershing's creation of an inde-
pendent American force at least six months earlier than Allied generals
had thought possible was a remarkable achievement that should not
be understated. But the First Army was a fighting force still in its
formative stages. American troops could not move or fight effectively
with massive traffic jams occurring, coordination of infantry and artil-
lery lacking, and command and control problems abounding. The
commander of the I Corps at St. Mihiel, Hunter Liggett, later provided
a realistic appraisal of Pershing's forces in September. "The possibility
of taking Metz and the rest of it, had the battle been fought on the
original plan, existed in my opinion, only on the supposition that our
army was a well-oiled, fully coordinated machine, which it was not as
yet."84
Germany had begun September in occupation of more French and
Russian territory than it had held in 1917, with an army of over
2,500,000, all its Allies still in the war, and its formidable defensive
position, the Hindenburg Line, intact. Defeat followed defeat, how-
ever, as the month progressed. Daily, Berlin's position became more
hopeless. In the Balkans the Allies collapsed the Bulgarian front with a
powerful offensive on September 15. Four days later "Bull" Allenby
launched a spectacularly successful British attack against Turkish de-
fenses near Megiddo. Supported by air power, horse soldiers main-
tained the momentum of the attack as the Turkish and German forces
fell to pieces in Palestine. Even before these dramatic successes on the
periphery, the War Office had assured the Eastern Committee on
September 11 that it would not be possible for the Germans "to take
advantage of the comparative cessation of military operations on the
Western front during the winter months to indulge in any big cam-
paign in the East."85
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The war news from Haig's command was also extremely good.
General Wilson told the War Cabinet of captured documents showing
that the Germans were "in a bad condition." As the British attacks at
Havrincourt and Epehy began on September 12 against the outer
defenses of the Hindenburg Line, the CIGS suggested that given "the
evidence of the last few weeks," no defensive position could "be
regarded as impregnable."86 On his own initiative, Haig visited the
War Office to persuade Milner that his continuous attacks constituted
the "beginning of the end" for the German army.87
Milner had heard similar expressions of confidence too many
times in the past not to be skeptical. He left London to inspect the war
up close. He found Foch full of praise for Haig's generalship. This was
no longer the Haig of the mud and blood of Passchendaele, Milner
reported to Lloyd George. Instead of "hammering away at a single
point" with distant objectives in mind, the new Haig had launched "a
series of successive attacks, all more or less surprises & all profitable"
with an economy of losses.88
British casualties mounted, however, as Haig's forces pressed
forward. From the Battle of Amiens, August 8, to the Armistice,
November 11, the BEF incurred some 350,000 casualties.89 Back in
London, Milner told Sir Henry Wilson that Haig was "ridiculously
optimistic." The lanky Irishman agreed, writing in his diary, "The Man
Power is the trouble & D H & Foch & Du Cane can't understand it."90
With the British secure in the East, Lloyd George no longer
thought of transferring divisions from the BEF to the outer theaters.91
The embarrassing Draft Report of the Committee of Prime Ministers
that was so at variance with American war policy (and the current
military situation!) was not signed but allowed to die a quiet death.
Instead, Foch's and the Americans' "western" strategy for the autumn
of 1918 and 1919 was ratified by the military representatives of the
SWC.92 When March gave Wilson a copy of this Joint Note No. 37,
dated September 10, 1918, the president responded, "I have read it
carefully and with not a little satisfaction."93
Lloyd George still did not expect the war to end in 1918, however,
and was no less concerned than before about the political conse-
quences should the British Empire enter peace negotiations with a
battered and diminished army in Western Europe. The British had
carried the weight of the war in 1918, while the role of the French was
reduced by the addition of American forces on their front.94 By the
time of the Armistice the French in fact held only forty miles of "active
front."95
With his thoughts on 1919, Lloyd George was prepared to con-
front Baker over the necessity of having more Yanks in the British
sector. As Bonar Law said of Lloyd George at this time, "He will only
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see one side of a question when he has made up his mind."96 In
negotiations with Reading and the Inter-Allied Maritime Council,
Baker had been discussing future British shipping obligations to the
AEF, especially cargo tonnage to supply the American troops, and
these talks—although delayed when Reading became ill with gout—
were nearing conclusion.97
On September 29 Lloyd George, who was himself recuperating
from influenza at Danny Park, reminded Maclay that he had the full
authority of the War Cabinet behind him and that he was acting as the
"trustee of the interests of the British soldier." He ordered that during
the discussions of the Inter-Allied Maritime Council, the shipping
controller pursue "relentlessly" the placement of more American
troops with the BEF.98 When Lloyd George sent Milner a copy of this
letter, he noted, that "the American Army is not to be used merely for
the relief of the French line whilst our men are left in an exhausted and
depleted condition to hold the mud through the winter."99
The American "show-down" with the British on the matter of
shipping finally occurred when Baker, at the prime minister's invita-
tion, drove to Danny Park on September 30. Although Griscom's
secondhand account is the only record of this confrontation, it has the
ring of truth in its essentials. After lunch, Lloyd George bitterly com-
plained about the small number of American troops in the British
sector.100 As far as Great Britain was concerned, he exclaimed, the
American army was "perfectly usless, and the shipping devoted to
bringing it over utterly wasted." In the face of the Welshman's violent
outburst, Baker did not blink. How could the prime minister say that
the American Army was "useless?" He had just returned from France,
where he had studied war maps showing that the AEF was opposed by
a considerable part of the German army. Baker then called Lloyd
George's bluff. "If you decide to withdraw your shipping," he coolly
told the Prime Minister, "I shall cable immediately to Washington to
cease sending troops on British ships, which may then be released at
once." Baker's message was crystal clear as his voice rose and his fist
thumped the table. Pershing's control and use of American forces was
nonnegotiable.101 The massive Meuse-Argonne Offensive, the largest
battle in American history, which had begun on September 26, gave
added force to his words.
On the way back to London, Reading told Baker: "Oh, by the way,
Mr. Secretary, the Prime Minister sent for me before we started and
asked me to excuse his not saying good-by. Incidentally, he also asked
me to say to you that you should think no more about the matter which
he raised for discussion after lunch."102
Subsequently, the Allied Maritime Transport Council, meeting at
Lancaster House October 1-2, recommended that no reduction in
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American troop transport take place for the remainder of the year, "in
spite of the grave condition of the import programmes." An additional
500,000 tons (which included 200,000 tons that had already been
arranged for in discussions between Baker and Reading)103 was di-
verted from imports to the American program from October through
December.104 On October 6 a triumphant Baker cabled Wilson: "Ton-
nage situation favorably cleared up."105
The single-minded determination of America's leaders to defeat
the German army in Western Europe had served to hold the alliance
together, simultaneously increasing Wilson's potential political influ-
ence. While Baker thwarted British efforts to place more American
troops on their front, President Wilson gave unequivocal notice that he
would send no more troops to northern Russia or cooperate with any
Allied effort to launch military operations in South Russia.106 Lloyd
George, playing what he thought was his trump card, British domi-
nance in shipping, had been completely routed in his efforts to harness
the American military role to British political and strategic objectives.
Just as American's shipping problems seemed resolved, Germany
cracked. On the night of October 3-4 the German government, accept-
ing the Fourteen Points as a basis for peace, appealed to President
Wilson for an armistice. Wilson told his secretary Joseph P. Tumulty
and Colonel House, "This means the end of the war."107 Serious
fighting still lay ahead—the German army remained capable of waging
a tenacious defensive struggle—but Wilson was right. With victory in
sight, attention increasingly shifted from the battlefield to the peace
settlement.
12
Pax Americana?
The war's unexpected conclusion in November could not have been
more advantageous to the British Empire's geopolitical goals. Nor
could the results from the worldwide battlefields have been more
surprising. As late as August the British political leadership, believing
that the war would not reach a climax in Western Europe until 1919 at
the earliest, had favored a conservative Continental military policy
designed to further imperial interests.
British arms in the outer theaters gave Lloyd George the strong
negotiating position he sought. Following the Battle of Megiddo in
Palestine in mid-September, Allenby's cavalry pursued the broken
enemy, advancing 350 miles in thirty-eight days. In the Mesopotamian
theater the British Empire's forces pushed north of Baghdad to Mosul.
Meanwhile, Baku was reoccupied and a British position established on
the Caspian Sea. With a peace settlement in mind, the War Cabinet
urged its eastern generals to secure control of as much Turkish terri-
tory as possible before the end of hostilities.1
To the initial discomfort of the Imperial War Cabinet, the BEF also
assumed the leading role in the Allied counteroffensives after the
Second Battle of the Marne. Lloyd George and most of the Empire
statesmen accepted the necessity of defeating the German army to get
a durable peace but were determined to husband British manpower. If
Foch's position as generalissimo had not protected Haig from Lon-
don's political interference, the BEF would not have been given per-
mission to launch its series of successful offensives. On the same day,
October 5, that President Wilson told House and Tumulty that Ger-
many's bid for peace through Washington meant an end to the war,
the BEF achieved one of its most dramatic successes, the breaching of
the final defenses of the famous Hindenburg Line. Some 35,000 pris-
oners and 380 guns were taken in a nine-day drive. This victory was
only one of the nine successive defeats inflicted upon the German
army by the BEF from August 8, the Battle of Amiens, to the last British
drive of the war, the Battle of Sambre, November 1-11. During this
glorious Hundred Days' Campaign, Haig's forces captured 2,840 guns
and 188,700 prisoners.
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These victories in both Europe and the Middle East had come
without employing a large American force in the British sector. Haig
advanced with the support of only two American divisions, organized
into a corps. When Pershing refused to replace American casualties
(some 13,182 men), Haig had to withdraw this corps from the line
on October 20. Although Pershing subsequently promised reinforce-
ments on October 23, he rejected the plea to bring Haig's American
Corps up to four divisions. This rationed American assistance to the
BEF continued to rankle the prime minister, who told the "X" Commit-
tee that with "250,000 men . . . being brought over every month, and
British ships alone . . .  carrying from 160,000 to 190,000 men a month,"
it was "preposterous that only 2 divisions were given to the British
Army."2
As British arms in September and October surpassed all expecta-
tions in Europe and elsewhere, the American First Army between the
Meuse River and the Argonne Forest proceeded at a crawl with heavy
losses. To reach the key German rail communications in the Sedan-
Mezieres region, the Americans had to overcome determined defen-
ders manning sophisticated and extensive fortifications along a narrow
front. "There was no elbow room," Drum, one of the AEF's most able
staff officers, has written. "We had to drive straight through."3
The First Army's staff hoped to exploit the AEF's material and
numerical superiority to achieve a breakthrough. Encouraged by the
easy American victory at St. Mihiel, AEF planners expected to ad-
vance ten miles within the first twenty-four hours of the attack. On
September 26 nine divisions, organized into three corps, attacked
along a twenty-mile front. Facing these double-strength American
divisions were five under-strength German divisions. With only four
of the nine American divisions ever having served in the line, how-
ever, the AEF's offensive soon faltered. Inexperienced units lost their
cohesion when faced with stiff German resistance. American logistics
bordered on total collapse. "Whether because of incompetence or
inexperience or both," Donald Smythe has asserted, "the First Army
was wallowing in an unbelievable logistical snarl. It was as if some-
one had taken the army's intestines out and dumped them all over
the table."4
The First Army tried again with a renewed offensive on October
4-5. Rather than the open warfare with "bayonet fighters" that Per-
shing had envisaged, the conflict resembled the attrition battles that
had characterized most of the earlier fighting on the western front. The
AEF advanced eleven kilometers on September 26. During the next
three weeks, the advance covered only five kilometers. The combina-
tion of limited advance with mounting casualties took its toll on Per-
shing. Driving near the front, he momentarily broke down, holding
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his head and uttering his dead wife's name. "Frankie . . . Frankie . . .
my God, sometimes I don't know how I can go on."5
Before the autumn of 1918 the United States had succeeded bril-
liantly in fitting its political objectives to its role in the land war.
Wilson's political and Pershing's military independence had been
maintained, goals that were intimately connected with dominating the
peace settlement. In September and October, however, America's
growing political and military influence was in some respects being
neutralized by the march of military events.
Yet President Wilson conducted peace talks as if he held Britain's
fate as well as Germany's in his hands. Despite the enormous casu-
alties that the British had suffered in wearing down the German army,
they were not consulted before Wilson responded to Germany's en-
treaties for peace. Colville Barclay, the British charge d'affaires in
Washington, reported to the Foreign Office that during a dinner in
honor of Sir Eric Geddes the president had given no hint of the
response he planned to make to the first German note. Smiling, he had
only suggested that his "position was a difficult one, as the Central
Powers were professing to be accepting his own terms."6
And the Allies would, too, if Wilson had his way. Urged by House
to "try to commit the Allies to some of the things for which we are
fighting" before victory was in their grasp,7 Wilson had delivered an
important speech on war aims on September 27 at a Liberty Loan drive
in New York city. The European nations were warned that the United
States wanted a "permanent" peace that could only be made without
"any kind of compromise or abatement" of Wilson's liberal principles.
The Allies were invited to join the president in making a peace that
would reflect the "final triumph of justice and fair dealing."8
In responding to Berlin's peace feeler, Wilson knew that he was
walking through a political mine field, both at home and abroad.9 His
powerful enemies Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt were
campaigning hard for German "unconditional surrender," a position
that had considerable popular appeal with the war-aroused American
public. Wilson feared that he might damage Democratic chances in the
forthcoming congressional elections if he were successfully portrayed
as favoring a soft policy toward the Hun. The Allies were no less
concerned that weakness on his part might alter the whole military and
political situation that seemed to be turning so dramatically against
Berlin.
These considerations, however, were almost certainly outweighed
in Wilson's mind by what appeared a heaven-sent opportunity to
impose his peace program on the Allies as well as the enemy. Hoping
to create a balanced environment for a liberal peace, Wilson resur-
rected his formula of stopping the war short of the total victory. "He
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Woodrow Wilson leads the victory parade. "All together now, boys!"
From Life, December 5,1918.
wants," Lodge correctly charged in the Senate, "to be the great world
figure in making the peace. If Germany surrenders unconditionally,
he will only share in making the peace with the Allies. His hold over
the Allies is the German Army in existence, which makes our Army
and our alliance indispensable."10 Wilson's realpolitik, however, was
faulty. What the president did not grasp was that the war's prolonga-
tion would make America supreme in the land war. If the AEF deliv-
ered the final and decisive blows as Pershing planned, the war would
end with America dominant militarily as well as economically.
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The president's tentative response to Berlin on October 8 probably
reflected House's advice: "delay without seeming so."11 Berlin was
asked to accept his peace plan, spelled out in the Fourteen Points and
subsequent speeches, and to limit any further discussion to the "prac-
tical details of their application." Wilson also insisted upon stiff condi-
tions for agreeing to an armistice: Germany's withdrawal from all
conquered territory.12
Lloyd George had retired for the night on October 12 when Ger-
many's response to Wilson's queries was received in Britain. Return-
ing from having delivered the news, the prime minister's private
secretary, Philip Kerr, was quoted as reporting: "There is awful lan-
guage going on upstairs. I can tell you! He thinks that the Allies are
now in a devil of a mess. Wilson has promised them an armistice."13
Lloyd George was especially annoyed by Wilson's arrogant and uni-
lateral approach to peacemaking.
On October 14, after breakfast, the president and House discussed
America's response to the German peace note of October 12. House
had never seen Wilson "more disturbed. He said he did not know
where to make the entrance in order to reach the heart of the thing. He
wanted to make his reply final so there would be no exchange of notes.
It reminded him, he said, of a maze. If one went in at the right
entrance, he reached the center, but if one took the wrong turning, it
was necessary to go out again and do it over."14 Believing that he was
on the verge of reshaping the world, Wilson responded positively to
Berlin but insisted on even tougher terms for an armistice: the existing
military supremacy of the United States and the Allies must be guaran-
teed.
Wilson's effort to define the basis for a good peace forced London
to confront the unhappy prospect that British influence on any peace
settlement might be considerably diminished.15 The British deeply
resented any implication that the president represented the forces of
light against the forces of darkness in international affairs. When The
Times correspondent in Washington, for example, in his October 19
comments on Wilson's political offensive, noted that the American
leader stood "for peace with justice" and a peace "free from any taint of
an old-fashioned, secret and revengeful diplomacy," the War Cabinet
reacted with indignation. The British, Lloyd George stressed, had
taken the lead in 1918 in redefining Allied war objectives. Wilson's
Fourteen Points address echoed much of what Lloyd George had
already expressed three days earlier on January 5.16
Two issues that threatened to divide London and Washington
were Wilson's precise interpretation of the freedom of the seas—the
second of his Fourteen Points—and his views on the fate of the
German colonies, which was of particular concern to the Dominions.
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Freedom of navigation on the seas would be fiercely resisted if it
undermined the security of the British Isles and communications with
the British Empire. As for Germany's overseas territories, Cecil ex-
pressed the British dilemma succinctly: "While undoubtedly a great
case" had been made against returning the colonies, it was "not so easy
to make out the case for our keeping them."17
British imperialists, it must be remembered, were convinced that
their Empire was the world's greatest civilizing force and the founda-
tion of future global stability. In the summer of 1918, when Allied for-
tunes were uncertain, the Imperial War Cabinet had divided roughly
into two camps over how the British Empire should deal with Amer-
ica's emergence as a global power. Lloyd George, Lord Reading,
Borden, and others had wanted to enlist American support for the
Empire's civilizing mission (and its future security) by giving Wash-
ington the administration of some Turkish and German territories: for
example, Palestine and German East Africa. "The more it [is] possible
to get the United States to undertake responsibility in world affairs,"
Borden had asserted, "the better for the world as a whole and for the
British Empire."18 Curzon, Hughes, Amery, and other avid imperi-
alists, however, were opposed to allowing Wilson to dictate to the
British in imperial matters. Their position was generally summarized
by Curzon: "My view is that the salvation of the dark places consists in
having them under British rule. It is rather unpopular to state this, and
at a Peace Conference it may even be impossible to state it, but I
deprecate the idea that when the time comes we are to sit still and take
what President Wilson offers us. If he says: 'I cannot have you British
there,' I am not prepared to say: 'AH right, we are quite willing to
disappear from the scene, you take our place.'"19
British fears of a serious Anglo-American division over the future
of conquered German and Turkish territories were somewhat allayed
by Wilson's comments to Wiseman on October 16. The president
expressed opposition to returning the captured colonies to Germany
and suggested that he would be happy to see them administered by
the British, "whose Colonial government [is] in many respects a model
for the world." The only catch was that the British should administer
these territories as a trustee for the proposed League of Nations, a
cover for controlling the enemy's former territories that already had
support in London.20
The peace process accelerated when Berlin accepted Washington's
latest and tougher terms. On October 22 Wilson candidly informed his
Cabinet that he planned to force the Allies to discuss peace on his
terms. Wilson and others believed that if the war continued until
Germany was beaten flat, the Allies would be encouraged to demand
harsh and vindictive terms.21 An unanswered question, of course, was
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whether America's contributions to the land war really gave Wilson
the commanding position he sought over the Allies. As Wilson con-
ferred with his Cabinet, House was on his way to Europe to bind the
Allies to a Wilsonian peace.
With matters coming to a head, the British struggled with two
difficult and related questions. First, should an armistice be accepted
that would save Germany from experiencing invasion and total defeat?
Second, how could Wilson be prevented from gaining a prepon-
derance of influence on the peace settlement? Understandably, the
British believed that they had earned the right to a peace in the
interests of the British Empire. At the same time, London wanted to
avoid a split with Washington that would jeopardize the peace and
stability of the postwar world.
Lloyd George once again embraced his full-blooded version of a
"knock-out blow" and was inclined toward invading the German
fatherland and dictating terms. "At the first moment when we were in
a position to put the lash on Germany's back she said, 'I give up, '" he
contemptuously noted. The question was "whether we ought not to
continue lashing her as she . . . lashed France." 22 Given the later Nazi
"stab in the back" myth, there was, in fact, a good deal to be said for the
Allied invasion of Germany that would convincingly demonstrate the
defeat of the German army.
Lloyd George, however, found little support for his hard-line
position. Haig, supported by the CIGS, told the civilians that the
Germans were not yet decisively defeated.23 "In my opinion the Ger-
man Army is capable of retiring to its own frontiers and holding that
line against equal or even superior forces," he told the "X" Committee
on October 19, 1918. According to Haig, the French Army was war-
weary; the AEF was hopelessly disorganized; and the BEF, taking into
account its heavy losses, was incapable of smashing what was left of
the German army on its own. If an armistice were not signed, Germany
would be able to "hold the line which [it] selects for defence for some
time after the campaign of 1919 commences."24
The pessimism of Haig, who is often criticized for being foolishly
optimistic about the German army's decline in 1916-17, is puzzling at
first glance. The General Staff's "Battle Situation Reports," which the
government received both before and during Haig's visit to London,
do not suggest that the resistance of the German army was stiffening or
that the steady British advance was slowing.25 On the other hand,
Haig realized that his tired and depleted forces were nearing the end of
their tether. His assessment of the military situation was apparently
intended to discourage unreasonable armistice terms that might pro-
voke the Germans to fight on.26 Within the next few weeks the arrival
of rain and mud might deny his troops victory in 1918. If a 1919
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campaign proved necessary, Haig's forces, whose losses could not be
replaced, would take second place to the AEF, an army now larger
than the BEF and continuing to grow. With the AEF delivering the final
and decisive blows to the Kaiser's army the magnificent advance of the
BEF during the last months of 1918 would be forgotten; instead, the
glory and added political influence would fall to the Americans. On
several occasions in 1918 Haig had expressed the belief that it would be
to the British Empire's advantage to stop the fighting while the BEF still
had the best fighting force in the anti-German coalition; otherwise, the
Americans might be in a military position to dominate the peace
settlement.27
Haig's nightmare was in fact Pershing's dream. The AEF's lead-
ership had long been building toward 1919. Once the Americans
dominated the battlefield, Pershing contemplated replacing Foch as
generalissimo; he told a staff officer in October that the "command
should go to an American."28 Pershing's faith in his 1919 plans, bol-
stered by the enormous increase in his forces after the German offen-
sives began in March, almost certainly explains his unexpected and
shocking stand on October 30 at an inter-Allied meeting to consider
armistice terms. The American field commander submitted a letter to
the SWC that emphasized America's growing military presence in
Europe and advocated continuing the war until Germany accepted un-
conditional surrender.29
Baker and Wilson were enraged at Pershing's attitude, so at vari-
ance with the administration's desire for a moderate armistice before
Berlin's armed forces lost all power of resistance. "Too much success or
security on the part of the Allies will make a genuine peace settlement
exceedingly difficult if not impossible," the president had just cabled
House.30
It has been suggested that Pershing's intent was to guarantee
harsh armistice terms rather than to seek unconditional surrender on
the battlefield.31 It is much more likely that Pershing, sensitive to
Allied criticisms of the performance of his forces, still wanted the war
to end through an American offensive in Lorraine. Attempting to
justify his position to House, he wrote: "I am of the opinion that we
shall not be able in case of an armistice to reap the benefits of a decided
victory which has not yet altogether been accomplished."32 Certainly
if hostilities had ended on October 30, when Pershing submitted his
letter to the SWC, the AEF would have shown a marked lack of
accomplishment in its Meuse-Argonne Offensive.
On November 1, however, the greatest American force ever as-
sembled broke through the German defenses. During the next ten
days, in what Pershing grandiosely called "probably the most impor-
tant operation that has been undertaken by the allies on the Western
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front," the Yanks advanced farther than they had during the previous
month.33 When the fighting ended on November 11, Griscom dis-
covered a curiously deflated Pershing at Chaumont. Minutes before
the Armistice went into effect at 11:00 A.M., Pershing, using a map on
his office wall, talked about the precise details of the American plan to
take Metz, which now would never be implemented. "What an enor-
mous difference a few days more would have made!" he exclaimed.34
If Wilson was angered by Pershing's opposition to the armistice,
considering him "glory mad," 35 Lloyd George was no less taken aback
by Haig's pessimism. As he told Lord Riddell, "If the Commander-in-
Chief is tired out, what must the Army be?"36 Sir Henry Wilson's
newly completed plan for a campaign in southeastern Europe to defeat
Austria-Hungary and then invade Germany, however, may have mo-
mentarily encouraged Lloyd George to hold out for Germany's de-
cisive defeat.37 If Sir Henry's plan for an Allied invasion through
Germany's back door ended the war, the prime minister's controver-
sial "eastern" strategy would be completely vindicated. But Lloyd
George found no support within his government for prolonging the
war in order to "crush" Germany and obtain "better security for peace
for the future."38 His colleagues now believed that they possessed a
negotiating position beyond anything anticipated a few months ear-
lier.
General Smuts's views apparently proved decisive. In a memoran-
dum circulated to the king and the war cabinet, he argued: "The salient
fact to remember is that, as matters now stand, this great result has been
achieved largely by the unexampled war effort of the British Empire.
On land and sea and in the air the great turn of the tide of war in the
summer and autumn of this year has been due to the supreme British
effort. If peace comes now, it will be a British peace, it will be a peace
given to the world by the same Empire that settled the Napoleonic
wars a century ago." Conversely, if the war were prolonged for an-
other year, the "centre of gravity" would shift to the United States,
which would become the "diplomatic dictator of the world." Lord
Reading strongly supported this position during a meeting of the War
Cabinet on October 26: "At present it [is] in the main America and the
British Empire that [are] dominating the situation, and we [are] in a
position to hold our own. . . . by continuing the War it might become
more difficult for us to hold our own."39
With no other great power in the world did Britain find such a
commonality of interests as with the United States. Yet the British
wanted to speak for themselves and not have President Wilson as-
sume, as Lloyd George expressed it, that he was "the great arbiter of
the war." 40 The British had sacrificed too much blood and treasure not
to expect that their relations with Wilson should be based on political
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equality. This attitude best explains the increasingly derogatory re-
marks made by British political and military leaders about the AEF's
contributions to the land war in Europe. The American army, Haig told
the political leadership on October 19, "is disorganised, ill-equipped
and ill-trained with very fewN.C.O.'s and officers of experience. It has
suffered severely through ignorance of modern war and it must take at
least a Year before it becomes a serious fighting force."41 For his part,
Lloyd George characterized the AEF as an "amateur army" suffering
enormous casualties because of poor leadership. Under these circum-
stances, the Americans' view that they were winning the war was
especially galling. The American Press were sending out "the most
absurd accounts of the prowess of their Army," and Wilson was
"probably being misled." In his last note, he had spoken of "the
supremacy of the troops of the United States of America and their
Allies, or some such phrase."42 If the Germans sued for peace, Lloyd
George insisted, it would be because of the "splendid" Grand Fleet
that had "provided the essential foundation of victory," and the victo-
ries of the BEF, which was now "the finest fighting force in the field." 43
The only credit the British were prepared to give Pershing in October
was that his offensive on the strategically important southern end of
the front had pinned down German forces that could not then be used
against the Allies.44
The British leadership pressed Clemenceau and Foch to make the
limited success of the AEF an issue with the American political lead-
ership—ostensibly to ensure that the AEF would in the future "pull its
proper weight."45 Just as important, however, the British were not so
subtly making the point that Germany sought an end to the fighting
more because of British than American military power. Clemenceau
apparently needed no urging to speak his mind about Pershing. He
had already sent a letter to Foch, dated October 21, accusing the
American commander of "marking time" since the beginning of the
Meuse-Argonne Offensive. "Nobody can maintain that these fine
[American] troops are unusable; they are merely unused," he harshly
noted.46
This was hardly fair. The AEF earned a measure of redemption in
November with its long and rapid advance as German resistance
crumbled on the battlefield and on the home front. During the Meuse-
Argonne campaign, from September 26 to November 11, the AEF,
committing twenty-two of its twenty-nine combat divisions, advanced
thirty-two miles to the north and fourteen miles to the northeast in
forty-seven days of continuous assault. Suffering a loss of 120,000
casualties (25,000 killed in action), the AEF captured some 26,000
prisoners, 874 guns, and 3,000 machine guns.47
America's greatest contribution to victory, however, was its ex-
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traordinary response to the German bid for victory in 1918. With over
2,000,000 troops in Western Europe by November, the United States
had surpassed all Allied expectations, and the psychological con-
sequences of the rapidly expanding American presence in Western
Europe were immense. As Vera Brittain writes in her recollections of
the war: "'Look! Look! Here are the Americans!' I pressed forward
with the others to watch the United States physically entering the War,
so god-like, so magnificent, so splendidly unimpaired in comparison
with the tired, nerve-racked men of the British Army. So these were
our deliverers at last, marching up the road to Camiers in the spring
sunshine."48
But the American land and naval part in bringing Germany to its
knees should not be exaggerated. The British believed that any com-
parison based on numbers was in their favor. Ships controlled by the
British had transported more than half of the Americans sent to Eu-
rope. At sea the Royal Navy enforced the blockade and dominated the
antisubmarine war; American warships could claim only four certain
"kills" of enemy submarines. In the air the U.S. Army Air Service
(which was dependent on foreign aircraft) constituted only 10 percent
of the air forces of the victorious powers on the western front. On land
the heaviest fighting in 1918 had been done by the British in absorbing
the first German blows in March and April and leading the counter-
offensive in September and October. The AEF's successes during only
110 days of extensive combat suffered by comparison. Doughboys also
had to rely on the Allies for modern armament, including tanks, high-
explosive shells, and (until the last weeks of the war) their automatic
weapons. According to Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett, who suc-
ceeded Pershing as commander of the First Army during the Meuse-
Argonne Offensive, his artillery (except for some 14-inch naval guns)
was totally dependent upon the Allies for its 4,000 big guns. Nor had
any of the shells expended been manufactured in America for the
AEF.49
The British confidently confronted President Wilson's spokesman,
Colonel House, in Paris on October 29 at a conference at the Quai
d'Orsay to discuss peacemaking. Lloyd George and Balfour had been
instructed by the War Cabinet to "make it perfectly clear to the Con-
ference that we do not accept the doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas,
and that a notification to this effect must be made in some form to
Germany before we entered into peace negotiations."50 Lloyd George
chose to make this point in dramatic fashion. When House threatened
the British with a separate peace, Lloyd George did not flinch. If the
United States made a separate peace, the British would be "sorry" but
could not give up the blockade, which enabled them to live. "As far as
the British Public is concerned, we will fight on."51
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Lloyd George clearly relished calling House's bluff and forcefully
making the point that London was not to be dictated to by Wash-
ington. Nevertheless, his government overwhelmingly believed that
Britain would never again be in a better position militarily to advance
British interests at a peace conference. Hence he was not about to
torpedo the peace progress, prolong the war, and cause an irreparable
schism with Washington if the British Empire's position in the postwar
settlement was protected.
The following day, the conference considered Lloyd George's
draft of the Allied reservations to the Fourteen Points. In addition to its
objection to the freedom of the seas, this document included a second
reservation concerning indemnities. Lloyd George stressed that Ger-
many was expected to pay for nonmilitary damages, which included
shipping losses. The prime minister also privately took up with House
the question of the British acquisition of enemy territories. Although
the president had already indicated to Wiseman that he would accept a
solution that gave Britain control of the German colonies, the Empire
statesmen pressed Lloyd George on this point. India and the Domin-
ions had provided 2,500,000 men to defend the British Empire. One
fifth of Haig's forces were Dominion troops, and imperial forces had
sustained the war on the periphery.52 Lloyd George therefore told
House that unless the Dominions were satisfied on the question of
certain German overseas territories, "Great Britain would be con-
fronted by a revolution." He also declared that Britain "would have to
assume a protectorate over Mesopotamia and perhaps Palestine."53
Having noted their reservations, the British were prepared to ac-
cept the Fourteen Points as a basis for the peace settlement. Wilson,
however, was loath to give an inch of freedom of the seas. This Anglo-
American impasse was broken when Lloyd George accepted a solution
that saved face for Washington. On November 3 he addressed a note to
House that expressed readiness to discuss freedom of the seas at the
forthcoming peace conference.54 Following the formal Allied accep-
tance of Wilson's peace plan with the exceptions of reparations and
freedom of the seas, House exuberantly cabled Wilson: "I consider that
we have won a great diplomatic victory in getting the Allies to accept
the principles laid down in your January eighth speech and in your
subsequent addresses. . . . I doubt whether any other [of the] heads
of the governments with whom we are55 have been dealing [quite]
realize how far they are now committed to the American peace pro-
gramme."56
On this same day Lloyd George gave a strikingly different version
of the pre-armistice negotiations to the Imperial War Cabinet: he told
the Empire statesmen that he had refused to accept the American
proposal on the freedom of the seas. Furthermore, having carefully
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studied the Fourteen Points and subsequent statements by President
Wilson, he said that he had not discovered "a single point which we
wanted that was not amply covered, with the exception of the points
regarding the freedom of the seas and indemnities, and of our position
in regard to these matters notice had been duly given."57 In sum, the
prime minister argued that the pre-Armistice discussions set the stage
for a peace settlement that was as much British as it was American. The
vagueness of Wilson's Fourteen Points, along with his apparent will-
ingness not to make trouble about Britain's territorial objectives, cer-
tainly helped in this respect. In the few cases where clear disagreement
surfaced, the British firmly stated their dissent. On the eve of the Paris
Peace Conference, then, the British had committed themselves to
nothing in the president's liberal peace objectives which threatened
the strategic interests of the British Empire.
The end of the war on November 11 found Britain with impressive
military achievements in Western Europe to match its triumphs in the
Middle East. The AEF's role in finishing the war seemed modest by
comparison. No Americans, only French and British officers, were
included when the German delegation signed the Armistice agree-
ment in Foch's railway car in the forest of Compiegne. If not for the
unexpected achievements of British arms during the last hundred days
of the war, the United States would have eventually achieved the
military dominance over Britain that it already enjoyed in the economic
realm. Whether Wilson's revolutionary diplomacy in that event would
have succeeded in creating a more stable world remains an argument
without end.
The British Empire seemed to have emerged from the war stronger
than ever. It had acquired vital overseas territory, and its only strategic
rival, Germany, had been vanquished. By default, the British Empire
was the world's only true global power. Yet although Great Britain
seemed destined to maintain its premier global position, time soon
proved that the British had been exhausted by the war, in spirit as well
as in its economy. Nationalistic unrest in Egypt, India, and Mesopo-
tamia, in addition to Arab-Jewish violence in Palestine, also brought
the last days of empire closer.
Despite America's and Britain's common struggle against Ger-
many, Wilson's substitution of moral for traditional diplomacy and his
self-appointed role as the peoples' spokesman militated against the
creation of a postwar Anglo-American partnership to maintain the
future peace and stability of the world. Wilson talked about interna-
tional law and universal rights, but his actions, even when the success
of collective security was at stake, were essentially designed to enable
the United States to control its own destiny. He placed the mainte-
nance of American freedom of action second only to the defeat of
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Germany. The imperial orientation of the British government and
Lloyd George's machinations also created a gulf between the two
Atlantic powers. President Wilson, naturally enough, did not link his
new world order to the furthering of the British Empire.
Although the United States had become a prodigious economic
power, its citizens favored a retreat into political isolation following
President Wilson's setbacks as a global peacemaker in 1919-20. The
political leadership looked inward and sought to defend American
interests independently of other powers. Yet American strategic and
political interests continued to parallel those of Great Britain more
closely than those of any other great power. The failure to achieve a
true Anglo-American partnership during and after the war thus repre-
sented a great setback to world stability, greater than the collapse of
the flawed League of Nations that emerged from the peace settlement.
With the European balance of power destroyed by the Great War, the
British government drew back from participation in another great
Continental war without the prospect of American assistance. Such
assistance was not forthcoming as Germany once again threatened
world peace in the 1930s.
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example, claims the capture of 26,000 prisoners, while Millett lowers the number of
POWs to 16,000. Recent examinations of the AEF's operational and tactical effec-
tiveness have been quite critical. See especially the important studies by Millett, "The
AEF and the American Strategy for Victory," Nenninger, "American Military Effec-
tiveness in the First World War," Smythe, Pershing, and Paul F. Braim, The Test of
Battle: The American Expeditionary Forces in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign (Newark,
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48. Vera Brittain, Testament of Youth: An Autobiographical Study of the Years 1900-1925
(New York, 1934), pp. 420-21.
49. Hunter Liggett, Commanding an American Army: Recollections of the World War
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50. WC (491 B), 26 October 1918, Cab 23/14.
51. Minutes of SWC, 29 October 1918, quoted in Czernin, Versailles, p. 26.
52. See French, British Way in Warfare, pp. 173,180.
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53. House to Wilson, 30 October 1918, WWP, 51:514. Lloyd George did not exagger-
ate Dominion apprehension. Concerned that reports of the SWC discussions contained
no mention of the German colonies, the War Cabinet telegraphed Lloyd George that the
Dominions' claim to "certain of them cannot possibly be waived." WC (495 A) 1 Novem-
ber 1918, Cab 23/14.
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